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The Economic Analysis of Advertising
Kyle Bagwell∗
This version: August 2005
“What makes the advertising issue fascinating...is that it is fundamentally an issue in how to
establish truth in economics.” (Phillip Nelson, 1974a)
1. Introduction
By its very nature, advertising is a prominent feature of economic life. Adver-
tising reaches consumers through their TV sets, radios, newspapers, magazines,
mailboxes, computers and more. Not surprisingly, the associated advertising ex-
penditures can be huge. For example, Advertising Age (2005) reports that, in 2003
in the U.S., General Motors spent $3.43 billion to advertise its cars and trucks;
Procter and Gamble devoted $3.32 billion to the advertisement of its detergents
and cosmetics; and Pfizer incurred a $2.84 billion dollar advertising expense for
its drugs. Advertising is big business indeed.
From the current perspective, it is thus surprising to learn that the major
economists of the 19th century and before paid little attention to advertising. The
economic analysis of advertising is almost entirely a 20th-century project. Why
didn’t 19th-century economists analyze advertising? Two reasons stand out.
First, 19th-century economic research is devoted largely to the development of
the theory of perfect competition, and this theory does not immediately suggest a
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role for advertising. As Pigou (1924, pp. 173-4) remarks, “Under simple competi-
tion there is no purpose in this advertisement, because, ex hypothesi, the market
will take, at the market price, as much as any one small seller wants to sell.” Of
course, whether a firm is competitive (i.e., price-taking) or not, it might advertise
if it were thereby able to shift its demand curve upward so that a higher price
could be obtained. But here a more basic problem arises: under the conventional
assumptions that consumers have fixed preferences over products and perfect in-
formation with regard to prices and qualities, there is no reason for consumers to
respond to advertising, and so the posited demand shift is unjustified.1
Second, while advertising has long been used by merchants, its transition to
“big business” is more modern. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, following
significant advances in transportation (railroads) and communication (telegraph)
networks, manufacturers were motivated to pursue innovations in the machin-
ery of production and distribution, so that economies of scale could be reaped.
These economies, however, could be achieved only if demand were appropriately
stimulated. The turn-of-the-century technological innovations that are associated
with mass production and distribution thus gave significant encouragement to
large-scale brand advertising and mass marketing activities.2
At the beginning of the 20th century, advertising was thus a ripe topic for
economic research. The economic analysis of advertising begins with Marshall
(1890, 1919), who oﬀers some insightful distinctions, and then gathers momentum
with Chamberlin’s (1933) integration of selling costs into economic theory. Over
the second half of the century, the economic analysis of advertising has advanced
at a furious pace. Now, following the close of the 20th century, a substantial
literature has emerged. My purpose here is to survey this literature.
In so doing, I hope to accomplish two objectives. A first objective is to organize
the literature in a manner that clarifies what is known.3 Of course, it is impossible
1As Braithwaite (1928, p. 28) explains: “Under conditions of perfect competition producers
would gain nothing by spending money on advertisement, for those conditions assume two things
- (1) that the demand curve is fixed and cannot be altered directly by producers, and (2) that
since producers can sell all that they can produce at the market price, none of them could
produce (at a given moment) more at that price than they are already doing.”
2The emergence of large-scale advertising is also attributable to income growth, printing
and literacy advances, and urbanization. See also Borden (1942), Chandler (1990), Harris and
Seldon (1962), Pope (1983), Simon (1970) and Wood (1958).
3Surprisingly, there does not appear to exist another contemporary and comprehensive survey
of the economic analysis of advertising. Various portions on the literature are treated in other
work. For example, Ekelund and Saurman (1988) oﬀer an interesting discussion of early views
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to summarize all of the economic studies of advertising. Following a century of
work, though, this seems a good time to bring to the surface the more essential
contributions and take inventory of what is known. Second, I hope to clarify how
this knowledge has been obtained. The economic implications of advertising are of
undeniable importance; however, the true nature of these implications has yielded
but slowly to economic analysis. There is a blessing in this. With every theoretical
and empirical methodological innovation in industrial organization, economists
have turned to important and unresolved issues in advertising, demonstrating
the improvements that their new approach oﬀers. Advertising therefore oﬀers
a resilient set of issues against which to chart the progress gained as industrial
organization methods have evolved.
It is helpful to begin with a basic question: Why do consumers respond to
advertising? An economic theory of advertising can proceed only after this ques-
tion is confronted. As economists have struggled with this question, three views
have emerged, with each view in turn being associated with distinct positive and
normative implications.
The first view is that advertising is persuasive. This is the dominant view
expressed in economic writings in the first half of the 20th century. The persuasive
view holds that advertising alters consumers’ tastes and creates spurious product
diﬀerentiation and brand loyalty. As a consequence, the demand for a firm’s
product becomes more inelastic, and so advertising results in higher prices. In
addition, advertising by established firms may give rise to a barrier to entry,
which is naturally more severe when there are economies of scale in production
and/or advertising. The persuasive approach therefore suggests that advertising
can have important anti-competitive eﬀects, as it has no “real” value to consumers,
but rather induces artificial product diﬀerentiation and results in concentrated
markets characterized by high prices and profits.
The second view is that advertising is informative. This view emerged in force
in the 1960s, under the leadership of the Chicago School. According to this ap-
proach, many markets are characterized by imperfect consumer information, since
search costs may deter a consumer from learning of each product’s existence, price
and quality. This imperfection can lead to market ineﬃciencies, but advertising
on advertising by economists, and Comanor and Wilson (1979) and Schmalensee (1972) provide
valuable surveys of early empirical analyses. Tirole (1988) discusses in detail a few of the recent
theories of advertising. Finally, in Volumes 1 and 2 of the Handbook of Industrial Organization,
Schmalensee (1989) provides further discussion of empirical findings, while Stiglitz (1989) oﬀers
some brief reflections on the theory of advertising.
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is not the cause of the problem. Instead, advertising is the endogenous response
that the market oﬀers as a solution. When a firm advertises, consumers receive
at low cost additional direct (prices, location) and/or indirect (the firm is willing
to spend on advertising) information. The firm’s demand curve becomes more
elastic, and advertising thus promotes competition among established firms. As
well, advertising can facilitate entry, as it provides a means though which a new
entrant can publicize its existence, prices and products. The suggestion here,
then, is that advertising can have important pro-competitive eﬀects.
A third view is that advertising is complementary to the advertised product.
According to this perspective, advertising does not change consumers’ preferences,
as in the persuasive view; furthermore, it may, but need not, provide information.
Instead, it is assumed that consumers possess a stable set of preferences into
which advertising enters directly in a fashion that is complementary with the con-
sumption of the advertised product. For example, consumers may value “social
prestige,” and the consumption of a product may generate greater prestige when
the product is (appropriately) advertised. An important implication is that stan-
dard methods may be used to investigate whether advertising is supplied to a
socially optimal degree, even if advertising conveys no information.
These views are all, at some level, plausible. But they have dramatically
diﬀerent positive and normative implications. The persuasive and informative
views, in particular, oﬀer conflicting assessments of the social value of advertising.
It is of special importance, therefore, to subject these views to rigorous empirical
and theoretical evaluation. Over the past fifty years, the economic analysis of
advertising, like the field of industrial organization itself, can be described in terms
of a sequence of empirical, theoretical and again empirical evaluative phases.
The empirical analysis of advertising was at center stage from the 1950s
through the 1970s. Over this period, a voluminous literature investigated general
empirical relationships between advertising and a host of other variables, includ-
ing concentration, profit, entry and price. Much of this work employs regression
methods and uses inter-industry data, but important studies are also conducted
at the industry, firm and even brand levels. This period is marked by vigorous
and mostly edifying debates between advocates of the persuasive and informative
views. The debates center on both the robustness and the interpretation of em-
pirical findings, and they identify some of the limitations of regression analyses,
particularly at the inter-industry level. While the inter-industry analyses are of-
ten inconclusive, defensible empirical patterns emerge within particular industries
or narrow industry categories. The evidence strongly suggests that no single view
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of advertising is valid in all settings.
The empirical studies suggest important roles for advertising theory. First,
theoretical work might make progress where empirical work has failed. A general
theoretical argument might exist, for example, that indicates that advertising is
always excessively supplied by the market. Likewise, a theoretical model might
assess the validity of the persuasive-view hypothesis that advertising deters en-
try. Second, advances in the theory of advertising might generate new predictions
as to the relationships between advertising and market structure. In turn, these
predictions could motivate new empirical work. Third, and relatedly, theoretical
work might provide a foundation from which to appropriately specify the supply
side of more sophisticated econometric analyses, in which the endogeneity of con-
sumer and firm conduct is embraced. Utilizing recent advances in game theory,
economists thus began in the late 1970s to advance formal theories of advertising.
This work is vital and ongoing.
Beginning in the 1980s, economists approached the empirical analyses of ad-
vertising with renewed interest. For the purposes of this survey, it is useful to
organize the modern work in three broad groups. Studies in the first group often
use new data sources and further evaluate the empirical findings of the earlier
empirical work. These studies are not strongly influenced by the intervening the-
oretical work. Studies in the second group also draw on new data sets, sometimes
constructed at the brand and even household levels, and reflect more strongly
the influence of the intervening theoretical work. The conduct of firms and con-
sumers in particular industries is emphasized. Studies in this group evaluate the
predictions of strategic theories of advertising, and may even specify and estimate
explicit structural models of consumer and firm conduct. Finally, following Sutton
(1991), a third group of studies culls from the intervening theoretical work a few
robust predictions that might apply across broad groups of industries. Studies in
the third group thus sometimes return to the inter-industry focus that character-
ized much of the earlier empirical work; however, the empirical analysis is now
strongly guided by general theoretical considerations.
This historical description provides a context from which to understand the or-
ganization of this survey. In Section 2, I describe the work of Marshall (1890, 1919)
and Chamberlin (1933), and I review the key initial writings that are associated
with each of the three views. This discussion is developed at some length, since
these writings contain the central ideas that shape (and are often re-discovered
by) the later literature. Section 3 contains a summary of the findings of the ini-
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tial and modern (first-group) empirical eﬀorts.4 In Sections 4 through 7, I present
research on advertising theory. Next, in Section 8, I describe the modern (second-
group) empirical eﬀorts. The modern (third-group) work is discussed in Section 9.
Section 10 identifies new directions and omitted topics, and Section 11 concludes.
The survey is comprehensive and thus long. The sections are organized around
topics, however, making it easy to locate the material of greatest interest. For
teaching purposes, if a thorough treatment of advertising is planned, then the sur-
vey may be assigned in full. Alternatively, if the plan is to focus on a particular
topic within advertising, then Section 2 and the section that covers the corre-
sponding topic may be assigned. Section 2 provides a general context in which to
understand any of the topic treatments found in later sections.
2. Views on Advertising
In this section, I discuss the key initial writings that led to each of the three main
views (persuasive, informative, complementary) of advertising. The assignment
of economists to views is, to some degree, arbitrary, as it is commonly recognized
that advertising can influence consumer behavior for diﬀerent reasons. There are,
however, important diﬀerences in emphasis among many of the key contributors.
I begin with Marshall (1890, 1919) and especially Chamberlin (1933), who set the
stage by identifying some of the possible views and implications of advertising. I
then review the key contributions that emphasize more forcefully the development
of one view over another. The section concludes with a general discussion that
inventories the potential social benefits and costs of advertising.
2.1. Setting the Stage
Some initial reflections on advertising are oﬀered by Marshall (1890, 1919). As
Marshall (1919) explains, advertising can play a constructive role by conveying
information to consumers. Constructive advertising can alert consumers to the
existence and location of products, and it can also convey (pre-purchase) infor-
mation concerning the functions and qualities of products. But Marshall (1890,
1919) also emphasizes that some kinds of advertising can be socially wasteful.
In particular, some advertising involves repetitive messages, and such advertising
4It is not always clear whether a study belongs in the first or second group. When there is
any ambiguity, I place the study in the first group, so that the topic treatments found in Section
3 may be more self contained.
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plays a combative role, as its apparent purpose is to redistribute buyers from a
rival firm to the advertising firm.5
Unfortunately, Marshall did not pursue a formal integration of advertising
into economic theory. With the development of his theory of monopolistic com-
petition, however, Chamberlin (1933) embraces this integration. Fundamental to
Chamberlin’s approach is the assumption that, within a given industry, firms sell
diﬀerentiated products. As a consequence, each firm faces a downward-sloping
demand curve and thus possesses some monopoly power. Chamberlin argues
additionally that a firm can use advertising and other promotional activities to
further diﬀerentiate its product from those of its rivals. Advertising-induced prod-
uct diﬀerentiation is beneficial to a firm as a means of expanding its market; in
graphical terms, by advertising, a firm generates an outward shift in its demand
curve. When a firm considers increasing its advertising, it thus balances this
market-expansion benefit against the additional “selling costs” that such an in-
crease would entail.
Chamberlin does not model consumer behavior explicitly, and he takes as given
that consumers respond to advertising. He does, however, oﬀer two explanations
for the presumed responsiveness. Chamberlin (1933, pp. 118-120) argues that
advertising aﬀects demand, because it (i) conveys information to consumers, with
regard to the existence of sellers and the price and qualities of products in the
marketplace, and (ii) alters consumers’ “wants” or tastes. When advertising com-
municates information that concerns the existence of the firm’s product, the eﬀect
is to expand the firm’s market with an outward shift in demand. If advertising
conveys price information as well, then the firm’s expanded demand curve also
may be more elastic, as more consumers then can be informed of a price reduc-
tion. But if advertising serves its second general purpose - that of creating wants
through brand development and the like - then the advertising firm’s demand
5Along with Marshall (1890, 1919), other early contributors to the economic analysis of
advertising include Fogg-Meade (1901), Pigou (1924), Shaw (1912), Sherman (1900) and Shryer
(1912). Fogg-Meade argues that advertising is a positive force for society, since it educates
consumers by bringing new goods to their attention. Pigou emphasizes that much advertising
is combative and thus socially wasteful. Shaw argues that advertising enables manufacturers to
by-pass the middleman and establish their brand names with consumers. Advertising thus gives
manufacturers incentive to maintain reputations for high quality. Sherman details the extent
and nature of advertising in the U.S. in the 19th century. He also observes that advertising
can play constructive and combative roles. Shryer oﬀers one of the first quantitative studies
of advertising. Using mail-order data, he argues that the eﬀect of advertising on sales exhibits
decreasing returns.
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curve shifts out and may be made more inelastic. Chamberlin thus identifies the
informative and persuasive roles for advertising.
Scale economies figure prominently in Chamberlin’s approach. First, Cham-
berlin assumes that a firm’s production technology is characterized by increasing
returns to scale up to a critical level of output. Second, Chamberlin (1933, pp.
133-36) stresses as well that there may be an economy of scale in advertising. To
motivate this scale economy, Chamberlin argues that (i) a consumer’s responsive-
ness to advertising messages may be “fortified by repetition,” and (ii) there may
be improvement in the organization of advertising expenditures at higher levels,
as gains from specialization in selling are realized and as more eﬀective media
(which may be accessible only at higher expenditures) are used. At the same
time, beyond a critical sales volume, diminishing returns are inevitable, since ad-
ditional advertising becomes less eﬀective once the most responsive buyers are
already reached. In total, Chamberlin concludes that the unit costs of production
and selling are each U-shaped, and on this basis he argues that a firm’s combined
unit cost curve is U-shaped as well.
Using these ingredients, Chamberlin describes a monopolistic-competition equi-
librium, in which each firm sets its monopoly price and yet earns zero profit. As the
standard textbook diagram depicts, at the firm’s monopoly price, its downward-
sloping demand curve is just tangent to its combined unit cost curve. Cham-
berlin argues that this tangency is a necessary consequence of the competitive
forces of entry. In this general manner, Chamberlin reconciles monopolistic and
competitive forces, by introducing a modeling paradigm that emphasizes product
diﬀerentiation, scale economies and advertising.
In an important application of his framework, Chamberlin (1933, pp. 165-7)
considers the possible price eﬀects of advertising. He compares the monopolistic-
competition equilibrium when advertising is allowed with the corresponding equi-
librium that would emerge if advertising were not allowed. On the one hand, the
demand-expanding eﬀect of advertising enables firms to better achieve economies
of scale in production, and this scale eﬀect works to reduce prices.6 On the other
hand, advertising entails selling costs, and so a firm’s combined unit cost is higher
when advertising is permitted. In a zero-profit equilibrium, this cost eﬀect works
to increase prices. Finally, advertising aﬀects pricing as well through an elasticity
eﬀect. When advertising increases the elasticity of a firm’s demand, as advertising
might when it contains price information, there is further support for the sugges-
6Marshall (1890, Chapter XIV) also briefly discusses the possibility that advertising induces
a beneficial scale eﬀect.
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tion that advertising reduce prices. Of course, the opposite suggestion is given
further credence, if advertising makes the firm’s demand less elastic, as advertising
might when it creates wants and encourages brand loyalty.
In light of these conflicting eﬀects, Chamberlin (1933, p. 167) concludes that
the net eﬀect of advertising on prices cannot be resolved by theory alone: “The
eﬀect of advertising in any particular case depends upon the facts of the case.”
Among these facts, Chamberlin’s discussion clearly suggests that the purpose
of advertising (persuasive or informative) and the extent of scale economies (in
production and advertising) warrant greatest attention. This is a balanced and
penetrating suggestion. It also serves to provide a general context in which to
understand subsequent research, wherein economists debate the purpose of ad-
vertising and the probable extent of scale economies.
2.2. The Persuasive View
In the writings that initially followed Chamberlin’s eﬀort, advertising’s persuasive
powers are given primary emphasis. These writings acknowledge a role for scale
economies, under which advertising may exert a price-reducing influence, but the
conclusion that emerges is that advertising may have important anti-competitive
consequences. In arriving at this conclusion, the persuasive-view advocates go
beyond Chamberlin to emphasize that advertising has an entry-deterrence eﬀect :
when advertising creates brand loyalty, it also creates a barrier to entry, since
established firms are then able to charge high prices and earn significant prof-
its without facing entry. As I describe below, the persuasive view is developed
through an increasingly sophisticated set of conceptual and empirical arguments.
In fact, the first advocates of the persuasive view were contemporaries of
Chamberlin’s. In her development of the theory of imperfect competition, Robin-
son (1933, p.5) includes some brief discussion of advertising, in which she argues
that “the customer will be influenced by advertisement, which plays upon his
mind with studied skill, and makes him prefer the goods of one producer to those
of another because they are brought to his notice in a more pleasing and forceful
manner.” Likewise, in considering the potential anti-competitive implications of
advertising, Robinson (1933, p.101) claims that if “a firm finds the market becom-
ing uncomfortably perfect (i.e., more competitive) it can resort to advertisement
and other devices which attach customers more firmly to itself.” In total, Robin-
son suggests that advertising has strong anti-competitive consequences, since it
deters entry and sustains monopoly power in a market where the conduct of es-
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tablished firms otherwise would be suitably disciplined by competitive pressures.
In a perceptive paper that, unaccountably, now seems largely forgotten, Braith-
waite (1928) contributes significantly toward a conceptual foundation for the per-
suasive view.7 Braithwaite regards advertising as a “selling cost,” the purpose
of which is to re-arrange consumers’ valuations, so that they are persuaded to
value more greatly the advertised product. Advertising shifts out a consumer’s
demand for the advertised product, and it thus distorts the consumer’s decisions
as compared to those that reflect his “true” preferences (as captured in his pre-
advertising demand). The real economic resources that are expended through
advertising activities thus may be wasted, since advertising’s eﬀect is to induce
consumers to purchase the wrong quantities of goods that are not well adapted to
their true needs at prices that are swollen from the cost eﬀect of advertising. On
the other hand, Braithwaite recognizes that advertising may also induce a scale
eﬀect that exerts a downward pressure on price.
In light of these competing influences, Braithwaite (1928, p. 35) establishes the
following result: if a monopolist’s advertising shifts out the demand for its prod-
uct, and if consumer surplus is evaluated relative to the initial (pre-advertising)
demand, then advertising increases consumer surplus only if it is accompanied by
a strict reduction in price. Figure 1 illustrates that consumer surplus may fall,
even if there is a strict reduction in price. The consumer surplus gain from a lower
price is marked as G, while the consumer surplus loss that comes from distorted
consumption is marked as L. Certainly, L can exceed G if the price decrease is
modest, and L necessarily exceeds G if price is unaltered.
Braithwaite also advances the entry-deterrence eﬀect of advertising. She ar-
gues that, by advertising, an established firm creates a “reputation” for its brand
among consumers. New entrants can then succeed only by developing their own
reputation through advertising, and Braithwaite (1928, p. 32) claims that for
them the necessary expenditures may be even higher: “But, since they have to
create reputation in the face of one already established, the probability is that
their advertisement costs will be heavier than those of the original manufacturer.”
Advertising thus may result in the creation of “reputational monopolies.” This
entry-deterrence eﬀect oﬀers further support for the belief that advertising causes
higher prices and lower welfare.
Finally, Braithwaite (1928, p. 36) considers whether reputation itself may con-
fer some possible benefit to the consumer. She states one possibility: “Advertisers
7Braithwaite (1928) and Chamberlin (1933) cover some similar terrain, and the contributions
appear to be independent (see Chamberlin (1933, p. 126)).
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maintain that their reputation is a guarantee of quality. For they say that it is not
worth a manufacturer’s while to stake his name and spend his money on advertis-
ing an article of poor quality.” In the end, she argues that the quality-guarentee
eﬀect is modest.8 Her reasons are that: (i) factually, reputations are sometimes
created for inferior goods which enjoy short-lived profits, (ii) consumers can be
poor judges of quality, and they may linger with an inferior product, and (iii)
any such guarantee is to some degree redundant, since a reliable retailer already
oﬀers an implicit guarantee as to the quality of products sold in his store. In
view of these considerations, Braithwaite (1928, p. 37) concludes that reputation
does not oﬀer advantages to consumers that are suﬃcient to compensate for the
harmful eﬀects of advertisement that she otherwise identifies.
The persuasive view of advertising is further advanced by Kaldor (1950). He
draws a distinction between the direct and indirect eﬀects of advertising on social
welfare. The direct eﬀect of advertising is associated with its role in the provision
of price and product-quality information to consumers, while the indirect eﬀects of
advertising include any consequent scale economies in production and distribution.
Kaldor begins with the direct eﬀect. Observing that the “price” of adver-
tising to the buyer is typically zero, Kaldor regards advertising as a subsidized
commodity (i.e., a commodity sold below marginal cost) that is sold jointly with
the advertised product. Advertising is then profitable to the seller, because it
is “complementary” to the advertised product (i.e., advertising increases the de-
mand for the advertised product). As Kaldor explains, given the absence of a
separate market for advertising and the associated divergence between price and
marginal cost, there can be no presumption that the amount of advertising is
eﬃcient. Moreover, while advertising can convey information, this information is
oﬀered by an interested party. Kaldor (1950, p. 7) thus argues that the major-
ity of advertising is persuasive in nature. After considering the direct eﬀect of
advertising, Kaldor suggests that advertising is a wasteful means of conveying a
modest degree of information.
If advertising is to be justified, then the justification must come from its in-
direct eﬀects. Here, the core of Kaldor’s argument is that advertising promotes
greater concentration; hence, the primary indirect eﬀects of advertising are the
same as those that are associated with increased concentration. The indirect ef-
fects thus can cut both ways. On the one hand, there may be a detrimental
8Fogg-Meade (1901), Marshall (1919) and Shaw (1912) are early proponents of the quality-
guarantee eﬀect. In contrast to Braithwaite (1928), they suggest that advertising and trademarks
can greatly enhance the incentive for manufacturers to oﬀer high-quality products.
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elasticity eﬀect: greater advertising may lead through greater concentration to
enhanced monopoly power and the loss in eﬃciency that such power brings. On
the other hand, there may be a beneficial scale eﬀect: greater advertising and the
increased concentration that it implies may give rise to an eﬃciency gain, due to
achievement of scale economies in production and/or distribution.
On what basis does Kaldor conclude that advertising promotes greater con-
centration? To develop this position, Kaldor assumes that an economy of scale to
advertising exists and that larger, more profitable firms are better able to finance
larger advertising expenditures. Kaldor (1950, p. 13) then argues that adver-
tising introduces an instability in the initial distribution of market shares, “with
the consequence (a) that the larger firms are bound to gain at the expense of the
smaller ones; (b) if at the start, firms are more or less of equal size, those that
forge ahead are bound to increase their lead, as the additional sales enable them
to increase their outlay still further.” This concentration eﬀect of advertising
continues until an oligopolistic structure emerges. According to Kaldor, there are
two reasons that the process halts before a monopoly structure is achieved. First,
advertising eventually becomes subject to diminished returns. Second, at some
point, each firm resists any intrusion into its market, being prepared to increase
its own advertising in response to any increase in advertising by another firm.
I return now to Kaldor’s comparison of indirect eﬀects. Given that these eﬀects
are competing, Kaldor reaches the same conclusion as did Chamberlin before him:
the net social consequence of advertising cannot be decided on the basis of eco-
nomic theory alone. To gain further insight, Kaldor considers the role of advertis-
ing in Britain in the late 19th century. In Kaldor’s view, the advent of large-scale
advertising contributed to the emergence of a new organizational structure, which
he calls “manufacturers’ domination.” Manufacturers used advertising to estab-
lish brand names and position those names in the foreground of the consumers’
consciousness, so that consumers would be persuaded to seek these brands. In
this way, large-scale advertising enabled manufacturers to leap over middlemen
and establish a direct connection with final consumers.9 The manufacturing sec-
tor then became more concentrated, and additional scale economies (associated
with mass-production techniques) were realized. The manufacturers’ domination
structure is thus characterized by low production costs and high selling costs. As
Kaldor acknowledges, his informal study does not aﬀord a conclusive assessment
as to advertising’s indirect eﬀects. In the main, though, he seems skeptical that
9Similar observations are made in other early eﬀorts. See Borden (1942), Braithwaite (1928),
Chamberlin (1933), Fogg-Meade (1901), Marshall (1919), Shaw (1912) and Tosdal (1918).
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manufacturer advertising can be justified by its indirect eﬀects.
The persuasive view next proceeds along two tracks. One set of work em-
barks on a broad assessment of the social consequences of advertising. Notably,
Galbraith (1958, 1967) and Packard (1957, 1969) propose a very negative view of
advertising, wherein the institution of modern advertising arises with the purpose
of creating wants among a population of passive consumers. I emphasize here a
second set of work. This work oﬀers an empirical assessment of the implications
of the persuasive view. Persuasive advertising instills brand loyalty and is thus
expected to exert an indirect influence on other market variables that correspond
to entry barriers, profit rates, concentration ratios and pricing levels. The per-
suasive view thus may be indirectly evaluated by checking the consistency of its
implications with cross-sectional data. The primary initial eﬀorts of this kind are
by Bain (1956) and Comanor and Wilson (1967, 1974).
On the basis of extensive interviews and a questionnaire survey, Bain oﬀers
a qualitative assessment of the relative importance of specific entry barriers in a
sample of 20 large U.S. manufacturing industries. Bain (1956, p. 14) considers
four structural forms that an entry barrier may take: absolute cost advantages of
established sellers, product diﬀerentiation advantages of established sellers, scale
economies and capital requirements. From this study, Bain (1956, p. 216) fa-
mously concludes that product diﬀerentiation is probably the most important
entry barrier. Using profit rate data from 1936-40 and 1947-51, Bain (1956, pp.
196, 201) further reports that the average profit rates for dominant firms are
significantly greater in high than moderate-to-low concentration industries; in ad-
dition, among highly concentrated industries, profit rates are significantly higher
for those that are categorized as having very high barriers to entry than for those
with lesser entry barriers. Bain thus suggests that concentration and barriers to
entry are two of the major determinants of profitability.
Where does advertising fit in? As a general matter, Bain (1956, p. 143) does
not conclude that advertising per se is the primary source of product diﬀerentia-
tion. But drawing on his interviews, questionnaires and estimates of “traceable”
advertising expenditures, Bain (1956, pp. 114-15, 125) clearly argues that an in-
cumbent firm may use advertising to contribute importantly toward a preference
for its established products in comparison to new-entrant products. This possibil-
ity is of particular significance in consumer-goods industries; in fact, Bain (1956,
p. 125) concludes that the “single most important basis of product diﬀerentiation
in the consumer-good category is apparently advertising.” On the whole, Bain’s
pioneering analysis suggests that advertising-induced product diﬀerentiation may
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constitute an important entry barrier that helps established manufacturers (espe-
cially in highly concentrated and consumer-goods industries) to set prices above
costs and earn considerable profits. His work thus oﬀers early empirical support
for the hypothesis that advertising has significant anti-competitive eﬀects.
As Bain acknowledges, his analysis is not conclusive. It is useful here to
note two limitations. First, Bain does not explain the process through which
advertising leads to a preference for established products and creates an entry
barrier. Second, Bain’s empirical analysis relies upon qualitative classifications of
industries with respect to market-structure variables.
These limitations motivate Comanor and Wilson (1967, 1974). Echoing the
“reputational” reasoning of Braithwaite (1928), they explain that advertising-
induced product diﬀerentiation can generate an entry barrier, if high prevailing
levels of advertising create additional costs for new entrants above those expe-
rienced by established firms. In support of this possibility, they emphasize that
a new entrant may face greater market-penetration costs than originally did the
pioneering firm, since the new entrant must induce consumers to switch from an
established and familiar product to a new and unknown product. As Comanor
and Wilson (1974, pp. 48-49) explain, high prevailing advertising levels then may
constitute a barrier to entry, if they “reinforce the experience that consumers have
with established products” so as to enhance brand loyalty and exacerbate the dif-
ferential advertising costs that await new entrants. They stress, too, that a new
(small-scale) entrant is at cost disadvantage relative to an established (large-scale)
firm, if an advertising scale economy is present.
Comanor and Wilson also respond to the empirical limitations of Bain’s analy-
sis. While Bain creates qualitative industry rankings for hard-to-measure market-
structure variables, Comanor and Wilson proxy for these variables with alter-
native variables for which quantitative data are available. They are thus able
to perform multi-variate regression analyses on measurable variables. Seeking to
explain profit averaged over the period 1954-57 for manufacturers in 41 consumer-
goods industries, they allow for a variety of explanatory variables, including the
advertising/sales ratio, the four-firm concentration ratio and measurements that
proxy for demand growth, scale economies and capital requirements. The adver-
tising/sales data are taken at the industry level from IRS statistics and proxy for
product diﬀerentiation. The rate of profit is measured at the industry level as the
after-tax rate of return on shareholder equity. As their main finding, Comanor
and Wilson report a positive and significant relationship between the rate of profit
and the advertising/sales ratio.
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Comanor and Wilson’s finding is consistent with the hypothesis that adver-
tising causes profitability. But advertising is in fact an endogenous variable, and
it thus inappropriate to treat industry advertising intensity as an independent
structural variable. Indeed, if firms re-invest a certain percentage of their profit
or sales in advertising, then their finding also may be interpreted in support of the
reverse hypothesis that profitability causes advertising. Relatedly, there may be
underlying influences (inelastic demand, low marginal cost) that result in larger
price-cost profit margins. Influences of this kind may generate both higher profit
and larger advertising, since firms have greater incentive to advertise when mark-
ups are large. If the corresponding variables are omitted from the regression, then
the relationship between advertising and profitability may be spurious.10
In response to the endogeneity concern, Comanor and Wilson (1974) extend
their analysis to include a profitability equation and a second equation in which
the advertising/sales ratio is influenced by profit margins and other variables.
They find that advertising intensity continues to aﬀect profitability. They also
supply some empirical support for the existence of important advertising scale
economies. On the basis of these and other findings, Comanor and Wilson (1974,
p. 239) interpret their study as oﬀering “empirical support for the conclusion
that the heavy volume of advertising expenditures in some industries serves as an
important barrier to new competition in the markets served by these industries.”
Comanor and Wilson’s work marks a significant step forward, but it also has
important limitations. First, while their emphasis on the experience-based de-
mand asymmetry between established and new firms is well-placed, they do not
endogenize the manner in which advertising interacts with consumers’ experiences,
so as to “reinforce” past experiences and diﬀerentially reward established firms.
Second, profitability may derive less from advertising itself than from the under-
lying product and market characteristics that determine advertising as well. The
endogeneity concern is fundamental and calls for simultaneous-equation methods;
however, in an inter-industry study, the identification of any structural equation
is diﬃcult, since most right-hand side variables are endogenous. Third, if adver-
tising generates brand loyalty, then measurement concerns arise: while accounting
profit treats advertising as a current expense, a true measure of profit would treat
10The endogeneity concern is defined and thoroughly explored by Schmalensee (1972). As
noted below, Telser (1964, p. 551) oﬀers an early statement of this concern. See also Sherman
and Tollison (1971). As I detail in Section 3, similar endogeneity problems arise with regard
to the relationships between advertising and sales as well as concentration. The endogeneity
concern is also suggested by the optimal advertising literature that derives from the work of
Dorfman and Steiner (1954). I discuss this literature in Section 4.1.
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advertising as (intangible) capital that depreciates at some rate. Fourth, inter-
industry studies leave unexposed important relationships that may be associated
with the particular features of the industry, product or advertising media mix.
These and other issues motivate much subsequent research, which I describe in
the sections that follow.
2.3. The Informative View
Under the informative view, advertising is attractive to firms as a means through
which they may convey information to consumers. An important implication of
this view is that advertising may have pro-competitive consequences. As noted
above, elements of this view appear in the writings of Marshall and Chamber-
lin. But the informative view really took flight in the 1960s, largely under the
leadership of a group of “Chicago School” economists.
The formal foundation for the information view is laid by Ozga (1960) and
Stigler (1961). Stigler interprets price dispersion as a reflection of consumer ig-
norance, where this ignorance in turn derives from the costs to consumers of
obtaining information as to the existence, location and prices of products. He
then constructs a model of optimal consumer search behavior, in which advertis-
ing eﬀectively reduces consumers’ search costs, since it conveys such information.
Stigler thus argues that advertising is a valuable source of information for con-
sumers that results in a reduction in price dispersion. Ozga develops similar
themes, although in his analysis consumers passively receive information (from
social contacts and/or advertising) and do not search for it. As well, Ozga (1960,
p. 40) goes beyond Chamberlin and oﬀers for informative advertising a new ratio-
nale for diminishing returns: “as more and more of the potential buyers become
informed of what is advertised, more and more of the advertising eﬀort is wasted,
because a greater and greater proportion of people who see the advertisements
are already familiar with the object.”
In Telser’s (1964) influential eﬀort, the theoretical and empirical foundations
for the informative view are significantly advanced. Telser’s explores the following
question: Is advertising compatible with competitive (i.e., price-taking) behavior
among firms? Telser (1964, p. 558) concludes with a positive answer: “Advertising
is frequently a means of entry and a sign of competition. This agrees with the
view that advertising is an important source of information.”
How does Telser arrive at this conclusion? He begins by considering the theo-
retical compatibility between advertising and competition. Like Chamberlin and
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Kaldor before him, Telser concludes that this issue cannot be resolved on the ba-
sis of theory alone. In reaching this decision, Telser notes that, on the one hand,
some kinds of advertising are compatible with, and even essential to, competi-
tion. For example, a certain fixed expenditure on advertising may be necessary
to inform consumers of a firm’s existence before any sales can be made. In the
competitive framework, it then can be understood that price is determined to
match average costs, inclusive of advertising expenditures (the cost eﬀect). On
the other hand, there are two reasons that advertising may be associated with
monopoly power. First, in an early statement of the endogeneity concern, Telser
(1964, p. 551) observes that “firms that have some monopoly power are more
likely to advertise because they can obtain most of the increased sales stimulated
by their advertising.” Second, Telser (1964, p. 541) allows that some advertising
may be persuasive and thereby give rise to monopoly power.
Given the lack of theoretical resolution, Telser pursues an empirical assess-
ment of the cross-sectional relationship between advertising intensity and other
market variables. Methodologically, Telser’s analysis is a natural intermediate
step between the earlier analysis of Bain and the subsequent analyses of Comanor
and Wilson. Telser computes advertising/sales ratios from IRS data and performs
simple regression analysis. He oﬀers two kinds of indirect evidence.
First, Telser considers the relationship between advertising and concentration.
Recall that Kaldor posits a positive relationship. Telser (1964, p. 542) takes the
following perspective: “If advertising fosters monopoly, then concentration and
advertising should be positively correlated.” For 42 consumer-goods industries,
Telser calculates (four-firm) concentration and advertising-sales ratios for three
diﬀerent census years. He then considers a linear regression of concentration
on advertising intensity, and he reports a positive but very weak relationship.
Telser (1964, p. 544) concludes that “the correlation between concentration and
advertising is unimpressive.”
Second, Telser examines the relationship between advertising and market-share
stability. Telser (1964, p. 547) reasons that if “advertising succeeds in shelter-
ing a firm’s products from competitive inroads, this should be reflected in more
stable market shares of the more advertised goods.” To explore this possibil-
ity, he considers the market-share and advertising patterns of products in three
consumer-goods classes: food, soap and cosmetics. Using various measures, Telser
finds that market-share stability appears inversely related to advertising intensity.
Telser (1964, p. 550) thus argues that his findings “refute the view that advertising
stabilizes market shares.” The apparent implication is that advertising facilitates
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entry and new-product introductions.
Telser’s analysis countered the then-prevailing persuasive view and oﬀered an
empirical legitimacy to the alternative view that advertising is an important source
of information that promotes competition. His work also spawned an on-going
empirical literature that explores the competitive eﬀects of advertising. In this
literature, some important limitations of Telser’s analysis are noted. Most impor-
tantly, Comanor and Wilson (1967, 1974) question Telser’s use of concentration as
a measure of market power. Like Bain, they contend that profitability is a better
measure of market power, and they argue that concentration and entry barriers
(such as advertising) are key explanatory variables for profitability.
I turn next to a pair of insightful papers by Nelson (1970, 1974b).11 He begins
with a simple question: How, exactly, does advertising provide information to
consumers? The informative content of advertising is clear, when the advertise-
ment contains direct information as to the existence, location, function or price
of a product. But what about all of the advertising that does not contain direct
information of this kind? Is it persuasive? Nelson argues rather that such ad-
vertising still plays an informative role, although the role is indirect. To develop
this argument, Nelson (1970) makes a distinction between search and experience
goods. A search good is one whose quality can be determined prior to purchase
(but perhaps after costly search), whereas the quality of an experience good can
be evaluated only after consumption occurs. Building on this distinction, Nelson
(1974b) argues that the indirect information contained in advertising is especially
important for experience goods.
Nelson (1974b, pp. 732-4) gives three reasons why advertising may provide
indirect information to consumers of experience goods. First, there is a signaling-
eﬃciency eﬀect. The demand expansion that advertising induces is most valuable
to eﬃcient firms, and these low-cost firms are also inclined to seek demand expan-
sion through other means, such as with lower prices and higher qualities. Thus,
by advertising, a firm signals that it is eﬃcient, which implies in turn that it of-
fers good deals.12 Second, consumers may have heterogeneous tastes, and it may
11As I discuss in Section 3, Nelson (1975) oﬀers additional evidence concerning the conse-
quences of advertising. Nelson (1974a, 1978) elaborates on some of the basic insights.
12The signaling-eﬃciency eﬀect appears to have been missed by earlier contributors. In fact,
Pigou (1924, p. 177) raises the general issue and reasons toward the opposite conclusion: “There
is, however, some slight ground for believing that firms of low productive eﬃciency tend to
indulge in advertisement to a greater extent than their productively more eﬃcient rivals. For,
clearly, they have greater inducements to expenditure on devices, such as special packages,
designed to obviate comparison of the bulk of commodity oﬀered by them and by other producers
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be diﬃcult to eﬃciently match products and buyers. A seemingly uninformative
advertisement can assist in this process, since a firm has the incentive to direct
its advertising toward the consumers that value its product the most. This is
the match-products-to-buyers eﬀect. Third, advertising may remind consumers of
their previous experience with the product, and such recollections are of more
value to sellers of high-quality goods. Given this repeat-business eﬀect, even new
consumers may draw a positive association between advertising and quality, and
advertising thus may signal quality.13
What about search goods? Certainly, advertising can provide indirect infor-
mation here as well. For example, even if a search-good advertisement contains no
direct information, the fact that the good is advertised may suggest that the seller
is eﬃcient and thus that the good is aggressively priced. Due to the signaling-
eﬃciency eﬀect, therefore, consumers may be encouraged to search for the ad-
vertised good. In comparison to experience goods, though, search goods oﬀer
greater potential for direct information transmission through advertising. Nel-
son (1974b, p.734) thus adopts the hypothesis that “advertising for experience
qualities is dominantly indirect information and advertising for search qualities is
dominantly direct information.”
Nelson (1970, 1974b) presents a variety of empirical evidence in support of
this hypothesis. First, he oﬀers evidence that advertising intensity is higher for
experience goods. This is consistent with the idea that the act of advertising
itself is the indirect means through which a seller of an experience good provides
information to consumers. Second, Nelson presents evidence that the ratio of
TV to magazine advertising is significantly higher for experience goods. This
supports his contention that search goods are especially conducive to the transfer
of direct information. Third, Nelson reports evidence for experience goods that
advertising intensity is higher for non-durable and lower-priced goods. These
findings are consistent with the general idea that, for major (durable and high-
priced) purchases, a consumer relies on the information of friends and family,
whereas for more frequent (non-durable and low-priced) purchases, a consumer
relies on advertising as a source of indirect information.14
at a given price.”
13Nelson (1974b, p.734) summarizes the argument as follows: “Advertising increases the prob-
ability of a consumer’s remembering the name of a brand. Those brands with the highest proba-
bility of repeat purchase have the greatest payoﬀ to improved consumer memory. In consequence,
brands which provide the highest utility have the greatest incentive to advertise.”
14For other early studies in which advertising intensity varies with the nature of the product,
see Borden (1942), Doyle (1968a,b), Else (1966) and Telser (1961).
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Nelson’s approach seems to assume that consumers make thoughtful inferences
in response to advertising. This is disquieting, since it seems rather that consumers
often devote little thought to advertising. But as Nelson stresses, his approach in
fact does not require that consumers make such careful judgments. If consumers
are responsive to advertising, whether thoughtfully or not, then this can induce
a positive relationship between advertising and consumer utility, since it is then
the most-eﬃcient and best-deal firms that gain the most from advertising. Thus,
when consumers naively respond to advertising, firm behavior is generated that
confirms the initial responsiveness.15
Nelson’s work enriches considerably the informative view of advertising. His
work also oﬀers support for the position that the advertising-profitability relation-
ship is spurious, since more eﬃcient firms both earn greater profit and, as Nelson
(1974b) argues, advertise more heavily. There are, however, important limita-
tions. First, as Nelson (1974b, p. 749) acknowledges, the empirical distinction
between search and experience goods is somewhat arbitrary, and so his empiri-
cal findings are not conclusive. Second, Nelson (1974b) reasons that high-quality
firms are especially attracted to demand-expanding advertising, but he does not
provide a formal model that delivers this prediction. As Schmalensee (1978) em-
phasizes, if lower-quality goods have lower marginal costs, then it is possible that
low-quality firms gain diﬀerentially from demand expansion. It is also possible
that a high-quality firm might prefer to relay indirect information to consumers
through its price choice rather than its advertising outlay. These concerns are
featured in subsequent formal research, as I discuss in Section 6.
2.4. The Complementary View
Under the complementary view of advertising, consumers possess stable prefer-
ences, and advertising directly enters these preferences in a manner that is com-
plementary to the consumption of the advertised product. This view is logically
distinct from the persuasive view (wherein advertising changes the utility func-
tion) and the informative view (wherein advertising directly aﬀects utility only if
it contains information). The complementary view allows that advertising may
contain information and influence consumer behavior for that reason. But there
15As Nelson (1974b, p. 751) puts it: “Many economists have felt that other consumers think
quite imprecisely about advertising - and well they might. But this superficial observation
has led economists, but not consumers, astray. Economists have failed to see that consumers’
response to advertising persists because of the underlying information role of advertising.” See
also Nelson (1974a, pp. 50-51).
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are other possibilities as well. For example, the consumer may value “social pres-
tige,” and advertising by a firm may be an input that contributes toward the
prestige that is enjoyed when the firm’s product is consumed.
The complementary view is also associated with the Chicago School. Impor-
tant elements of this view are found in Telser’s (1964) work, but Stigler and Becker
(1977) oﬀer a more complete statement of the central principles. Under their ap-
proach, consumer utility derives from the consumption of various commodities.
These commodities, however, are not sold or purchased on the market; rather,
they are produced through a household production technology that uses market
goods, advertising and other variables (e. g., time) as inputs. In the simplest rep-
resentation, a consumer buys a market good in quantity X at some per-unit price
Px, and the market good and its associated advertising expenditures A are then
inputs that jointly produce an amount Z of the commodity. The consumption of
Z then implies a utility level U for the consumer. For example, if Y represents
the level of some composite good, then these relationships might be captured as
follows: U = U(Z, Y ) and Z = g(A)X, where (Uz, Uy, g(A), g0(A), X, Y ) > 0.
Importantly, this structure implies a complementarity between A andX in the
production of Z. As Stigler and Becker (1977, p. 84) put it, when a firm advertises
more, its product becomes more attractive to the consumer, since “the household
is made to believe - correctly or incorrectly - that it gets a greater output of the
commodity from a given input of the advertised product.”16 Using this approach,
Stigler and Becker show that even a perfectly competitive firm may advertise.
Intuitively, a price-taking firm may be willing to incur an advertising expense,
because the derived demand for its product then shifts up, enabling it to “take”
a higher price. An implication is that firms may compete in the same commodity
(e.g., prestige) market even though they produce diﬀerent market goods (e.g.,
jewelry and fashion) and advertise at diﬀerent levels.
The welfare implications of the complementary approach are explored by
Nichols (1985).17 Drawing on Lancaster’s (1966) characteristic approach to con-
16Bridging the informative and complementary views, Verma (1980) posits that advertising
contains information and thereby enables consumers to produce information at lower cost, so
that they can more eﬀectively convert market goods and time into valued commodities. Verma
describes specifications for the underlying information and commodity household production
functions under which it may be derived that advertising exerts a complementary influence on
the demand for the advertised product. An implication is that advertising should be highest,
when the consumers’ time cost is high and/or alternative information gathering methods are
relatively ineﬀective. See also Ehrlich and Fisher (1982) and Sauer and Leﬄer (1990).
17See also Hochman and Luski (1988), who reconsider Nichols’s (1985) analysis of perfectly
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sumer behavior, Nichols interprets Z as the level at which a characteristic is
enjoyed, when the market good is consumed at level X and advertised at level
A. Consumer welfare is then given by U = U(g(A)X,Y ), where Y is again a
composite nonadvertised good. For any given A, the consumer chooses X and Y
to maximize U subject to the budget constraint I = PxX+PyY, where I is income
and Py is the price of good Y . A profit-maximizing monopolist chooses A and Px,
where PM(A) denotes the monopoly price of X for a given level of advertising, A.
Nichols then considers a slight increase in advertising from the profit-maximizing
level. As this change has no first-order eﬀect on the monopolist’s profit, social
welfare rises if and only if consumer welfare rises. The consumer experiences a
direct gain from the increase in A, but there also may be a harmful eﬀect of a
higher price (if P 0M(A) > 0). I formally analyze a related model in Section 4.2, but
one conclusion is already suggested: the consumer gains - and thus a monopolist
undersupplies advertising - when an increase in advertising would not cause an
increase in price (i. e., when P 0M(A) ≤ 0).18
A related but distinct analysis is developed by Becker and Murphy (1993).
Under their approach, the level of advertising A for a good X enters directly into
the utility function: U = U(A,X, Y ). Over the relevant range, the marginal utility
of advertising may be positive (UA > 0), in which case advertising is a “good,” or
it may be negative (UA < 0), so that advertising is a “bad,” but in either event
the marginal utility of the advertised product rises with advertising (UAX > 0).
Advertising is thus complementary to the advertised product and serves to shift
out the demand for this product. The existence of a stable preference function
ensures that the normative implications of advertising can be explored, once it is
explained how the quantity of advertising consumed is determined.
As Becker and Murphy note, it is often infeasible to separately and directly
sell advertising to consumers.19 Instead, advertisements may be given away (e.g.,
competitive commodity markets with advertising, and Fisher and McGowan (1979), who propose
that the direct eﬀect of advertising on consumer surplus be included when the welfare eﬀects
of advertising are considered. Adams and Yellen (1977) take the same position. As discussed
further in Section 4.2, the Fisher-McGowan (1979) paper is written in response to a formalization
of the persuasive view oﬀered by Dixit and Norman (1978). See also Wernerfelt (1990), who
argues that brand advertising creates value for consumers, since it enables them to signal through
brand choice their types to one another.
18Observe that this implication is incompatible with Braithwaite’s (1928) (taste-changing)
result that monopoly advertising diminishes consumer surplus unless price is strictly reduced.
19Consider a separate market for TV advertisements. If the ads were “goods,” then consumers
would pay for them; and if they were “bads,” then consumers would be paid to watch them.
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direct mail ads are “free” to receive) or sold jointly with the other products (e.g.,
newspaper/TV ads are sold jointly with newspapers/TV programs). The former
case may be understood as a situation in which advertising is a good (or at least
not a bad) that is given away, the quantity of advertising is determined by the
producers, and each consumer simply accepts (consumes) all of the advertising
that is received. This is the conventional modeling approach. The latter case
is more novel. It corresponds to a situation in which each consumer determines
his consumption quantity of the joint good, given the price of the joint good. As
advertising is complementary, it may be sold at a subsidized implicit price. Indeed,
if advertising is a bad (e.g., TV ads may lower utility), then its implicit price
is negative (advertisers include free and enjoyable programs to compensate the
viewer for watching the ads).20 Thus, while Becker and Murphy acknowledge that
the advertising market has special properties, they conclude that these properties
do not prohibit the assimilation of advertising into consumer choice theory.
The welfare analysis of advertising may now proceed using standard tech-
niques. In line with Nichols’s finding, Becker and Murphy show that a monopolist
undersupplies advertising, when advertising is a good and increased advertising
does not raise price. The key point is that a monopolist cannot appropriate all of
the consumer-surplus benefits that are associated with advertising.
It is interesting to contrast the complementary view with the other views. In
response to the anti-competitive interpretation of advertising under the persua-
sive view, Nelson (1974b) makes the pro-competitive argument that advertising,
when properly understood, is informative. Advocates of the complementary view,
by contrast, circle back and agree with the persuasive view that advertising of-
ten provides little information. Their response is rather that even uninformative
advertising can be beneficial, since consumers may value it directly.
The main advantage of the complementary view is that it oﬀers a framework
within which to conduct the welfare analysis of seemingly persuasive advertising,
without positing that such advertising embodies indirect information. Surpris-
ingly, the apparent implication is that such ads may be undersupplied, at least in
monopoly markets. This view also has important limitations. First, the restric-
Either way, important monitoring problems could arise: it could be diﬃcult to ensure that all
watching consumers pay, and that all paid consumers watch. As noted above, the joint-supply
nature of advertising is observed also by Kaldor (1950), who concludes that advertising thus may
be excessively supplied. By contrast, Telser (1964, 1966) stresses that there may be joint-supply
economies, since the transactions (e.g., monitoring) costs associated with a separate advertising
market might be considerable. See also Steiner (1966) for a rejoinder.
20See also Barnett (1966) and Telser (1978).
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tions that are imposed upon the data may be weak, since the specific predictions
are often sensitive to assumptions placed upon unobservable household produc-
tion or utility functions. Second, the assumption that consumers interact with
advertising on a voluntary basis may be challenged. Under the complementary
approach, a consumer tolerates an ad that is a bad, since the consumer receives
compensation through some joint consumption experience. But there are also ads
that lower utility and cannot be avoided. For example, a consumer may find an ad
on a passing city bus objectionable but unavoidable.21 This kind of advertising,
like pollution, may be excessively supplied. A complete argument in favor of this
suggestion, however, must explain why a firm chooses to supply such an ad. One
possibility is that the ad is not a bad to all consumers, and “innocent bystanders”
may suﬀer as the ad makes its journey to the intended audience.
2.5. Summary
The discussion above describes the insightful reasoning that led to the formation
of each of the three conceptual views of advertising. These views identify the
main considerations that govern the impact of advertising on social welfare. Four
(not entirely exclusive) considerations are identified:
1. Combative Advertising: As Marshall explains, some advertising is combat-
ive, acting to redistribute consumers among brands. If the real diﬀerences between
brands are modest, then combative advertising may be excessive. Under the in-
formative view (Ozga, Stigler, Telser, Nelson), also acknowledged by Marshall,
advertising is mainly constructive and corresponds to a necessary competitive
cost that is associated with the provision of information to consumers.
2. Persuasion and Consumption Distortions: As Braithwaite argues, ad-
vertising may change tastes and distort consumption quantities. This results in a
loss in consumer surplus relative to the pre-advertising benchmark. Informative-
view advocates counter that much advertising is informative, either directly or
indirectly, and there is no taste-changing consumption distortion. For a given
product, complementary-view advocates (Stigler, Becker, Nichols, Murphy) argue
further that the post-advertising demand curve is the relevant benchmark, even
21As Fogg-Meade (1901, pp. 231-2) put it more than a century ago, “The successful adver-
tisement is obtrusive. It continually forces itself upon the attention. It may be on sign boards,
in the street-car, on the page of a magazine, or on a theatre program. Everyone reads it in-
voluntarily, and unconsciously it makes an impression. It is a subtle, persistent, unavoidable
presence that creeps into the reader’s inner consciousness.”
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for non-informative advertising.
3. Joint Supply: As Kaldor stresses, advertising is often jointly supplied, and so
there is no separate market for advertising in which consumers may directly regis-
ter their willingness to pay. Given that the suppliers of advertising value its com-
plementary eﬀects, the supply of advertising may be excessive. Complementary-
view advocates counter that consumers make choices as to bundles that include
advertising; furthermore, any social welfare analysis should include the manner in
which consumers directly value advertising. Advertising may be undersupplied.
4. Brand Loyalty, Advertising Scale Economies and Market Power:
Persausive-view advocates (Braithwaite, Robinson, Kaldor, Bain, Comanor, Wil-
son) argue that advertising creates brand loyalty (reputations) and may be subject
to increasing returns to scale. Advertising thus results in greater market power
for established firms, and market performance suﬀers: advertising deters entry
and leads to higher prices. Informative-view advocates counter that advertising
provides price and quality information and facilitates entry. Market performance
is enhanced: advertising encourages entry, eﬃcient production, lower prices and
higher-quality products.
The key initial writings oﬀer conceptual frameworks with which to identify
the main considerations that govern advertising’s social value. As well, some
initial evidence is presented. At the same time, the arguments have important
limitations, as I have noted. There is more to be done. In the remainder of this
survey, I describe further progress in the economic analysis of advertising. I begin
in the next section, with a description of empirical research that further evaluates
the eﬀects of advertising.
3. Empirical Regularities
Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, as the distinctions between the persuasive and
informative views became clear, a huge volume of empirical work emerged that
evaluates the predictions of these two views. Much of the initial work follows the
lead of Bain (1956) and Comanor and Wilson (1967, 1974) and seeks empirical
regularities at the inter-industry level. But many of the earlier eﬀorts also search
for regularities using data at the industry, firm or even brand level. As I discuss
in the Introduction, in the modern empirical literature, studies are increasingly
conducted at such levels. In the present section, I review the initial and (first-
group) modern empirical analyses of advertising.
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The studies are organized by topic. Each subsection treats a separate topic
and then wraps up with a summary of the main conclusions coming from research
on that topic. By organizing the section in this way, I hope to provide convenient
and self-contained treatments of several topics, while enabling a casual reader
to simply read the associated summary and then move on to a topic of greater
interest. The review is non-technical. I direct the reader to other surveys and
books that treat some of these topics in greater detail than is possible here.22
At the outset, it is important to emphasize two of the many obstacles with
which an empirical analysis of advertising must contend. First, the relationships
between advertising and other variables are beset with endogeneity concerns. Ad-
vertising may be associated with higher sales, because firms respond to greater
sales with greater advertising; advertising may be associated with inelastic de-
mand, since advertising firms are attracted to markets in which consumers are
poorly informed; advertising may be associated with greater profitability, because
advertising firms are more eﬃcient or operate in markets with inelastic demands;
and so on. Second, fundamental measurement problems may arise. For exam-
ple, a firm’s sales and profit may be influenced by its current advertising and its
past advertising (due to “goodwill” eﬀects). The proper treatement of advertising
(current expense or intangible capital?) in the measured profit rate then becomes
an important consideration.
In light of these and other obstacles, it is natural to question the relevance
of the empirical studies reviewed here. These studies, however, play a valuable
descriptive role. If one view on advertising is generally true, then the implications
of that view should be confirmed in the studies reviewed here. Likewise, if the ef-
fects of advertising are rather found to vary across circumstances, then the studies
reviewed here may suggest empirical regularities for certain groups of industries or
among particular variables. Such findings can guide subsequent theory construc-
tion, ultimately leading to more successful empirical eﬀorts that use new data
sets and obtain consistent estimates of structural parameters. Finally, several of
the studies reviewed here confront the endogeneity of advertising. Some studies
attempt to estimate structural parameters using simultaneous-equation methods,
while other studies seek exogeneous variation in advertising through laboratory
or natural experiments.
22For other reviews of aspects of the material covered here, see Albion and Farris (1981),
Berndt (1991), Comanor and Wilson (1979), Ekelund and Suarman (1988), Hay and Morris
(1991), Ornstein (1977), Scherer and Ross (1990), Schmalensee (1972, 1989) and Simon (1970).
26
3.1. The Direct Eﬀects of Advertising
I begin by considering the direct eﬀects of advertising. Evidence is described that
concerns the eﬀect of a firm’s advertising on its current and future sales, the sales
of other firms and the brand loyalty of its consumers. I also discuss evidence as
to the presence or absence of advertising scale economies.
3.1.1. Sales
I review here empirical studies of advertising and sales. Two questions are em-
phasized. First, is there a positive association between current advertising and
current and future sales? If a significant association with future sales is detected,
this would support a goodwill eﬀect and thus the contention of Braithwaite (1928)
that advertising can have long-lasting reputational eﬀects. Second, does advertis-
ing influence overall industry demand, or is it more combative, as Marshall (1890,
1919) suggests, tending to redistribute sales within the industry?
By the start of the 1970s, there existed a number of statistical studies that ex-
plain sales or market shares with advertising and other variables. As Schmalensee
(1972, Chapter 4) details, however, most these studies suﬀer from serious lim-
itations. With important exceptions, the earlier studies fail to include lagged
measures that would permit identification of a goodwill eﬀect and measures that
would assess the eﬀect of rival-firm advertising on own sales. In addition, while
some early work acknowledges that advertising is endogenous, a simultaneous-
equation analysis of advertising and sales did not appear until the late 1960s.23
The empirical analysis of the advertising-sales relationship takes a step forward
with Lambin’s (1976) ambitious eﬀort. Lambin uses various sales, quality, price
and advertising data for 107 individual brands from 16 product classes and 8
diﬀerent Western European countries, where the observations are mainly drawn
from the 1960-70 period. With these data, he can consider how changes in the
advertising outlay for one brand may aﬀect the current sales of that brand and
rival brands. As well, he can look over time and evaluate goodwill eﬀects and
the rival-brand response that an advertising outlay may induce. Further, Lambin
oﬀers estimates based on simultaneous-equation methods and concludes that the
risk of simultaneity bias in his sample is limited.
23Jastram (1955) oﬀers an early discussion of the goodwill eﬀect. Roberts (1947) presents an
early analysis of the eﬀect of rival advertising on own sales. The reverse-causality possibility
between advertising and sales is acknowledged by Borden (1942) and Berreman (1943), but it
appears that the first simultaneous-equation analysis is oﬀered by Bass (1969).
27
Some of Lambin’s findings are as follows. He finds that brand advertising has a
significant and positive eﬀect on the brand’s current sales and market share. Fur-
ther, using a distributed-lag model, in which a brand’s current sales are explained
by current advertising and a constant fraction of previous-period sales, Lambin
interprets the lagged-sales coeﬃcient as a measure of advertising’s goodwill eﬀect
and reports evidence of a goodwill eﬀect for advertising.24 But the quantitative
impact of advertising on (current and future) sales is limited: sales appear more
responsive to price and product-quality selections. Lambin also reports that a
firm’s sales and market share are negatively related to rival advertising. Going
further, he indicates that advertising reaction elasticities are often positive over
time, so that an increase in brand advertising appears to induce rivals to respond
with more advertising. In fact, Lambin oﬀers only limited support for the view
that advertising increases industry demand, suggesting instead that the compet-
ing eﬀects of own and rival advertising on own sales tend to cancel. Lambin’s
study thus oﬀers some support for the notion that advertising is combative.
These relationships are explored further in other studies. First, a number of
studies explore the goodwill eﬀect of advertising. One group of studies posits
a distributed-lag relationship between current sales and advertising expenditures
and then estimates the rate at which advertising’s eﬀect depreciates through time.
In influential early studies, Palda (1964), Peles (1971b) and Telser (1962) suggest
that the goodwill eﬀect of advertising may be substantial. For certain industries,
they report that the firm-level depreciation rates are in the range of 15 to 50% per
year.25 Lambin’s (1976, p. 96) depreciation-rate estimates for brand advertising
vary widely across product groups but take an average of around 50% per year.
Likewise, in a study of the cigarette industry, Brown (1978) reports brand-level
depreciation rates in the 60% range.
In an important survey, Clarke (1976) considers the various distributed-lag
24Like other distributed-lag studies described below, Lambin follows Koyck (1954) and posits
a constant depreciation rate. The formalization involves two steps. First, specify that a brand’s
current-period sales (St) are determined as a function of current (At) and past (Aτ , for τ < t)
advertising levels: St = α + θ
Pt
τ=0 β
t−τAτ + εt. Second, take diﬀerences and derive that
St = α(1 − β) + βSt−1 + θAt + υt, where υt ≡ εt − βεt−1. The weight on previous-period
sales now captures the goodwill eﬀect of advertising. A goodwill eﬀect is present when β > 0,
and 1 − β is the constant rate of depreciation for past advertising. Notice that this approach
assumes that persistence in sales derives only from advertising. As I discuss below, some recent
research includes the possibility that firm-specific factors (like product quality) generate sales
persistence. See also Berndt (1991) for a discussion of alternative formulations.
25Other early studies also suggest a low rate of depreciation. Comanor and Wilson (1979),
Schmalensee (1972) and Weiss (1969) evaluate a number of the early eﬀorts.
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studies and identifies a “data-interval-bias” problem. The use of annual advertis-
ing data when the eﬀects of advertising on sales depreciate over a shorter period
of time can lead to biased estimates of the depreciation rate. On the basis of
studies using data for shorter periods, Clarke (1976, p. 355) concludes that “the
duration of cumulative advertising eﬀect on sales is between 3 and 15 months;
thus this eﬀect is a short-term (about a year or less) phenomenon.” More re-
cently, several studies oﬀer further support for this conclusion. Using various
data and specifications for the advertising-sales relationship, Ashley et al (1980),
Boyd and Seldon (1990) and Seldon and Doroodian (1989) all oﬀer evidence that
the eﬀect of advertising on sales is often largely depreciated within a year (if not
less). Leone’s (1995) recent survey is of particular interest. He provides a theo-
retical explanation for the data-interval bias and then presents empirical support
for the generalization that on average the eﬀect of advertising on sales is largely
depreciated within six to nine months.
When assessing the goodwill impact of advertising, it is important that firm-
specific factors not be omitted. As Nelson’s (1974b) theory suggests, it may be
that advertising aﬀects initial sales but that long-term sales are driven by firm-
specific factors, like product quality. Given that higher-quality firms may advertise
more, the eﬀects of advertising on future sales may be overstated in an empirical
analysis that omits product quality. Using CompuStat data for 417 firms for
the years 1982 to 1986, Landes and Rosenfield (1994) show that the distributed-
lag approach indeed overstates the durability of advertising when firm-specific
dummies are not used to control for omitted firm-specific factors.26 The role
of brand-specific factors is also stressed by Thomas (1989), who oﬀers a brand-
loyalty specification and reports depreciation rates of 80% and above for brands
of soft drinks and cigarettes. Likewise, Kwoka (1993) examines the determinants
of model sales in the U.S. auto industry, finding that the eﬀect of advertising is
short-lived while product styling has a much longer impact.
Second, a number of studies explore the eﬀect of advertising on industry ver-
sus firm or brand sales. In an important early study, Borden (1942) makes a
distinction between advertising that increases “selective” (i.e., firm/brand) and
“primary” (i.e., industry) demands. His case studies of U.S. industries suggest
26There is also another group of studies, in which the depreciation rate for advertising is
inferred as the rate that best accounts for observed relationships between current advertising
expenses and market values. Studies of this general nature are oﬀered by Ayanian (1975, 1983),
Bloch (1974) and Hirschey (1982). As Landes and Rosenfield (1994) argue, the market-value
studies make strong “steady-state” assumptions and (like distributed-lag studies) overstate the
durability of advertising when controls are not used for firm-specific factors.
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that advertising is often combative, exerting a strong eﬀect on selective demand.
He argues that trends in primary demand derive from underlying social and en-
vironmental considerations, with advertising serving to reinforce these trends.
The combative nature of advertising is further explored in more recent work.
One strand of work emphasizes advertising reactions. In studies of leading brands
in certain Australian markets, Metwally (1975, 1976) reports that advertising re-
action elasticities are positive over time and detects a substantial cancellation
eﬀect. As with Lambin’s study, this work suggests that advertising is often char-
acterized over time by reciprocal cancellation.27 Some additional support for this
suggestion emerges from studies that consider the response of incumbent firms
to entry. For example, Alemson’s (1970) study of the Australian cigarette indus-
try suggests a reciprocal cancellation eﬀect, whereby new entrants advertise to
gain market share and thereby induce increased advertising by incumbents, who
seek to maintain market share. Likewise, Thomas (1999) studies the ready-to-eat
cereal industry and reports that incumbent firms often respond to entry with ad-
vertising, in order to limit the sales of new entrants. Finally, in cross-sectional
work, Cubbin and Domberger (1988) examine 42 consumer-goods industries and
report evidence that dominant incumbent firms in static (slow-growth) markets
often respond to entry with an increase in advertising.
Another strand of studies emphasizes the relationship between industry ad-
vertising and sales. These studies suggest that advertising may increase primary
demand in some industries but not others. For example, positive relationships
between industry advertising and sales are reported for the U. K. cigarette in-
dustry (Cowling et al (1975)), the U.S. cigarette industry (Seldon and Doroodian
(1989)), the U.S. orange market (Nerlove and Waugh (1961)) and the U.S. auto
industry (Kwoka (1993)), but other studies report little evidence of a primary
demand eﬀect for the U. S. cigarette market (Baltagi and Levin (1986), Hamil-
ton (1972), Schmalensee (1972)), U.S. beer market (Nelson (2004), Tremblay and
Tremblay (2005)), or U. K. instant-coﬀee market (Cowling et al (1975)).
In summary, the studies discussed above suggest three main conclusions. First,
a firm’s current advertising is associated with an increase in its sales, but this
eﬀect is usually short lived. Second, advertising is often combative in nature. An
increase in advertising by one firm may reduce the sales of rival firms, and rivals
may then react with a reciprocal increase in their own advertising eﬀorts. Third,
27See also Telser (1962) and Brown (1978) for descriptions of competitive advertising among
U. S. cigarette manufacturers. Related evidence is oﬀered by Kelton and Kelton (1982) for the
U. S. brewery industry. See also Tremblay and Tremblay (2005).
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the overall eﬀect of advertising on primary demand is diﬃcult to determine and
appears to vary across industries.
3.1.2. Brand Loyalty and Market-Share Stability
According to the persuasive view, the direct eﬀect of advertising is that brand
loyalty is created and the demand for the advertised product becomes less elastic.
Ideally, a direct empirical assessment of this eﬀect would draw from a longitudinal
data set that includes household-level advertising-exposure and brand-purchase
data as well as the advertising and pricing behaviors of rival firms. As I discuss
in Section 8, with the advent of supermarket scanner data, empirical assessments
of this kind have recently appeared. At this point, however, I focus on the earlier
empirical investigations of advertising and brand loyalty. These studies pursue
two indirect assessments. First, it may be possible to estimate demand functions
for individual brands, in order to see if consumers exhibit more “inertia” in highly
advertised markets, or if the estimated price elasticities are lower in magnitude in
product groups with high advertising intensity. Second, following Telser (1964),
it may be possible to infer the extent of brand loyalty, by further examining the
relationship between advertising and market-share stability.
In the first category, Lambin captures brand loyalty with a measure of con-
sumer inertia. For the distributed-lag model, Lambin (1976, pp. 72, 115-18) ob-
serves that the lagged-sales coeﬃcient may be generally interpreted as a measure
of consumer inertia. He finds significant inertia eﬀects in most markets. Using
various measurements of advertising intensity, however, Lambin fails to find a
positive and significant relationship between brand inertia rates and brand ad-
vertising intensity. Apparently, consumer inertia is important, but the cause of
inertia more likely rests with price and quality than with advertising.28 In a sep-
arate approach, Lambin estimates the elasticities of demand for several brands,
and he then regresses the absolute value of estimated elasticity alternatively on
diﬀerent measurements of advertising intensity. The regression coeﬃcients are
negative, though the statistical significance of the estimates are mostly weak. As
Lambin (1976, pp. 138-40) notes, this gives modest support to the position that
advertising reduces the elasticity of demand.
In a number of marketing studies from the late 1970s, the eﬀect of advertising
28In this context, it is useful to recall the studies by Kwoka (1993), Landes and Rosenfield
(1994) and Thomas (1989), which oﬀer evidence in support of the view that brand loyalty is
associated more with brand-specific factors (like product quality) than with advertising per se.
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on demand elasticity is further examined. As Boulding et al (1994) explain,
however, many of these studies have important limitations. Boulding et al use
longitudinal and cross-section PIMS (Profit Impact of Market Strategies) data,
in order to assess at the business-unit level the eﬀect of advertising on demand
elasticity. They report evidence that current advertising reduces future demand
elasticity for firms that price above the industry average.
The second empirical strategy is to explore the relationship between advertis-
ing and market-share stability. A number of studies agree with Telser (1964) that
advertising is associated with market-share instability. Support for this conclu-
sion can be found in Ferguson’s (1967) study of the liquor industry, Backman’s
(1967) analysis of consumer non-durable sectors, Alemson’s (1970) study of the
Australian cigarette industry, and Reekie’s (1974) examination of specific U. K.
sectors (particularly, foodstuﬀs and toiletries). In addition, Lambin oﬀers modest
empirical support for the proposition that increased advertising intensity desta-
bilizes market shares.
On the other hand, Gort (1963) examines the market shares of the largest firms
in U.S. manufacturing sectors in 1947 and 1954, and he reports that market shares
are more stable in industries in which product diﬀerentiation is greater. Caves
and Porter (1978) attempt to reconcile these divergent findings, by distinguishing
between advertising’s roles as a conduct variable that is associated with non-price
competition and the disturbance of market shares and as a structural variable
that is associated with product diﬀerentiation and the insulation of market shares.
Using PIMS data, Caves and Porter (1978, p. 309) report that structural product
diﬀerentiation (as measured by advertising intensity) exerts a stabilizing influence
on market shares, whereas non-price competition itself (as measured by product
R&D) works to destabilize market shares.
Finally, more recent work oﬀers further evidence in support of Telser’s (1964)
view. In an inter-industry study, Hirschey (1981) considers a large cross-section of
U. S. industries over the 1947-72 period and finds that advertising is positively and
significantly associated with entry (over 1963-72) and the growth of established
nonleading firms (over 1947-63). Similarly, Eckard (1987) looks at the 1963-82
period and finds no evidence that the market-share instability of leading firms is
lower in high-advertising industries. In an industy study, Eckard (1991) considers
the eﬀect of the 1970 U.S. ban on TV advertising for cigarettes. He finds that
brand and firm market shares are more stable in the period after the ban; further-
more, leading-brand shares were declining before the ban and are stable after the
ban. Likewise, Sass and Saurman (1995) conduct an industry analysis of the malt
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beverage market. They report evidence that large national brewers gain market
share at the expense of smaller brewers, in states where (retail) price advertising
is restricted.
What conclusions emerge? Given the data limitations, any conclusions must
be tentative. That said, it is perhaps most relevant to remark that the studies do
not provide strong evidence that advertising consistently increases brand loyalty
or stabilizes market shares.
3.1.3. Advertising Scale Economies
I consider here empirical studies that evaluate the possibility of an advertising
scale economy. It may be recalled that Kaldor’s concentration eﬀect derives from
an assumed economy of this kind. Broadly, the empirical studies stress that an
advertising scale economy may arise for two reasons: (i). the marginal eﬀective-
ness of advertising messages in generating sales may be greater, when the number
of messages is already large, and (ii). the advertising expenditure per message
(the price per message) may fall as more messages are sent.
Consider first the eﬀectiveness of advertising on sales. As Chamberlin (1933,
pp. 133-36) and Ozga (1960, p. 40) suggest, there are conflicting eﬀects. Intu-
itively, an advertising scale economy may appear (i) if advertising expenditures
must pass a threshold level before they command the consumer’s attention, or (ii)
if, beyond any such threshold level, the marginal benefit to sales of advertising
messages is increasing, due to the increased control that the advertised product
exercises over the consumer’s consciousness. At high levels of advertising, how-
ever, a decreasing return to scale may arise (i) as less responsive consumers are
reached, or (ii) as an increasing number of messages must be sent in order to reach
a consumer that has not yet been exposed to the advertisement. This intuitive
discussion suggests that an advertising scale economy may emerge at low sales
volumes (due to the threshold eﬀect), but it does not oﬀer a clear suggestion as
to the presence of such an economy at higher sales volumes. A role for empirical
study is thus suggested.
Using various (e.g., logarithmic) measures, a number of studies regress sales
on advertising and oﬀer evidence that advertising’s eﬀectiveness is subject to
diminishing returns. In essence, these studies hold other inputs constant and
argue that doubled advertising results in less than doubled sales. Simon (1970, p.
21) oﬀers a summary of the advertising studies of this kind. He concludes that
“there is not one single piece of strong evidence to support the general belief that
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increasing returns exist in advertising.”29 Simon (1970) also presents evidence for
direct-mail and clip-out coupon advertising methods that decreasing returns set
in even at low sales volumes. Lambin (1976, pp. 95-8) presents further evidence
consistent with decreasing returns, as his estimated advertising-sales elasticity
coeﬃcients are less than unity. But Lambin’s (1976, pp. 127-9) findings also
suggest a possible threshold eﬀect, since he finds that small brands keep a higher
ratio of advertising share to market share than do large brands.
As Comanor andWilson (1974, 1979) emphasize, scale economies are normally
defined with reference to a proportional increase in all inputs. This is potentially
important, since economies may be achieved only when advertising is increased in
unison with other marketing and production inputs. Under some circumstances,
however, the costs of advertising and production are plausibly separable, in which
case an important consideration is that advertising in all media be increased in
the same proportion. Brown (1978) conducts an interesting study of this kind for
the cigarette industry. Using a distributed-lag, simultaneous-equation model of
advertising and sales, Brown (1978, p. 433) uses his estimates to calculate the
“amount of advertising capital required per unit of sales for any chosen level of
sales.” The estimated average cost function is decreasing over a large volume of
sales, and higher for new brands, suggesting a cost disadvantage for new entrants.
Seldon et al (2000) oﬀer a related analysis of the beer industry, but their estimates
suggest diseconomies of scale.30
In other recent work, heterogeneity across brands is emphasized. Much of this
work also reports evidence of diseconomies of scale in advertising. In a study of
174 brands in 11 categories of small, packaged consumer goods, Boyer and Lan-
caster (1986, p. 515) find “little support for the proposition that large brands
support their market shares with a disproportionately small share of advertis-
ing expenditure.” Likewise, Thomas (1989) specifies a brand-loyalty model that
allows for heterogenous brand quality. He reports evidence of advertising scale
diseconomies in the cigarette and soft drink industries. On the other hand, Dube
et al (forthcoming) specify a model in which advertising must exceed a threshold
29Early advertising studies that find evidence of diminishing returns include Palda (1964),
Peles (1971a), Roberts (1947), Shryer (1912), Simon (1969) and Telser (1962). Schmalensee
(1972) reviews the early studies. More recent reviews are oﬀered by Albion and Farris (1981),
Arndt and Simon (1983), Berndt (1991) and Simon and Arndt (1980).
30See also Bresnahan (1984), who reports some evidence in support of advertising scale
economies in his study of the beer industry. Seldon et al (2000) explain the diﬀerences between
their methodology and that used by Bresnahan (1984). For further discussion of advertising in
the beer industry, see Fare et al (2004), Nelson (2004) and Tremblay and Tremblay (2005).
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level in order to contribute to the goodwill stock. Studying the major brands
in the Frozen Entree Category, they find strong evidence of a positive thresh-
old level. As they argue, this finding also provides an interpretation of observed
“pulsing” strategies, whereby a company rotates between positive-advertising and
no-advertising phases.
Consider now the possibility that advertising scale economies are generated
through a reduction in the advertising expenditure per message as more messages
are sent. One possibility is that the advertising rate schedule favors large adver-
tisers. In this context, a vigorous debate has emerged with respect to the rates
charged by TV networks, particulary in the early 1960s.31 Blake and Blum (1965)
observe that published rate schedules for network television advertising were char-
acterized by significant quantity discounts. In a comprehensive response, Blank
(1968) emphasizes the distinction between published price lists and the prices that
were actually paid. Over the relevant time period, the cost per minute of adver-
tising varied with cumulative purchases, but it also varied importantly with the
program to which the advertisement was joined. Using data for 1965 and 1966,
Blank finds that larger advertisers actually paid higher prices per unit of time
(i.e., per minute), since they advertised in more popular programs. Furthermore,
he notes that price per unit of time is not the relevant measure: the real issue is
whether larger advertisers paid less per “unit of audience.” To operationalize this
idea, he considers the cost per thousand homes reached per commercial minute.
Blank (1968, p. 28) finds “no consistent relationship between cost per thousand
and size of the advertiser.”32
A second possibility is that large advertisers are favored in that there are ben-
31This period is of special interest, because of a 1963 decision by the FTC not to allow a
merger between Clorox and Procter & Gamble. It was feared that the merger would enable the
Clorox brand to enjoy quantity discounts in advertising, which would put it at an advantage
relative to other liquid bleaches. Blank (1968) and Peterman (1968) state that the networks
ceased to oﬀer quantity discounts in 1966.
32In a subsequent study, Peterman (1968) considers the 1960-63 period and aﬃrms that there
is little empirical support for actual discrimination in favor of large advertisers. Comanor
and Wilson (1974, pp. 53-61), however, distinguish between discounts associated with the
total number of messages purchased from a network and those purchased on specific programs.
They report evidence that supports the presence of discounts within programs. But Peterman
and Carney (1978) re-examine the estimates once more, and they conclude that the estimated
discounts are much smaller than those reported by Comanor and Wilson (1974). Further support
for Blank’s (1968) conclusions is oﬀered by Schmalensee (1972) and Riesz (1973). The latter
study finds that the extent to which firms concentrate their advertising expenditures among the
networks is generally stable across firms of diﬀering sizes.
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efits to national versus local TV advertising. In line with Chamberlin’s (1933, p.
134) general discussion, national advertising may be a more eﬀective medium that
is available only at high levels of advertising expenditure. Porter (1976a) argues
that there is a distinct cost advantage from national (network) TV advertising
as compared to achieving the same coverage through local (spot) TV advertis-
ing. But Peterman (1979) presents evidence that diﬀerences between network
and spot rates are far smaller than Porter’s (1976a) discussion suggests. In addi-
tion, as Scherer and Ross (1990, p. 135) observe, even if network advertising has
a cost advantage, there is also an oﬀsetting consideration: network advertising is
less flexible than spot advertising, since spot advertising can be better adapted
to the conditions of the local market.
Finally, a diﬀerent approach is to seek indirect evidence of an advertising scale
economy, while remaining agnostic as to the reason that this scale economy exists.
In this context, it may be noted that Porter (1976a) oﬀers indirect evidence of a
scale economy that is associated with TV advertising. Like Comanor and Wilson
(1967, 1974), he considers U. S. industries that manufacture consumer goods, and
he regresses industry profits on advertising measures and other variables. When he
replaces industry advertising intensity with industry TV advertising intensity, he
discovers an increase in the size and significance of the coeﬃcient on advertising.33
Similar indirect evidence is oﬀered by Mueller and Rogers (1980, 1984), who find
an important role for TV advertising in explaining increases in concentration for
U. S. consumer-goods industries. On the other hand, Lynk (1981) oﬀers evidence
that TV advertising is associated with reductions in concentration. These studies
are discussed in greater detail below.
What tentative conclusions are suggested? On the whole, the studies that
evaluate the eﬀectiveness of advertising suggest that advertising often entails di-
minishing returns beyond a threshold level, where the threshold level varies across
circumstances and may be small. Turning to the studies that evaluate the TV
advertising rate schedule, the evidence appears to suggest that any historic dis-
crimination in favor of large advertisers is small. There is, however, some indirect
evidence of a scale economy that is associated with TV advertising.
33Related findings, using diﬀerent measures of profitability, are provided by Hirschey (1978,
1982) and Connor and Peterson (1992).
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3.2. The Indirect Eﬀects of Advertising
I consider now the indirect eﬀects of advertising on market outcomes. Specifically,
I examine the associations between advertising and concentration, profit, entry,
prices and quality.
3.2.1. Concentration
According to Kaldor, advertising scale economies exist and big firms are bet-
ter able to finance large advertising expenditures; as a consequence, advertising
promotes greater concentration and leads to an oligopolistic structure. I discuss
above the studies that examine the existence of scale economies in advertising.
Here, I consider further empirical analyses of the association between advertising
and concentration.
The first empirical examination of the advertising-concentration relationship
was oﬀered by Kaldor and Silverman (1948). For 118 English industries in 1938,
they measure (advertising) concentration by the number of firms needed to ac-
count for 80% of industry advertising, and they then calculate the mean adver-
tising intensity for each concentration category. Kaldor and Silverman find that
advertising intensity is highest in the eight-firm concentration category, with the
advertising intensity declining substantially when the concentration measure ex-
ceeds 9 firms or falls below 4 firms. Advertising intensity thus is related to this
measure of concentration in an inverted-U fashion. Evidently, large-scale adver-
tising is associated with oligopolistic industries.34
The next set of work explored the possibility of a linear relationship from
advertising intensity to concentration, using inter-industry data, regression anal-
ysis and standard (e.g., four-firm) measures of concentration. As discussed in
Section 2.3, Telser (1964) oﬀered the first test of this kind. For 42 three-digit
consumer-product groups, he finds that the relationship is weak and unimpres-
sive. No significant relationship is also observed by Comanor and Wilson (1974),
Guth (1971), Lambin (1976) and Schnabel (1970), while Ornstein and Lustgarten
(1978) report a significant but weak positive relationship in the 1960s (but none in
the 1940s). Examining Telser’s (1964) data, Nelson (1975) likewise finds no signif-
icant correlation between advertising intensity and concentration for nondurable
experience goods and durable goods; however, he reports a significant correlation
34See Schnabel (1970) for a re-examination of the Kaldor-Silverman data. Else (1966) and
Doyle (1968b) also use U. K. data to relate (advertising) concentration to advertising intensity.
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between advertising intensity and concentration for search goods.35
A related set of studies explores a linear relationship from advertising intensity
to concentration, using data for a given industry that varies across diﬀerent mar-
kets (brands, regions, etc.). For example, Vernon (1971) examines 18 therapeutic
product classes in the U.S. ethical pharmaceutical industry. In a multi-variate
analysis, he finds no evidence that high promotion results in high concentration;
indeed, he suggests that high promotion may be associated with less concentration
(and thus, perhaps, greater entry). Likewise, Edwards (1973) regresses concen-
tration on advertising intensity for 36 large banks from 23 distinct metropolitan
areas, where concentration is measured by the ratio of deposits of the three largest
banks in the area to the total deposits in the area. A multi-variate analysis again
reveals no significant relationship between advertising intensity and concentration.
Finally, utilizing cross-state variation in the legal restrictions on beer advertising,
Sass and Saurman (1995) report evidence that (retail) price advertising reduces
state-level concentration for brewers.
Some studies use inter-industry data over diﬀerent time periods to consider
advertising as a determinant of changes in concentration. Various studies report
evidence that post-war U. S. concentration levels have increased over time in indus-
tries that manufacture consumer goods and that the rate of increase is positively
associated with advertising intensity.36 For example, Mueller and Hamm (1974)
look at 166 U. S. industries over the period 1947-70. For consumer-goods indus-
tries, they report a significant positive relationship between advertising intensity
and changes in four-firm concentration, when the advertising-intensity dummy
variable is medium or high. In comprehensive eﬀorts that use a continuous mea-
sure of advertising intensity and diﬀerentiate between alternative types of media
advertising, Mueller and Rogers (1980, 1984) oﬀer multiple-regression analyses
and report a large and significant role for TV advertising in explaining changes
in four-firm concentration ratios for U.S. manufacturers in consumer-goods indus-
tries between 1947 and 1977. From this evidence, it appears that the emergence
of TV advertising in the 1950s created a structural disequilibrium that resolved
over time with a growth in concentration levels for consumer-goods industries.
Going further, this evidence might be interpreted as support for the persua-
sive view that (TV) advertising confers market power. But this interpretation
may not be valid. First, the empirical relationship may be challenged. Lynk
35Other influential studies include Mann et al (1967) and Telser (1969b). See Ornstein (1977)
for a survey of early empirical investigations of advertising and concentration.
36See Ornstein (1977) for a survey of early empirical studies of this kind.
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(1981) observes that concentration tended to fall for those U.S. industries that
most increased the fraction of advertising in TV. Lynk’s interpretation is that an
exogenous reduction in the cost of transmitting information (i.e., the emergence
of TV) promotes entry and reduces concentration, much as informative-view ad-
vocates suggest. Likewise, in his time-series analysis of the 1970 U.S. TV ban
on cigarette advertising, Eckard (1991) reports that industry concentration was
declining prior to the ban and that this trend reversed after the ban. Second, even
if it is accepted that TV advertising is positively associated with concentration,
this does not imply that TV advertising is associated with greater market power.
TV advertising may facilitate the entry of more eﬃcient firms or the realization
of scale economies in production, distribution or advertising. Complementing the
Mueller-Rogers (1980, 1984) data set with additional industry price and output
data between 1963 and 1977, Eckard (1987) finds that prices grew more slowly
and output grew more quickly in industries that used TV advertising.
Beginning in the 1970s, economists emphasized that the causality between
advertising and concentration might run both ways, with concentration also in-
fluencing advertising. This suggests a more complex, non-linear relationship, such
as the quadratic, inverted-U pattern reported by Kaldor and Silverman. Signifi-
cant non-linear relationships are reported in many studies (Cable (1972), Cowling
et al (1975), Greer (1971, 1973), Martin (1979a,b), Sutton (1974), Strickland and
Weiss (1976), Weiss et al (1983)). But other studies oﬀer little support for a
quadratic relationship (Brush (1976), Mann et al (1973), Ornstein (1977), Orn-
stein and Lustgarten (1978)), present mixed findings (Rees (1975)) or provide
little evidence of a positive relationship (Reekie (1975)). More recent work, how-
ever, emphasizes industries in which a large share of sales go to final consumers
and oﬀers evidence of a quadratic, inverted-U pattern. Buxton et al (1984) dis-
tinguish between 51 U.K. (3-digit) manufacturing industries on the basis of the
proportion of sales that go to final consumers. With advertising intensity as the
dependent variable, they find a significant quadratic relationship between adver-
tising intensity and concentration, especially for industries of less-than-average
concentration and with a greater proportion of sales to final consumers. Like-
wise, Uri (1987) considers 301 U.S. (4-digit) industries and reports evidence of an
inverted-U pattern for industries with a high share of sales to final consumers.
The interpretation of an inverted-U relationship is not clear. Greer (1971)
suggests one perspective: in less concentrated markets, competitive escalations in
advertising may induce greater concentration, much as Kaldor originally argued;
whereas, in highly concentrated markets, collusion among firms and decreasing re-
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turns to scale in advertising may limit combative advertising. Rivalrous advertis-
ing may thus be most acute in oligopolistic markets. Building on themes suggested
by Demsetz (1973, 1974), Nelson (1974b, 1975) and Telser (1964), however, an
alternative interpretation also might be advanced: advertising is an instrument of
competition, used with particular vigor by low-cost firms in oligopolistic markets,
that increases concentration by directing sales to the most eﬃcient firms.
In summary, the relationship between advertising and concentration is com-
plex. As Telser (1964) initially argued, the hypothesis of a linear and positive
relationship between advertising and concentration receives little support. Some
support does emerge, however, for an inverted-U relationship, especially in indus-
tries that direct sales largely to final consumers. Some support also can be found
for an association between the emergence of TV advertising and the subsequent
increase in concentration rates for industries that manufacture consumer goods.
The appropriate interpretation of these relationships, however, is not clear.37
3.2.2. Profit
Under the persuasive view, advertising creates brand loyalty and works to deter
entry. As Bain (1956) and Comanor and Wilson (1967, 1974) argue, this con-
clusion may be indirectly evaluated by examining the inter-industry association
between advertising intensity and profitability. I consider here further work that
evaluates the eﬀects of advertising on profits.
The main finding of Comanor and Wilson (1967, 1974) is that a strong and
positive relationship exists between advertising intensity and profitability (mea-
sured under accounting procedures as the after-tax rate of return on equity) for
U. S. manufacturing industries that produce consumer goods. As Comanor and
Wilson (1967, 1974) demonstrate, this finding emerges in multi-variate regressions
when single- or multiple-regression techniques are used. And related results arise
also in other studies, using Canadian, Japanese, U. S. and U. K. data.38 Arguably,
37As I discuss in Section 9, recent work by Sutton (1991) draws on the intervening game-
theoretic models and oﬀers an interpretation of the relationship between advertising, concentra-
tion and market size.
38The literature is vast, and I provide here only a sample. Supportive studies using U.S. data
include those by Backman (1967), Boyer (1974), Connolly and Hirschey (1984), Connor and
Peterson (1992), Domowitz et al (1986a, 1986b), Esposito and Esposito (1971), Gomes (1986),
Hirschey (1978, 1985), Jones et al (1977), Kwoka and Ravenscraft (1986), Mann (1966), Martin
(1979a,b), Miller (1969), Porter (1974, 1976a, 1976b, 1979), Ravenscraft (1983), Vernon and
Nourse (1973) and Weiss (1974). Likewise, Cowling et al (1975), Geroski (1982) and Nickell and
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this finding may be accepted as a “stylized fact.” I consider here two further ques-
tions. First, does the relationship between advertising intensity and profit vary
with the nature of the industry? Second, are there measurement and/or endo-
geneity concerns that confound the interpretation of this finding as evidence that
advertising deters entry?
Consider first the nature of the industry. As Telser (1964) observes, in indus-
tries that manufacture producer goods, advertising may play a less central role in
the selling costs of the firm. Selling costs may reflect more the expenses that are
associated with salesmen and so on. Some empirical support for a diminished role
of advertising for manufacturers of producer goods is oﬀered by Weiss et al (1983).
It therefore might be expected that the relationship between advertising intensity
and profitability would be weaker in producer-goods industries. Domowitz et al
(1986a, 1986b) provide evidence that is consistent with this expectation. They
find that the positive relationship between advertising intensity and profitability
is weakened in manufacturing industries that supply producer goods.39
The nature of the industry may be important, even among industries that
manufacture consumer goods. Following Copeland (1923) and Chamberlin (1933,
Chapter VI), Porter (1974, 1976b) draws a distinction between convenience and
non-convenience goods. Convenience goods are low-priced, frequently purchased
consumer goods, such as soft drinks, toothpaste and soap, that are widely available
at retail outlets. By contrast, non-convenience goods are high-priced, infrequently
purchased consumer goods, such as furniture, televisions, and motor vehicles, that
are available at more specialized retail outlets. For the consumer, the purchase of
a convenience good is a relatively unimportant event, and brand choice may be
made on the basis of vague information that is available at low cost. Manufac-
turer brand advertising may then influence the consumer and thereby represent a
key source of product diﬀerentiation. By contrast, for non-convenience goods, the
consumer’s purchase decision is more important. The consumer is then willing
to incur meaningful search costs in order to obtain better information. Conse-
Metcalf (1978) use U. K. data and report evidence of a positive relationship between advertising
and profitability. Similar findings are reported by Jones et al (1973, 1977) and Orr (1974b) for
Canadian data and by Caves and Uekusa (1976) and Nakao (1979) for Japanese data. There
are also some dissenting studies. For example, Salinger (1984) finds that advertising interacted
with concentration fails to exert a significant and positive influence on profitability measures;
Eckard (1991) reports that cigarette-industry profit margins increased after the 1970 U.S. ban
on TV advertising; and Landes and Rosenfield (1994) oﬀer evidence that the relationship may
reflect the omission of firm-specific variables (like product quality).
39See also Esposito and Esposito (1971), Jones et al (1977) and Miller (1969).
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quently, competing brands may be diﬀerentiated on the basis of point-of-service
information provided by sales personnel at retail outlets. In short, consumer
choice may be more responsive to advertising by manufacturers of convenience
than non-convenience goods.40
An important implication is that the role of manufacturer advertising in shap-
ing the bilateral power relationship between manufacturers and retailers may vary
with the type of good.41 A convenience-good outlet is pressured by its con-
sumers to carry heavily advertised goods, and the manufacturer of a convenience
good thus may advertise over the head of retailers to reach final consumers and
thereby improve its bargaining position with retailers. On the other hand, for non-
convenience goods, retailers are in a powerful position, as a retailer can always
stock and push alternative brands. The manufacturer of a non-convenience good
is thus less able to use advertising to improve its terms of trade with retailers.
As Porter (1974, p. 425) puts it, the broad point here is that “advertis-
ing is a more powerful influence on the rate of return for products sold through
convenience outlets than for those sold through non-convenience outlets due to
the diﬀerential importance of advertising on consumer choice and on the rate-
of-return bargain between manufacturer and retailer.” To test this hypothesis,
Porter (1974, 1976b) follows Comanor and Wilson (1967) and considers 42 U.
S. consumer-goods industries, which he then subdivides into convenience and
non-convenience industries. The empirical findings support Porter’s (1974) hy-
pothesis. For the convenience-good category, advertising intensity emerges as a
powerful and significant determinant of profitability. The role of advertising in
explaining profitability is substantially diminished for non-convenience goods.
A further distinction can be made between industries that manufacture con-
sumer goods and the retail and service industries that deal directly with the
public. Advertising by retailers is expected to have greater information content,
whereas advertising by manufacturers may reflect a greater persuasive orienta-
40Similar themes are advanced by Doyle (1968a,b). As I describe in Section 2, Nelson (1970,
1974b) oﬀers the related finding that advertising intensity tends to be higher for frequently
purchased, lower-priced and non-durable goods. He interprets advertising as representing a
source of indirect information. See also Ehrlich and Fisher (1982) and Verma (1980), who
emphasize that advertising provides information that reduces time costs. Advertising intensity
then may be lower in market settings for which other forms of information transmission (e.g.,
personal selling) are more eﬃcient. Laband (1986) oﬀers evidence that supports this conclusion.
See also Sauer and Leﬄer (1990).
41For related points in earlier work, see Kaldor (1950) and the references cited in footnote 9.
See also the discussion in Section 3.2.4 of Steiner’s (1973, 1978, 1984, 1993) work.
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tion. This distinction is embraced by Boyer (1974), who examines the impact
of advertising intensity on profitability for 41 consumer-goods manufacturers and
also for consumer retail and service sectors. He finds that the association between
advertising intensity and profitability is again strong and positive for consumer-
goods manufacturing industries. But his novel finding is that there is a weak and
negative association between advertising and profitability in retailing and service
industries. Boyer interprets this finding as indicating that retailers, who often
advertise in print media as opposed to TV, provide informative advertisements
that lead to lower prices.42
I consider next the interpretation of the positive relationship between adver-
tising and profitability. A first issue is whether this relationship reflects a mea-
surement problem in the treatment of profit rates. The empirical studies of this
relationship commonly measure the rate of profit as reported after tax profit di-
vided by net worth (assets or equity), where both the numerator and denominator
are measured according to accounting procedures under which advertising outlays
are treated as current expenses. But this “accounting profit rate” may be a bi-
ased measure of the “true profit rate,” if advertising has a goodwill eﬀect. This
is because advertising expenditures are then in truth investments that generate
“intangible capital.” The accounting profit rate may be biased in either direction,
since it may understate the numerator (the firm’s advertising outlay may exceed
the true current depreciation in its advertising capital) and the denominator (the
firm’s stock of advertising capital should be included in its total asset value).43
This raises the possibility that the positive advertising-profitability relationship is
spurious, being derived from a measurement approach that biases the profit rate
upward in the presence of heavy advertising. This possibility was first noted by
Backman (1967), Telser (1968, 1969a) and Weiss (1969).
The two profit rates diﬀer only in the presence of a goodwill eﬀect. An in-
vestigation of this bias thus requires some estimate of the depreciation rate for
42This is also consistent with Nelson’s (1975) finding that the relationship between advertising
and profitability is negative for search goods, though the relationship is not significant.
43Following Telser (1969) and Demstez (1979), it may be shown that the accounting profit
rate overstates the true profit rate if the accounting profit rate exceeds the growth rate of
advertising capital. To see this, let π/E (π∗/E∗) denote the accounting (true) profit on equity.
Then π/E ≡ [R − V C − a − dkK]/K and π∗/E∗ ≡ [R − V C − daA − dkK]/[A + K], where
R−V C is revenue less variable costs, a is current advertising outlay, K is tangible capital which
depreciates at rate dk, and A is advertising capital which depreciates at rate da. The bias is
then characterized as π/E−π∗/E∗ = [π/E−A0/A][A/(A+K)], where A0 ≡ a− daA is the net
advertising investment.
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advertising capital. Weiss (1969) concludes that the relationship between advertis-
ing intensity and profit rates remains positive, as in the original Comanor-Wilson
(1967) regressions, when the profit rate is recomputed under the assumption that
advertising has a durable eﬀect that depreciates at a rate of 33% per year. Co-
manor and Wilson (1974) confirm this conclusion, after using higher depreciation
rates derived from their industry demand estimates. On the other hand, using an
advertising depreciation rate of 5% rate per year for all firms, Bloch (1974) argues
that advertising does not have a statistically significant eﬀect on the true rate
of profit; and Ayanian (1975) reports a similar finding, using somewhat higher
depreciation rates that vary across industries.44 Yet, as I discuss in Section 3.1.1,
more recent studies suggest that the depreciation rate is often quite high. This
suggests that any bias may be small in magnitude.
A second interpretative issue is whether the advertising-profitability relation-
ship reflects the fact that advertising and profitability are jointly determined.
As Schmalensee (1972, 1976a, 1989) emphasizes, advertising intensity and prof-
itability may be positively associated, because they are endogenous and positively
related to omitted variables that induce large mark ups. In particular, and in line
with arguments by Demsetz (1973, 1974) and Nelson (1974b, 1975), firms of supe-
rior eﬃciency may advertise more and earn more. Following this line of reasoning,
it may be possible to disentangle the causal possibilities somewhat by looking at
how the relationship between advertising and profitability varies within an indus-
try between large and small firms. If advertising deters entry, then small and
large firms may both benefit from this “shared asset,” in which case a positive
advertising-profitability association for all firms may be expected. But, if advertis-
ing facilitates the entry of eﬃcient, large firms, then the advertising-profitability
association may be much stronger for large firms. Gomes (1986), Kwoka and
Ravenscraft (1986) and Porter (1979) provide inter-industry evidence that the
advertising-profitability association indeed is significantly greater for large firms.
This finding oﬀers some support for the informative view. It is also possible,
however, that persuasive advertising insulates large, pioneering firms from com-
petitive incursions, even though recent entrants would be more eﬃcient yet were
they to operate at large scale.
Clearly, the endogeneity concern is formidable. Furthermore, simultaneous-
equation methods are unlikely to fully resolve this concern. As Schmalensee
(1989) explains, in the long run essentially all conduct and structure variables
44Further studies include Ayanian (1983), Comanor and Wilson (1979), Demsetz (1979),
Grabowski and Mueller (1978), Hirschey (1982), Landes and Rosenfield (1994) and Nakao (1979).
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are endogenous; as a consequence, there may be a shortage of exogenous variables
that can be used as valid instruments.45
In summary, there is evidence that advertising intensity is positively associ-
ated with (accounting) profitability for manufacturers of consumer goods. Within
the consumer-goods category, this association is strongest for convenience goods.
The advertising-profitability association is weaker for producer goods, and the
association appears negative for retail and service sectors. These patterns admit
plausible economic interpretations. But it is diﬃcult to draw general inferences
as to the association between advertising and entry, due to measurement and
endogeneity concerns.
3.2.3. Entry
It is also possible to examine the entry-deterrence eﬀect of advertising by exploring
the direct relationship between advertising and entry. I consider empirical research
of this kind next.
One group of studies suggests that advertising indeed deters entry. For exam-
ple, Orr (1974a) obtains data on entry for 71 Canadian manufacturing industries
in each year from 1963 to 1967, where entry is measured by the increase in the
number of corporations in the industry. Orr then regresses entry on a number
of variables, and he finds that advertising intensity exerts a significant and nega-
tive influence on entry in consumer-goods but not producer-goods manufacturing
industries. Related findings are also oﬀered by Duetsch (1975), Gorecki (1976),
Harris (1976), Masson and Shannon (1982), Schwalbach (1987) and Shapiro and
Khemani (1987). In the market for physician services, Rizzo and Zeckhauser
(1990) find that the potential returns from advertising are greatest for experienced
physicians, which suggests that advertising may inhibit entry in this industry.
A second group of studies, however, suggests that advertising may facilitate
entry. Alemson (1970), Ferguson (1967), Hirschey (1981), McDonald (1986) and
Telser (1962) report evidence that is consistent with the view that advertising
facilitates entry and new-product innovations. Backman (1967), Eckard (1991),
Farris and Buzzell (1979), Lambin (1976) and Leﬄer (1981) also report evidence
for various industries and product classes that advertising intensity is positively
correlated with new-product innovations. Porter (1978) observes further that a
firm’s use of network TV advertising is strongly and positively associated with
45Studies that use simultaneous-equation methods include Comanor and Wilson (1974), Con-
nolly and Hirschey (1984), Geroski (1982), Martin (1979a,b) and Strickland and Weiss (1976).
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its rate of new introductions to the product line and its overall sales volume.46
Finally, in an inter-industry study, Kessides (1986) seeks to explain net entry in
266 U. S. manufacturing industries between 1972 and 1977. He concludes that, in
most industries, advertising facilitates entry.47
Questionnaire studies oﬀer further insight. In a survey of nearly 300 U.S.
product managers in a variety of product groups, Smiley (1988) and Bunch and
Smiley (1992) consider the strategies that are most commonly used by firms that
seek to deter entry. They find that the creation of product loyalty through ad-
vertising is one of the most frequently used entry-deterrence strategies. Limit
pricing and capacity expansion, for example, are less popular. In a related study
of U.K. product/brand managers, Singh et al (1998) report that a modest fraction
of managers regard advertising as an important variable with which to slow down
or dissuade new rival products. In their study, advertising appears most impor-
tant as a means for launching new products. Together, these studies suggest two
lessons. First, advertising is an important strategic variable. Second, managers
both use advertising to deter (or restrain) the entry of new products by rivals and
to promote the entry of their own new products.48
The U. S. pharmaceutical industry is an especially well-suited industry in
which to search for an entry-deterrence eﬀect of advertising. In this industry, an
incumbent firm enjoys a long period of monopoly power followed by a specific
patent-expiration date after which generic-firm entry is possible. The data thus
may be divided into “pre-entry” and “post-entry” periods, and it is possible to
explore the eﬀect of incumbent pre-entry advertising on entry. As Scott Morton
(2000) explains, many studies treat incumbent pre-entry advertising as exogenous
46The interpretation of a positive relationship between new-product innovations and adver-
tising is not straightforward: such innovations might reflect entry (a new product from a new
firm) or entry deterrence (product proliferation by an established firm). Henning and Mann
(1978) oﬀer evidence in support of the latter interpretation. Clearly, though, advertising can
complement innovation, if it enables firms to establish trademarks and develop reputations. See
Shaw (1912) for an early statement.
47See also Highfield and Smiley (1987). They report no significant relationship between ad-
vertising intensity and new firm creation for four-digit U.S. industries over the 1976-81 period.
48The association between advertising and entry also may be guaged by examining the manner
in which incumbent firms adjust advertising following entry. As observed in Section 3.1.1,
Alemson (1970), Cubbin and Domberger (1988) and Thomas (1999) describe situations in which
incumbents respond to entry with advertising. Further studies of this behavior are reported in
Section 8. But it is also often true that entry meets with little incumbent response. See Bunch
and Smiley (1988), Geroski (1995), Grabowski and Vernon (1992), Leﬄer (1981), Robinson
(1988), Singh et al (1998) and Smiley (1988).
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to the entry decision.49 Under this hypothesis, and for a sample of 98 drugs that
lost patent protection between 1986 and 1992, she finds that advertising may exert
a very slight eﬀect on generic entry, where the sign of the eﬀect depends on the
type of advertising. The exogeneity hypothesis, however, is suspect: incumbent
pre-entry advertising and entry both depend on unobserved expectations as to
the profitability of the post-entry market. Scott Morton thus instruments for
incumbent pre-entry advertising in an equation that explains generic entry. The
coeﬃcient on advertising is then insignificantly diﬀerent from zero. Scott Morton
(2000, p. 1103) concludes “that brand advertising is not a barrier to entry in the
US pharmaceutical industry.”
In total, the direct evidence of the association between advertising and entry
is somewhat mixed. Advertising may be used to raise the cost of entry, but it
also may be the means of eﬀective entry. The appropriate interpretation of the
advertising-entry relationship is subtle and seems to vary across industries.
3.2.4. Price
As Chamberlin (1933) explains, advertising has conflicting eﬀects on price, and
the overall relationship cannot be deduced on theoretical grounds alone. I review
next the empirical research that addresses the advertising-price relationship.
Consider first the impact of manufacturer advertising on the retail price. A
variety of evidence suggests that heavily advertised brands are more expensive for
final consumers than are less-advertised goods within the same product class. See,
for example, Borden (1942), Backman (1967, p. 125), Nickell and Metcalf (1978),
Scherer and Ross (1990, pp. 581-92), Telser (1964, p. 542) and Tremblay and
Tremblay (1995). This evidence is consistent with the persuasive view. But, as
information- and complementary-view advocates might argue, it is also possible
that heavily advertised goods have higher prices, because they have higher (or less
variable) quality or embody prestige eﬀects that consumers directly value. More-
over, even if the relative prices of advertised products are higher, there remains
the question of whether on average absolute prices are higher when advertising is
present than when it is not. This is a diﬃcult question, to which I now turn.50
In a series of papers, Steiner (1973, 1978, 1984, 1993) considers the relationship
between manufacturer advertising and retailer margins and prices. Like Kaldor,
49See Grabowski and Vernon (1992), Hurwitz and Caves (1988) and Leﬄer (1981).
50For other approaches to this question, see Eckard (1987), Gallet (1999) and Leahy (1991).
They provide evidence that manufacturer advertising may be associated with lower prices.
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Steiner argues that manufacturer advertising shifts power to the manufacturer.51
Retail margins may fall for two reasons. First, when a brand is heavily advertised,
retailers are more attracted to a reduced retail price for the brand. Intuitively,
a heavily advertised brand is “identifiable” and serves as a benchmark by which
consumers may compare prices across retailers; thus, a retailer’s reputation for low
pricing is particularly sensitive to the price that it sets for the advertised brand.
Extending this argument, a retailer may regard a heavily advertised brand as an
especially attractive candidate for “specials” and loss-leader promotions. Second,
when a brand is heavily advertised and thus of particular value to retailers, the
manufacturer may be tempted to raise the wholesale price. For these reasons,
a negative relationship between manufacturer advertising and retail margins is
implied.52 The overall eﬀect of manufacturer advertising on the final retail price is
less clear and depends on the extent to which the manufacturer raises its wholesale
price. Retailers set a lower retail price on the advertised brand if any increase in
the wholesale price is small.
In support of this argument, Steiner (1973) considers the toy industry and re-
ports evidence that the emergence of large-scale TV advertising in the late 1950s
precipitated a substantial drop in retail margins. In cross-sectional work, Albion
(1983), Reekie (1979), Farris and Albion (1987) and Nelson (1978) oﬀer evidence
that manufacturers’ advertising and retailer margins are inversely related, while
Steiner (1993) provides anecdotal support of this relationship in particular indus-
tries. In a related study, Nelson et al (1992) consider the relationship between
market share and the wholesale price for the Maxwell House coﬀee brand in dif-
ferent regions. They find that the wholesale price is higher in regions for which
market share is higher. In their suggested interpretation, well-known brands are
attractive to retailers as items on which to run specials, since such brands are
used as benchmarks for cross-store price comparisons, and manufacturers of such
brands are thus able to charge higher wholesale prices.53
Manufacturer advertising also may impact retail pricing by influencing the
scale and function of retail firms. This argument builds from the observation
51Similar arguments appear also in earlier work, as observed in footnote 9. Albion and Farris
(1981) and Farris and Albion (1980) discuss some of Steiner’s arguments in further detail.
52Marshall (1919, pp. 301-02) also argues that branded goods are often used as “leaders” and
that wholesale prices are often high.
53Some related themes emerge in a recent study by Chevalier et al (2003). Using scanner data
from a large supermarket chain, they find that retail prices and margins tend to be lower for an
item over periods for which the item is in peak demand (e.g., tuna at Lent). This is also the
time at which the item is more likely to be advertised by the retailer.
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that manufacturer brand advertising and point-of-sale retail service are substi-
tute sources of pre-purchase information for consumers. Brand advertising pro-
vides consumers with an implicit quality guarantee, due to the reputational capital
that the brand embodies, and a retailer provides a similar implicit guarantee when
it elects to carry a brand. In addition, retailer service can improve consumers’
information with regard to specific product features. Suppose now that some
underlying change were to occur that occasioned a substantial increase in manu-
facturer brand advertising. Time-constrained consumers might then demand less
information from retailers, and retail competition could then focus more on price
and less on service. Discount chains carrying brand goods might emerge.
Evidence of this pattern is reported in some industries. In particular, Steiner
(1978) argues that this pattern describes the U.S. toy industry, and Pashigian and
Bowen (1994) report supportive evidence from the mid-1970s for the U.S. apparel
and toy industries. But what is the underlying change? As Steiner (1978) argues,
one possibility is that the emergence of TV advertising in the 1950s lowered the
cost to manufacturers of providing brand information.54 Pashigian and Bowen
propose a second possibility: the growth in (relative) earnings by females in the
mid-1970s implied an increased cost to shopping time, this instigated a growth
in branding, and brand advertising eventually substituted for retail service. Un-
der both interpretations, greater manufacturer advertising is associated with the
emergence of large-scale retailers that oﬀer modest service and low prices.
Consider second the impact of retail advertising on the retail price. The classic
study on this topic is oﬀered by Benham (1972). In the 1960s, considerable
variation existed across states in the U.S. with respect to the legal treatment
of advertising in the eyeglass industry. Broadly, states fell into three groups:
some states prohibited all advertising, some states prohibited price advertising but
allowed non-price advertising, and some states had no restrictions. This variation
provides a natural experiment with which to assess the eﬀect of retail advertising
on retail pricing. Benham reports that eyeglass prices were substantially higher
in states that prohibited all advertising than in states that had no restrictions;
furthermore, prices were only slightly higher in states that allowed only non-price
advertising than in states with no restrictions. The association between price
advertising and lower prices is striking and directly supports the informative view.
The association between non-price advertising and low prices is also striking. It
appears to reflect the entry of large-scale retail firms into markets that permit
54See also Bresnahan (1984).
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non-price advertising.55
Similar findings are reported in studies of other industries. Cady (1976) con-
siders the U. S. retail market for prescription drugs in 1970, when legal restrictions
on retail advertising varied across states. He finds that retail prices are signifi-
cantly and positively related to advertising restrictions, and he also reports a
price-reducing influence for non-price advertising. Maurizi and Kelly (1978) com-
pare retail gasoline prices across major cities. They find that both the mean and
variance of prices are lower in states where price advertising is allowed. The same
finding is reported by Feldman and Begun (1978, 1980), who study the price of
examinations performed by optometrists. The optometry industry is also the sub-
ject of an important FTC (1980) study. Using FTC data, Kwoka (1984) finds that
non-advertising and especially advertising firms reduce the price of examinations
in markets for which advertising is allowed.56 Using survey data for the routine
legal service market in 17 U.S. metropolitan areas, Schroeter et al (1987) report
evidence that price-cost ratios are lower when area-wide advertising intensity is
greater. These studies all support the informative view.
As Benham acknowledges, it is possible that advertising restrictions and prices
are both endogenous variables that reflect some underlying influence; for example,
if sellers are well organized in a given region, then they may be able to secure
legislation (advertising restrictions) that facilitates their collusive conduct (high
prices). This concern motivates two longitudinal eﬀorts. First, Glazer (1981)
compares supermarket food prices in Queens, New York and Long Island, over a
two-month period in 1978 when a newspaper strike limited the price information
that could be communicated through advertising in Queens. The newspaper strike
is clearly an exogenous source of variation in advertising restrictions. For a few
commonly advertised grocery items, Glazer reports that relative prices rose in
Queens during the strike, before returning to normal levels at the end of the
strike. Second, Milyo and Waldfogel (1999) consider the liquor industry and
make use of an exogenous shock: the 1996 Supreme Court ruling that overturned
Rhode Island’s ban on advertising prices of alcoholic beverages.57 Using data for
55Benham and Benham (1975), Haas-Wilson (1986) and an FTC (1980) study consider the
impact of a range of commercial practice restrictions in the optometry industry. These studies
suggest that restrictions impede the flow of information from firms to consumers and thus deter
the entry of large-scale (“commercial”) firms that oﬀer low prices.
56An important issue is whether the quality-adjusted price is also lower at advertising firms.
For diﬀerent perspectives, see Kwoka (1984) and Parker (1995).
57For an earlier longitudinal study of the liquor industry, see Luksetich and Lofgreen (1976),
who argue that legislation that relaxed restrictions against price advertising in Minnesota re-
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33 alcoholic beverage products at 115 stores between 1995 and 1997, they find
that advertising stores substantially cut the prices of advertised products and
have lower prices on average than other stores. In contrast to Stigler’s (1961)
predictions, however, the introduction of price advertising has little eﬀect on the
prices of non-advertised products and is not associated with a reduction in price
dispersion across stores.
In summary, the impact of manufacturer advertising on retail prices is complex.
There is some evidence, though, that manufacturer advertising may encourage
loss-leaders featuring the advertised item and facilitate the growth of low-price
discount outlets. For many industries, there is also substantial evidence that
retail advertising leads to lower retail prices. Recent work, however, suggests that
the distinction between the eﬀect of advertising on the prices of advertised and
non-advertised products warrants greater attention.
3.2.5. Quality
According to Nelson (1974b), when a product is heavily advertised, it is more
likely that the quality of the product is high. I summarize now empirical work
that examines further the relationship between advertising and quality.
In most empirical studies, a positive relationship between advertising and
product quality is observed in some circumstances, but the relationship fails (or
weakens) in other circumstances. For example, Archibald et al (1983) exam-
ine the market for running shoes for 178 brands. They consider the correlation
between advertising levels and product quality, where quality is measured by
published rankings in the magazine Runners’ World. The correlation between
advertising and quality is found to strengthen significantly after the publication
of ratings. Caves and Greene (1996) consider 196 product categories and evaluate
the rank correlations between brands’ product-quality rankings and advertising
outlays, where quality rankings are measured using Consumer Reports data. They
find that advertising and quality are generally uncorrelated among brands. The
advertising-quality relationship is positive, however, for innovative goods and also
goods for which buyers’ experience and search are both useful in making the brand
choice. Finally, Tellis and Fornell (1988) explore the advertising-quality relation-
ship over the product life cycle. Using PIMS data for a sample of 749 consumer
businesses for the period 1970-1983, wherein a firm’s product quality is measured
on the basis of a (confidential) self-assessment, they find that advertising, market
sulted in lower retail prices.
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share and profitability are all positively associated with product quality. They
observe further that these relationships are especially strong at later stages in the
product life cycle.58
A common theme in these studies is that consumers are responsive to adver-
tising that contains direct information as to product quality. This suggests that a
positive advertising-quality relationship often may reflect the diﬀerential benefit
that firms with high-quality products enjoy from providing direct product-quality
information through their advertisements.59 The study by Archibald et al, for
instance, suggests that firms with high rankings are eager to communicate this
information to consumers through advertising. Likewise, Caves and Greene (1996,
p. 50) explain that their findings are “consistent with advertising as information,
if higher quality goods have more features or capabilities (which buyers learn
from verifiable advertised information).” The findings of Tellis and Fornell can
be viewed in this way, as well. To interpret the strengthening of the relationship
over the product life cycle, Tellis and Fornell explain that it is less tempting for a
low-quality firm to advertise once the product matures, in part because consumers
are then better informed.
This discussion highlights the distinction between direct and indirect product-
quality information. In fact, this distinction becomes ambiguous, once it is al-
lowed that consumers have imperfect memories. As Nelson (1974b) argues in
his discussion of the repeat-business eﬀect, a firm with a high-quality product
gains more from rekindling the memories of its old consumers, and the fact that
the firm advertises therefore represents a source of indirect information to new
consumers. But advertising is then also a means by which old consumers gain
access to direct information that concerns the product’s quality and attributes.
From this perspective, an advertisement that provides indirect information to
new consumers simultaneously provides direct information to old consumers. The
“memory-activation” role for advertising may be of special value for firms with
high-quality goods that are in the later stages of the product life cycle. This sug-
gests that the life-cycle pattern observed by Tellis and Fornell might emerge, even
if the content of advertisements for mature, high-quality products is not more
58For additional studies that report evidence of a positive advertising-quality relationship, see
Marquardt and McGann (1975) and Rotfeld and Rotzoll (1976). Kirmani and Rao (2000) oﬀer
a recent survey.
59A related point is that firms may have greater incentive to select high-quality products
when consumers possess greater direct product-quality information. Jin and Leslie (2003) oﬀer
striking evidence in support of this point.
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informative in some literal sense.60
Experimental work oﬀers a means by which a researcher might gain direct ev-
idence as to the manner in which advertising influences consumers’ perceptions.
The experiments conducted by Homer (1995), Kirmani and Wright (1989) and
Kirmani (1990, 1997) are of particular interest. These studies examine how sub-
jects’ expectations about product quality are aﬀected by perceived advertising
expenditures. An inverted-U relationship is suggested. Provided that advertising
expenditures are not unreasonably high, consumers perceive higher advertising
expenditures as indicating that the manufacturer has greater confidence in the
quality of the product. When advertising levels reach excessive levels, however,
consumers may infer that the manufacturer lacks confidence in the product’s qual-
ity and is desperate. These studies provide some evidence that consumers infer a
positive relationship between advertising expenditures and product quality. This
inference is broadly consistent with Nelson’s (1974b) reasoning.
There exists also a small literature that examines the advertising-quality rela-
tionship in the retail sector. Utilizing state-level variation in advertising restric-
tions for the optometry industry, Kwoka (1984) considers whether the ability to
advertise results in a deterioration in quality of eye examinations, where quality is
measured as time spent in the examination. In comparison to firms in states that
restrict advertising, advertising firms oﬀer lower quality but non-advertising firms
select higher quality. In total, Kwoka’s work thus suggests that the presence of
advertising serves to (i) reduce prices and lower quality at advertising firms, and
(ii) reduce (to a smaller extent) prices and raise quality at non-advertising firms.
Kwoka also suggests that average quality is higher in markets for which advertis-
ing is allowed than in markets for which it is not.61 This suggestion, however, is
disputed by Parker (1995), who considers alternative measures of quality.
What are the main lessons? Perhaps the main finding is a negative one: the
studies described here do not oﬀer strong support for the hypothesis of a system-
atic positive relationship between advertising and product quality. The studies
do suggest, however, that a positive relationship is more likely when advertising
60This suggestion is of particular relevance, in light of work by Arterburn and Woodbury
(1981) and Resnik and Stern (1978) that studies the content of magazine and TV advertising.
Their studies suggest that often little “hard” information is supplied through these media. See
Abernethy and Franke (1996) for further discussion.
61Similarly, Haas-Smith (1986) studies the price of an eye examination bundled with a pair of
glasses, where quality is measured by the thoroughness of the eye examination and the accuracy
of the eyeglass prescription. She finds that commercial practice restrictions raise price without
increasing quality.
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conveys direct information (broadly defined) to consumers. Finally, when adver-
tising is allowed in retail service industries, there is some evidence that advertising
firms may have lower product quality and non-advertising firms may have higher
product quality than they would were advertising not allowed.
3.3. Summary
At a broad level, the empirical research described here oﬀers progress on three
fronts. First, it indicates clearly that no single view of advertising is valid in all
circumstances. This in itself is progress, and especially so when compared to the
absolutist tone adopted in many of the initial discussions of advertising.62 Second,
progress is also achieved at a more constructive level: a number of important
regularities are identified that hold within particular industries or narrow industry
categories. Finally, progress is also apparent at a methodological level. While
some of the earlier empirical work regards advertising as a structural variable
that proxies for product diﬀerentiation, subsequent work is increasingly attentive
to the endogeneity of advertising and the interpretive as well as econometric issues
that endogeneity implies.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the empirical studies suggest important
roles for advertising theory. Theoretical work might oﬀer important insight into
questions - Is advertising excessively supplied? Does it deter entry? - that the
empirical analyses fail to resolve. In addition, theoretical work may provide novel
interpretations of some of the constructive findings that the empirical analyses
oﬀer for diﬀerent market structures. New predictions may also emerge. Finally,
with advances in advertising theory, a foundation may be provided on which
to specify the endogenous determination of advertising, so that future empirical
analyses might proceed at a more structural level. With these roles in mind, I
present in the next four sections a review of the economic theory of advertising.
4. Monopoly Advertising
In this section, I focus on positive and normative theories of monopoly advertis-
ing. The monopoly case is of interest in its own right, and it also represents a
simple setting within which to begin the formal analysis of advertising. In sub-
sequent sections, I consider more advanced topics, including multi-firm markets
62As Lambin (1976, p. 99) puts it: “The feeling that emerges is that the economic power of
advertising has been overstated by critics and apologists of advertising.”
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and monopoly advertising that signals product quality.
4.1. The Positive Theory of Monopoly Advertising
In the preceding two sections, it is emphasized that any observed relationship
between advertising and other variables (e.g., profit) must be interpreted with
great care, since advertising is endogenous. At a broad level, the significance of
this idea can be appreciated without the aid of a formal model, and indeed I have
proceeded on this assumption. The development of a formal theory, however,
does make possible important additional insights. In a classic paper, Dorfman
and Steiner (1954) oﬀer one of the first formal theories of optimal monopoly ad-
vertising.63 This theory identifies the key structural features on which endogenous
monopoly advertising depends, and it also oﬀers a general framework within which
specific theories of monopoly advertising may be developed.
4.1.1. The Dorfman-Steiner Model
The Dorfman-Steiner model takes the following form. Suppose that a monopolist
chooses the price of its product, P , and a level of advertising, A, where A may
denote the number of fliers sent, minutes of TV or radio time bought, etc.. The
cost per advertisement is assumed constant and is given by κ. The market demand
function is represented as D(P,A), where attention is restricted to (P,A) ≥ 0 for
which D > 0 and DA > 0 > DP . The monopolist’s variable cost of production is
given by C(D(P,A)), where C 0 > 0. Under these assumptions, the monopolist’s
profit function is defined as Π(P,A) ≡ PD(P,A)−C(D(P,A))−κA. This model
assumes that consumers respond to advertising, but it does not explain why. The
model is therefore not yet suitable for normative analysis. It is, however, now
possible to derive a positive theory of monopoly pricing and advertising.
To this end, it is useful to examine the first-order conditions for profit maxi-
mization. Assuming throughout that second-order conditions hold, the monopo-
list maximizes profit if and only if its price and advertising selections satisfy the
following first-order conditions:
ΠP = (P − C 0)DP +D = 0 (4.1)
ΠA = (P − C 0)DA − κ = 0 (4.2)
63See also Rasmussen (1952), who presents a formal analysis of optimal advertising but im-
poses the assumption that price is fixed. See Schmalensee (1972) for further discussion.
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Let PM(A) denote that price that satisfies (4.1). This is the profit-maximizing
price for any given level of advertising. Similarly, for any given price, let AM(P )
denotes the advertising level that satisfies (4.2). The monopolist maximizes profit
with its joint selection of price and advertising when it picks a pair (PM , AM) such
that (PM , AM) = (PM(AM), AM(PM)).
To interpret the first-order conditions, let εP ≡ −PDP/D and εA ≡ ADA/D
denote the price and advertising elasticities of demand, respectively. Manipulation
of (4.1) yields the familiar markup rule:






Substituting (4.3) into (4.2), it follows that the marginal revenue from a dollar
increase in advertising expenditure must equal the price-elasticity of demand:
PDA
κ
= εP . (4.4)
The ratio of advertising expenditures to sales revenue, or the advertising intensity,
is κA/PD. Using (4.4), the advertising intensity must equal the ratio of elasticities







The proportion of sales revenue that a profit-maximizing monopolist spends on
advertising is thus determined by a simple elasticity ratio.64
Dorfman and Steiner provide a formal expression for some of the reverse-
causality concerns raised in Sections 2 and 3. For example, consider the persuasive-
view hypothesis that a high advertising intensity makes the demand function more
price inelastic and thereby leads to a large markup. Dorfman and Steiner provide
a formal basis under which the reverse causal pattern also may be advanced: all
else equal, when the demand function is more price inelastic (i.e., when εP is
smaller), a monopolist chooses a high advertising intensity and a large markup.
4.1.2. Two Examples
This general framework places little restriction on the manner in which adver-
tising impacts demand. By imposing further structure, it is possible to capture
64Related rules may be derived in dynamic settings with goodwill eﬀects. See Nerlove and
Arrow (1962), Friedman (1983), Gould (1970) and Schmalensee (1972).
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some of the eﬀects emphasized under alternative views of advertising. I consider
two examples.65 In the first example, monopoly advertising raises the willingness
of consumers to pay and thereby generates an upward shift in the monopolist’s
demand function. This example is illustrative of the persuasive view. In the
second example, monopoly advertising informs new consumers that the product
exists and thereby generates an outward shift in the monopolist’s demand func-
tion. This example is illustrative of the informative view. At a positive level, both
examples are compatible with the complementary view.
In the first example, each consumer considers whether to buy a unit of the
monopolist’s product, where the consumer’s valuation for this product may be
influenced by the monopolist’s advertising. Consumers are “vertically diﬀerenti-
ated” with respect to the influence of advertising on their valuations. Formally,
when the monopolist advertises at level A and sets the price P , a consumer of
type θ enjoys utility θg(A)−P if the consumer buys one unit of the monopolist’s
product, where g(0) = 1 and g0(A) > 0. The consumer receives zero utility other-
wise. There is a mass of consumers of size N > 0, and θ is uniformly distributed
over [0, 1]. A consumer of type θ thus buys the monopolist’s product if and only
if θ ≥ P/g(A), and so the market demand function is D(P,A) = N [1− P/g(A)].
As the persuasive view suggests, when advertising is increased, the demand
function becomes more inelastic. Formally, it is easily derived that εP = P/(g(A)−
P ), so that the elasticity eﬀect is dεP
dA
< 0. The persuasive view also holds that
the profit-maximizing price, PM(A), rises when the level of advertising is raised,
provided that no oﬀsetting scale eﬀect is present. Using (4.1), it may be confirmed
that ΠPA = N [g0 + C 00DA]/g when evaluated at P = PM(A). It follows that:
sign{P 0M(A)} = sign{g0 + C 00DA}. (4.6)
Therefore, if marginal cost is constant or increasing, then the monopoly price
indeed does rise when advertising is increased. On the other hand, if there is a
significant scale eﬀect, then greater advertising could lower the monopoly price.
Further insight can be developed using the inverse demand function. This
function is represented here as P (A,Q) = g(A)(1 − Q/N), where Q denotes the
quantity of units sold. Observe that PAQ = −g0/N < 0, which indicates that
advertising shifts up the demand function by more at lower quantities. Intuitively,
the marginal consumer has a lower θ and thus gets a smaller valuation gain from
an advertising increase than do the inframarginal consumers who have higher θ0s.
65See also Pepall et al (1999, Chapter 10) for a similar presentation.
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The second example builds on an approach suggested by Butters (1977). Sup-
pose there are N consumers, each of whom possesses the same individual demand
function, d(P ), for the monopolist’s product, where d is positive and decreas-
ing below a reservation price: d0(P ) < 0 for P ∈ [0, R] and d(R) = 0. The
monopolist chooses the number of advertising messages, A, that are sent. Each
“ad” is received by exactly one consumer, and each consumer is equally likely
to receive any given ad. A consumer becomes aware of the monopolist’s prod-
uct only by receiving an ad. The probability that a consumer receives no ad
is then [1 − 1/N ]A ≈ e−A/N for N large. The market demand function is thus
D(P,A) = N [1− e−A/N ]d(P ) ≡ G(A)d(P ). Observe that G0 > G(0) = 0 > G00.
As the informative view suggests, when advertising is increased, the demand
function does not become more inelastic. In fact, advertising here has no elasticity
eﬀect: dεP
dA
= 0.66 Consider next the impact of an increase in the level of adver-
tising upon the profit-maximizing price, PM(A). Using (4.1), it is readily shown
that ΠPA = −DPC 00DA when evaluated at P = PM(A). Therefore, for A > 0, the
eﬀect of advertising on the monopoly price is entirely dictated by the scale eﬀect:
sign{P 0M(A)} = sign{C 00}. (4.7)
In contrast to the first example above, if marginal cost is constant, then advertising
has no eﬀect on the monopoly price.
The inverse demand function is now P (A,Q) = d−1(Q/G(A)), where d−1 is
a strictly decreasing function. Calculations reveal that PAQ > 0 provided that a
demand-curvature condition, dd00 − (d0)2 < 0, is satisfied. Under this condition,
advertising shifts up the demand function by more at higher quantities. Intu-
itively, at a given level of advertising, if the quantity is high, then the individual
demand, d(P ), must be high, and so a low price is implied. From this starting
point, an increase in advertising would lead to a significant volume increase, as
new consumers would bring forth large individual demands at the low price. To
maintain the original volume, a significant price increase is then required.
Finally, it is interesting to link these examples back to the earlier literature.
Two points warrant emphasis. First, the examples confirm Chamberlin’s insight:
the eﬀect of advertising on price is determined by the elasticity and scale eﬀects
of advertising, where the former is itself determined by the purpose (persuasion
or information) of advertising. The second point concerns the market demand
function D under the informative view. This function is strictly increasing and
66The informative view in fact holds that advertising increases the price-elasticity of demand.
This eﬀect arises in diﬀerentiated-goods markets with multiple firms, as I discuss in Section 5.2.
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concave in A, and it captures formally Ozga’s rationale for diminishing returns.
In particular, at a higher level of advertising, the benefit of additional advertising
is lower, since it becomes less likely that a new ad reaches a consumer who has
not already learned of the product’s existence.
4.2. The Normative Theory of Monopoly Advertising
Does a monopolist advertise to an extent that is socially excessive, inadequate
or optimal? Many of the earliest commentators on advertising oﬀer unequivocal
answers, but the theoretical frameworks on which their answers are based are
rarely clarified. Empirical eﬀorts also fail to oﬀer a conclusive answer. Perhaps
advances in theory might provide a means by which to answer this question with
guarded confidence. Motivated by this prospect, I oﬀer here a formal discussion of
the recent development of the normative theory of monopoly advertising. Under
the assumption that advertising is utility increasing (a good), this work suggests
that a profit-maximizing monopolist may advertise to an extent that is socially
inadequate. To develop this suggestion, I use the model and two examples pre-
sented just above. They constitute a unifying framework in which to present
recent developments in the persuasive, informative and complementary views.
4.2.1. The Persuasive View
Under the persuasive view, advertising changes the preferences of consumers. An
issue thus arises as to the standard by which consumer welfare should be assessed.
Braithwaite oﬀers the first analysis of this kind. As discussed in Section 2.2, she
measures consumer welfare relative to pre-advertising tastes, and she establishes
that monopoly advertising lowers consumer welfare if the monopoly price rises or
remains unchanged when advertising occurs. As Figure 1 illustrates, consumer
surplus may (but need not) increase if advertising is coupled with a decrease in
the monopoly price. Intuitively, advertising induces a consumption distortion:
consumers purchase additional units at a price that exceeds what those units are
“truly” worth. This consumer-welfare loss, L, due to advertising can be oﬀset only
if the price falls, so that there is a consumer-welfare gain, G, from the purchase
of truly desirable units at a lower price.
But a complete welfare analysis requires as well that the impact of advertising
on profit be considered. This step is taken by Dixit and Norman (1978). To
understand their argument, consider Figure 2, in which an increase in advertising
from A0 to A1 results in an outward shift in demand from D(P,A0) to D(P,A1).
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As depicted, Dixit and Norman assume that the additional advertising increases
price from P0 to P1 and quantity sold from D(P0, A0) to D(P1, A1). Let ∆A ≡
A1−A0 > 0 and∆P ≡ P1−P0 > 0. For simplicity, they suppose that the marginal
cost of production, C 0, is constant.
Two interpretations are possible. First, if A0 = 0, then the initial demand
curve, D(P,A0), corresponds to a market without advertising, so that the sub-
sequent demand curve, D(P,A1), reflects the level of demand once advertising
is allowed. Second, if A0 > 0, then the demand shift describes a market with
an initial level of advertising that is subsequently increased. Allowing for either
interpretation, I refer to D(P,A0) as the initial demand curve and to D(P,A1)
as the subsequent demand curve. Dixit and Norman are flexible when it comes
to the precise standard by which consumer welfare is measured; however, they do
require that the same standard be used before and after advertising is increased.
I define the initial (subsequent) standard as the consumer surplus associated with
the initial (subsequent) demand curve.
Consider first the case in which the initial standard is used. As Braithwaite
observes, under the assumption that advertising leads to a higher price, consumer
welfare is then decreased by advertising, due to the induced consumption distor-
tion: consumers pay more for additional units than those units are truly worth,
as depicted by the area Z, and pay more now for units that were desirable even
before the change in advertising, as captured by the area X.67 The change in
consumer surplus under the initial standard is thus ∆CS0 ≡ −[X + Z] < 0. But
the monopolist enjoys an increase in producer surplus in amount X +Z +V > 0.
The change in the monopolist’s profit, ∆Π ≡ Π(P1, A1) − Π(P0, A0), balances
the increase in producer surplus against the additional advertising expenditure:
∆Π = X + Z + V − κ∆A. Under the assumption that the advertising industry
operates at constant cost and earns zero rents, the resource cost of advertising,
κ∆A, is the same for the monopolist as for society. The change in welfare under
the initial standard, ∆W0 ≡ ∆CS0+∆Π, is thus determined as ∆W0 = V −κ∆A.
While the monopolist and a social planner agree on the cost of advertising, they
disagree on the size of the benefit that additional advertising implies. Consider a
small increase in advertising. Then, quantity and price both change little, and so
Z is second order in size. The following relationship is apparent:
∆W0 ≈ ∆Π−D(P0, A0)∆P. (4.8)
67In Figure 2, the unlabeled triangle that is southwest of the area Y is understood to rest in
both region X and region U .
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The disagreement thus emerges because consumers must pay a higher price on
units that were purchased even in the initial situation. The transfer has no welfare
significance, but it does increase monopoly profit. Under the initial standard,
therefore, the private benefit to the monopolist of small expansion in advertising
that results in a higher price exceeds the social benefit.
Consider second the case in which the subsequent standard is adopted. The
same logic applies. To see this, observe that the change in consumer surplus,
∆CS1, is now captured in Figure 2 as ∆CS1 = Y −X, where Y reflects the new
consumer surplus that is enjoyed under the subsequent standard when additional
units are consumed at the price P1. The monopolist’s change in profit remains
∆Π = X +Z + V − κ∆A. The change in welfare under the subsequent standard,
∆W1 ≡ ∆CS1+∆Π, is thus determined as ∆W1 = Y +Z+V −κ∆A. As before,
for a small increase in advertising, quantity and price both change little, and so
Z and now Y are second order in size. But this means that the welfare diﬀerence
under the two standards, ∆W1−∆W0, is second order. Indeed, for small changes,
we obtain the same formula
∆W1 ≈ ∆Π−D(P0, A0)∆P. (4.9)
Thus, even under the subsequent standard, the private benefit to the monopolist
of a small expansion in price-increasing advertising exceeds the social benefit.
Using (4.8) and (4.9), two findings are obtained. First, for a small increase
in advertising, whether the initial or subsequent standard is used, the monopolist
will not undersupply and may oversupply price-increasing advertising. Put dif-
ferently, for a small amount of price-increasing advertising, private profitability
is necessary, but not suﬃcient, for social desirability. Next, suppose that (i) the
initial and subsequent advertising levels are given as A0 = AM −∆A < AM = A1,
and (ii) for any advertising level A, the monopolist chooses its profit-maximizing
price, PM(A). Given the assumption that advertising is price-increasing, it fol-
lows that P0 = PM(AM −∆A) < PM(AM) = PM = P1. An envelope argument is
now available: under (4.1) and (4.2), when the price-advertising pair is increased
slightly from (P0, A0) to (P1, A1), there is no first-order eﬀect on monopoly prof-
its and hence ∆Π = 0. According to (4.8) and (4.9), social welfare would rise
under either standard if the monopolist were to slightly reduce its advertising
and price from their profit-maximizing levels, (PM , AM). A second finding is thus
established: monopoly advertising that increases price is excessive.68
68It is also possible to evaluate the increase in advertising from A0 = AM −∆ to A1 = AM
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These are striking findings. But important concerns may be raised. A first
concern is the assumption that advertising increases price. As discussed in Section
3.2.4, in multi-firm markets at least, the empirical support for the price-increasing
assumption is mixed. Likewise, in the positive models of advertising, the price-
increasing assumption finds mixed theoretical support: under constant marginal
costs, the assumption holds in the first but not the second example. A second
concern is the manner in which Dixit and Norman measure consumer welfare.
This concern is more subtle, and I turn to it next.
4.2.2. An Alternative Approach
Under the Dixit-Norman approach, the impact of advertising on consumer welfare
is measured relative to a fixed standard. Price-increasing monopoly advertising
is then excessive, since the monopolist is motivated by the prospect of obtaining
a higher price on those units that are initially purchased. This accounts for
the term D(P0, A0)∆P in (4.8) and (4.9). As Dixit and Norman acknowledge,
an important feature of their approach is that the area between the initial and
subsequent demand curves on infra-marginal units (i.e., units below D(P0, A0))
plays no part in the calculations. In Figure 2, this is depicted by the area U .
An alternative perspective is that the right comparison is rather between
the consumer surplus under the initial demand curve at the price-quantity pair
(P0,D(P0, A0)) with the consumer surplus under the subsequent demand curve
at the price-quantity pair (P1,D(P1, A1)). For small changes, this amounts to a
comparison between consumer surplus under D(P,A0) at the price-quantity pair
(P0,D(P0, A0)) with the consumer surplus under D(P,A1) at the price-quantity
pair (P1,D(P0, A0)). Intuitively, the “Dixit-Norman term,” D(P0, A0)∆P, would
enter into this comparison and again provide an influence toward excessive price-
increasing monopoly advertising. But a new “infra-marginal term,” corresponding
to the area U, would also arise. The latter term would account for the additional
consumer surplus that advertising generates on the initial units as demand shifts
from D(P,A0) to D(P,A1). This additional surplus arises regardless of the di-
rection of the change in price, and it represents a social benefit from advertising
that the monopolist cannot appropriate. Accordingly, the infra-marginal term
provides an influence toward inadequate monopoly advertising.
using the pre-advertising standard (i.e., the consumer surplus associated with the demand curve
D(P, 0)). As Dixit and Norman show, the case for excessive advertising is then even greater,
since advertising induces a (first-order) consumption-distortion cost.
62
The Dixit-Norman and alternative approaches can be understood with refer-
ence to the two examples presented above. The Dixit-Norman approach may be
associated with the first example, if it is assumed that an existing consumer of
type θ does not experience a “real” gain in utility when advertising is increased.
The alternative approach is founded on the informative and the complementary
views. First, in line with the second example presented above and as Kotowitz
and Mathewson (1979a) and Shapiro (1980) explain, the upward shift in demand
might reflect informative advertising that brings new consumers into the market.
Surely, the surplus enjoyed by these consumers should enter into the welfare cal-
culation. Second, as Fisher and McGowan (1979) emphasize, even in the first
example, it is possible that consumers value the social prestige that an advertised
product may facilitate.
Two conclusions of the alternative approach may now be anticipated. First,
monopoly advertising is inadequate if advertising does not raise price. Intuitively,
in the case of price-maintaining or price-decreasing advertising, the Dixit-Norman
term is neutral or reinforces the infra-marginal term. Second, monopoly adver-
tising may be inadequate, even if advertising raises price. In this case, the Dixit-
Norman and infra-marginal terms pull in opposite directions, but the latter may
dominate if the price increase is not too great. This second conclusion, of course,
contrasts with the implication under the persuasive view (as formalized by Dixit
and Norman) that a monopolist always supplies price-increasing advertising to a
socially excessive extent.
With the central ideas now in place, I now formalize the alternative approach
and develop its two main conclusions. Drawing on the two examples, I also develop
the informative and complementary foundations for the alternative approach in
some further detail.
4.2.3. Price-Maintaining and Price-Decreasing Monopoly Advertising
For a given price and advertising level, let social welfare be defined as




where R(A) satisfies D(R(A), A) = 0 and may vary with A. Notice that this
formulation captures the alternative approach: under (4.10), when the price-
advertising pair changes from (P0, A0) to (P1, A1), the change in consumer welfare
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is calculated by comparing the consumer surplus under D(P,A0) at the price-
quantity pair (P0, D(P0, A0)) with the consumer surplus under D(P,A1) at the
price-quantity pair (P1,D(P1, A1)).
In line with the Dixit-Norman analysis, suppose now that (i) the monopolist
begins at its monopoly solution, (PM , AM), and (ii) when advertising is changed
to some nearby level A, the monopolist responds with its profit-maximizing price,











Under (4.1) and (4.2), advertising does not have a first-order eﬀect on profit.
Given that D(R(A), A) = 0, (4.11) thus may be re-written as
dW (PM(A), A)
dA




As the discussion above anticipates, there are two terms. The first term in (4.12)
is the Dixit-Norman term. The sign of this term is dictated by the impact of
advertising on price. The second term in (4.12) is the new infra-marginal term.
The sign of this term is positive.
The first conclusion is now established: if additional advertising would not
cause the monopolist to raise its price (i.e., if P 0M(AM) ≤ 0), then welfare would
be increased were the monopolist to raise its advertising above the monopoly level.
Put diﬀerently, the monopoly supply of price-decreasing and price-maintaining
advertising is inadequate. Intuitively, in the absence of a price increase, additional
monopoly advertising induces a consumer-surplus gain that the monopolist cannot
appropriate; therefore, the monopolist advertises to an inadequate extent.
To see this conclusion in action, consider the case of informative monopoly
advertising, as captured in the second example above. The appropriate measure
of welfare is then given by (4.10), where D(P,A) = G(A)d(P ) and R(A) ≡ R.
Using (4.7), the first conclusion now may be stated at a structural level: when
advertising is informative, monopoly advertising is inadequate if marginal cost
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is constant or decreasing. Kotowitz and Mathewson (1979a) and Shapiro (1980)
oﬀer early statements of this result for the case of constant marginal costs.
Consider next the case of complementary advertising. The first conclusion is
of course valid for this case as well, and indeed Nichols (1985) and Becker and
Murphy (1993) oﬀer general derivations of this conclusion. But when advertising
has a social-prestige component, the possibility that advertising is price-increasing
is of special relevance. In the first example above, consumers directly value adver-
tising, and greater monopoly advertising generates a higher monopoly price when
marginal cost is constant or increasing. In this case, it cannot be concluded from
(4.12) that complementary monopoly advertising is inadequate. The possibility
of price-increasing advertising thus requires further consideration.
4.2.4. Price-Increasing Monopoly Advertising
When advertising increases price, the Dixit-Norman and infra-marginal eﬀects
are conflicting. In the presence of conflicting eﬀects, one strategy is to directly
calculate the net welfare eﬀects of advertising for the problem at hand. Another
strategy is to look for a new suﬃcient condition under which one eﬀect dominates
the other. Both strategies are illustrated here.
I start with a net welfare calculation. Consider the first example above, under
which welfare is given by (4.10) when D(P,A) = N [1 − P/g(A)] and R(A) =
g(A). Suppose further that marginal cost is constant at some level c, where




0(AM)/2 > 0. Notice that D(PM , AM) = N [g(AM)−PM ]/g(AM) > 0
and DA = NPg0/g2 > 0. Using (4.12), it can be shown that
dW (PM(A), A)
dA
|A=AM = DA(PM , AM)D(PM , AM)g(AM)/2N > 0.
Thus, even though advertising raises price and induces a welfare-reducing Dixit-
Norman eﬀect, it also shifts out demand and generates a welfare-enhancing infra-
marginal eﬀect. In the first example, the latter eﬀect dominates, so that even
price-increasing advertising is inadequately supplied by a monopolist.
The second strategy is to look for a new suﬃcient condition that allows for
price-increasing advertising. To this end, I borrow from the product-quality anal-
ysis oﬀered by Spence (1975) and Tirole (1988, Section 2.2.1), with advertising
now substituting for product quality. The analysis is conducted with reference to
the inverse-demand function, P (Q,A), where PA > 0 > PQ. In this context, the
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monopolist’s profit function is given as π(Q,A) = P (Q,A)Q − C(Q) − κA. The
first-order conditions for profit maximization are then:
πQ = P − C 0 +QPQ = 0 (4.13)
πA = QPA − κ = 0 (4.14)
Let QM(A) denote the solution to (4.13), and let AM(Q) represent the solution
to (4.14). The monopoly solution, (QM , AM), is then defined by QM = QM(AM)
and AM = AM(QM).




P (X,A)dX − C(Q)− κA. (4.15)
Suppose now that (i). the monopolist begins at its monopoly solution, (QM , AM),
and (ii). when advertising is changed to some nearby level A, the monopolist
responds with its profit-maximizing quantity, QM(A). Then, using (4.15),
dW (QM(A), A)
dA





This expression can be signed under two conditions. Assume first that the
value of advertising is greater for infra-marginal than marginal consumers: PAQ <
0. Assume second that advertising beyond the monopoly level does not decrease
the profit-maximizing level of output: Q0M(AM) ≥ 0. Then, by (4.16),
dW (QM(A), A)
dA
|A=AM > [P (QM , AM)− C 0(QM)]Q0M(AM) +QMPA(QM , AM)− k
= −QMPQ(QM , AM)Q0M(AM)
≥ 0,
where the first inequality uses PAQ < 0, the equality uses (4.13) and (4.14), and
the second inequality uses Q0M(AM) ≥ 0. With this, a second conclusion is now
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established: if PAQ < 0 and Q0M(AM) ≥ 0, then advertising is supplied by a
monopoly to an extent that is socially inadequate.69
The key intuition can be easily summarized. As (4.14) reveals, when the
monopolist chooses advertising while holding quantity fixed, it balances the cost
of additional advertising against the benefit of selling the fixed quantity at a
higher price. The extent to which price rises is in turn measured by the benefit
that additional advertising brings to the marginal consumer. On the other hand,
as (4.15) suggests, a social planner balances the cost of additional advertising
against the benefit it brings to all of the monopolist’s consumers. If PAQ < 0,
then the marginal consumer gets the least benefit from additional advertising;
thus, for a given quantity, the monopolist provides too little advertising. As is
standard, for any given level of advertising, the monopolist also provides too little
quantity. It follows that welfare would rise if the monopolist were to increase
advertising without decreasing quantity.
This analysis dovetails nicely with the first example. Under constant marginal
costs, this example satisfies both of the two conditions: PAQ < 0 is established
above, and Q0M(AM) ≥ 0 is easily confirmed.70 Thus, the first example oﬀers a
concrete illustration of the suﬃcient conditions just derived. At the same time, the
analysis clarifies the general features that are embodied in the example and that
underlie the finding of inadequate advertising. Of course, the second conclusion
holds as stated whether advertising is complementary due to the information it
conveys or the social prestige that it facilitates. The former case is captured by
the second example, but in this example PAQ > 0 when individual demands are
not too convex. The second conclusion appears most relevant for advertising that
facilitates social prestige.
Nichols (1985) presents a related suﬃcient condition that applies when con-
sumer welfare is the maximized value of U(g(A)X,Y ), where X and Y are chosen
subject to a budget constraint: PxX + PyY = I. Nichols derives that consumer
welfare rises with greater advertising if and only if [g0A/g−P 0M(A)A/PM(A)] > 0,
where PM(A) is the monopoly price of good X when A is given. Thus, social
welfare rises when the monopolist increases advertising above the monopoly level
69Becker and Murphy (1993) also discuss the case of price-increasing advertising, and they de-
rive an expression corresponding to (4.16). They do not derive the two conditions (PAQ < 0 and
Q0M (AM ) ≥ 0) reported here that suﬃce for inadequate price-increasing monopoly advertising.
As I discuss below, Nichols (1985) derives a related suﬃcient condition for the characteristic
approach that he adopts.





if and only if additional advertising increases “prestige productivity” (i.e., g) in
a greater percentage than it increases the price of the advertised product. This
requirement is automatically satisfied if advertising is price-maintaining or price-
decreasing. A limitation of this approach is that g is not easily observed.
Finally, it is important to remark on the possibility raised in Section 2.4 that
advertising is a bad that is sold jointly with some other good (e.g., TV programs
may compensate viewers for watching TV ads). This possibility is not included
in the analysis above, where I follow the conventional modeling approach and as-
sume that advertising is a good whose quantity is determined by the monopolist.
But Becker and Murphy argue that the first conclusion above continues to hold
when advertising is a bad that is jointly sold. Intuitively, if the consumer volun-
tarily accepts additional advertising and the price of the good does not rise, then
additional monopoly advertising again induces a consumer surplus gain that the
monopolist is unable to appropriate.
4.3. Summary
In this section, I summarize research on the positive and normative theory of
monopoly advertising. The Dorfman-Steiner model oﬀers a positive theory of a
monopolist’s price and advertising selections, and the first-order conditions pro-
vide a formal interpretation for some of the endogeneity concerns raised in the
previous section. Two examples are also examined. These examples confirm
Chamberlin’s insight that advertising’s eﬀect on price is related to the elasticity
and scale eﬀects of advertising, where the elasticity eﬀect is determined by the
purpose of advertising. The second (informative) example also captures Ozga’s
rationale for diminishing returns to advertising.
Dixit and Norman provide a foundation for the normative theory of persuasive
advertising. They argue that, if the consumer welfare that advertising renders is
measured relative to a standard that remains fixed as advertising changes, then a
monopolist provides price-increasing advertising to an extent that is socially ex-
cessive. Proponents of the informative and complementary views, however, argue
that the fixed-standard approach ignores consumer-welfare gains from advertising
that are associated with information and social prestige. Under the alternative
approach that their work suggests, a monopolist provides price-maintaining and
price-decreasing advertising to an extent that is socially inadequate. Furthermore,
under conditions that are plausible when advertising facilitates social prestige, a
monopolist provides even price-increasing advertising to an extent that is socially
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inadequate. On the whole, the research described above suggests that a profit-
maximizing monopolist may advertise to an extent that is socially inadequate.
At the same time, it is important to highlight two assumptions of the models
presented here. First, as mentioned in Section 2.4, the models do not include ads
that are utility reducing (bads) and unavoidable. For example, an objectionable
ad on a city bus, streetcar or taxi is diﬃcult to avoid, and internet “pop-up” ads
are also intrusive. If a monopolist can profit from ads that are objectionable and
unavoidable, then the possibility of excessive monopoly advertising would gain
renewed credibility. Second, the models assume that the monopolist is unable to
segment the market by targeting its ads to certain groups and then practicing
price discrimination. If a monopolist can segment its consumers, then it may be
able to appropriate the increase in surplus that its advertising creates. It then
becomes more likely that the monopolist advertises at a socially optimal level.71
5. Advertising and Price
Monopoly advertising may be inadequate, since the monopolist cannot appropri-
ate the consumer surplus that additional advertising creates. But in markets with
multiple firms advertising is also an important instrument of competition. The
advertising of one firm may steal the business and thus diminish the profit of
another. This business-stealing externality raises the possibility that advertising
may be excessive. In multi-firm markets, it is thus unclear, a priori, whether
advertising is inadequate, excessive or optimal.
This tension is recognized by Marshall (1919), who acknowledges both the ben-
eficial constructive and wasteful combative roles that informative advertising may
play. In the context of persuasive advertising, an early formalization is oﬀered
by Dixit and Norman (1978), who consider not just monopoly but also multi-
firm markets. Due to the business-stealing externality, they find that advertising
then may be excessive even when it results in a lower price. With important
exceptions, however, the recent theoretical literature emphasizes informative ad-
vertising.72 I summarize here recent theoretical analyses of multi-firm markets in
71For further discussion, see Adams and Yellen (1977) and Lewis and Sappington (1994).
72For example, see Friedman (1983) and Schmalensee (1972, 1976b) for positive theories of
oligopolistic advertising competition, under the general assumption that a firm’s advertising in-
creases the demand for its product. For other models in which advertising plays a persuasive role,
see Banerjee and Bandyopadhyay (2003), Baye and Morgan (2004), Bloch and Manceau (1999),
Chioveanu (2005), Doraszelski and Markovitch (2004), Kotowitz and Mathewson (1979b), Von
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which advertising provides price information.
5.1. Homogeneous Products
In a classic paper, Butters (1977) oﬀers the first equilibrium analysis of infor-
mative advertising in a multi-firm model. In Butters’s model, firms produce a
homogeneous product at a constant unit cost c. There are N consumers. As in
the second example above, a consumer can learn of a firm’s existence and price
only by receiving an ad from that firm, and ads are distributed randomly across
consumers at a cost of κ per ad. Finally, and in contrast to the second example,
consumers have symmetric unit-demand functions, so that R − P is the surplus
that a consumer enjoys when a unit is purchased at price P . To ensure that
production has social value, assume that R > c+ κ.
In this multi-firm setting, there are three kinds of consumers. Some consumers
are uninformed : they receive no ads. Uninformed consumers never learn of any
firm, make no purchase and receive zero utility. Other consumers are captive: they
receive ads from only one firm. A captive consumer knows of one firm and thus
buys from that firm, provided that the price does not exceed R. Finally, some
consumers are selective: they receive ads from more than one firm. A selective
consumer buys from the lowest-priced known firm, if that price does not exceed
R. If there is more than one such firm, a selective consumer picks one at random.
The number of uninformed consumers is determined by the total number of
ads, A, that firms send. Let Φ denote the probability that a consumer receives at
least one ad. The probability that the consumer is uninformed is then 1 − Φ =
(1− 1/N)A ≈ e−A/N for N large. If a proportion Φ of consumers are to receive at
least one ad, then a total of A = N · ln[1/(1− Φ)] ads must be sent. The social
cost of advertising so that a proportion Φ of consumers are not uninformed is thus
A(Φ) = κN · ln[1/(1− Φ)]. (5.1)
Each firm chooses which price (or prices) to advertise and the number of ads
to send out at each such price. As Butters shows, when the number of firms is
finite, firms adopt mixed strategies in any Nash equilibrium. To see the forces at
hand, hypothesize an equilibrium in which all firms advertise the same price. If
this price were to exceed c+ κ, then a firm could do better by sending the same
der Fehr and Stevik (1998) and Tremblay and Martins-Filho (2001). Becker and Murphy (1993),
Hochman and Luski (1988), Nichols (1985) and Stigler and Becker (1977) consider complemen-
tary advertising in perfectly competitive markets.
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number of ads but deviating to a slightly lower price. The firm then increases its
expected profit, since it wins its selective consumers with probability one. On the
other hand, if the candidate equilibrium price is c+ κ or lower, then a firm earns
negative profit, since some recipients are selective and choose a diﬀerent firm. The
sunk cost of sending an ad, κ, is then not covered, and a firm would do better by
sending no ads.
It is possible, however, to describe simply the limiting behavior that obtains
when the numbers of firms and consumers are suﬃciently large. Each seller is
then negligible relative to the market. The behavior of any individual seller is
indeterminant, but equilibrium does constrain market behavior. Butters shows
that every P ∈ [c + κ, R] must be advertised by some firm and that every such
price must generate zero expected profit. For P ∈ [c + κ, R], let x(P ) denote
the equilibrium probability that an ad with price P would be accepted by the
consumer that receives it. Then x(P ) is the probability that a consumer does not
receive an ad with a price below P . It follows that x(P ) is strictly decreasing. In
fact, since every P ∈ [c+κ, R] earns zero profit, x(P ) is defined by (P − c)x(P )−
κ = 0. This implies that x(c+ κ) = 1 > κ/(R− c) = x(R).
In eﬀect, x(P ) is a downward-sloping demand curve that confronts each firm
in equilibrium. The firms compete with one another, but each firm also possesses
some monopoly power, due to the informational product diﬀerentiation that ad-
vertising creates. The demand curve is thus not perfectly elastic. But firms earn
zero profit, once the cost of advertising is included. Butters thus oﬀers a first
equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with informative advertising.
What are the normative implications? Given that consumers possess identi-
cal unit demands, price plays no welfare role. A social ineﬃciency occurs only if
the advertising choice is excessive or inadequate, so that too few or many con-
sumers are uninformed. In the market equilibrium, the probability x(R) that a
consumer purchases when the highest possible price is received must equal the
probability 1 − Φe that the consumer does not receive any other ad. Hence,
1 − Φe = x(R) = κ/(R − c). Consider now the social planner’s choice. When
an additional consumer learns of the existence of some firm, the social benefit is
R − c. But there is also a cost to reaching a previously uninformed consumer.
Using (5.1), the advertising cost per-consumer is A(Φ)/N = κ · ln[1/(1 − Φ)],




{Φ(R− c)− κ · ln[1/(1− Φ)]}.
The first-order condition is R− c−κ/(1−Φ∗) = 0, which implies that the market
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equilibrium level of advertising is socially optimal: Φe = Φ∗.
This is a striking finding. To see the intuition, consider the private benefit
to a firm of sending an ad at the price R.73 This benefit equals (R − c) times
the probability that the consumer receives no other ad. But this is also the
social benefit from sending an ad, since the ad increases social surplus (in amount
R− c) only when the consumer receives no other ad. Put diﬀerently, the highest-
priced firm appropriates all consumer surplus and steals no business from rivals;
therefore, it advertises at the socially optimal rate. Now consider the private
benefit to a firm from sending an ad at a lower price, P < R. Such an ad
generates consumer surplus that the firm does not appropriate, and it also may
steal business. Given that every P ∈ [c + κ, R] earns zero profit, however, the
private benefit to a firm from sending an ad is the same whether P < R or P = R.
Private and social benefits thus agree even for ads with P < R.
Butters’s model has been extended in many interesting directions. Stegeman
(1991) assumes that the numbers of consumers and firms are large, and then mod-
ifies Butters’s model with the assumption that consumer valuations are hetero-
geneous. He shows that informative advertising is then inadequate. Intuitively,
in equilibrium, the highest-priced firm sets its price strictly below the highest
consumer reservation value; therefore, a firm that advertises the highest price no
longer captures all of the surplus from the new sales that it creates. Since such
a firm does not steal business from any other, it advertises at a socially inad-
equate rate. Additional ads at lower prices would increase social surplus by at
least as much, and so an increase in advertising at any advertised price would
increase welfare. Likewise, Stahl (1994) reports that equilibrium advertising is
inadequate, when the Butters model with a finite number of firms is extended
to allow for downward-sloping individual demand curves (as in the second ex-
ample above) and general advertising technologies. Stahl shows that the unique
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is symmetric, and he finds that sellers choose a
common advertising level while mixing over prices.
The Butters model also may be extended to allow a more active role for con-
sumers. Suppose that consumers are aware of the existence of firms and seek only
price information. This is plausible in an established industry. Ads are one source
of price information, but a consumer might also obtain price information through
costly search. In comparison to the work described above, an important new
feature is that uninformed consumers may search for firms and make purchases.
73Butters is unable to oﬀer an intuition for his welfare finding. My discussion here draws on
Tirole (1988, Section 7.3.2) and Stegeman (1991).
72
Robert and Stahl (1993) provide an analysis of price advertising in an optimal
search model.74 Assuming that firms make simultaneous advertising and pricing
choices, Robert and Stahl characterize a unique and symmetric price-dispersion
equilibrium, in which a firm either charges a high price that is not advertised or
selects from an interval of lower prices that are advertised. The high price may be
interpreted as a “list price.” Firms that charge this price sell only to uninformed
consumers, and the list price is set at a level that dissuades such consumers from
further search. In the interval of advertised “sales,” an interesting prediction is
that advertising intensity is greater at lower prices. Intuitively, the marginal ben-
efit of advertising is greater at lower prices, since such prices are more likely to
attract the recipient (who may be selective).75
Interesting findings also arise when the model is extended to allow for sequen-
tial choices by firms. McAfee (1994) posits that firms first choose their advertising
rates and then choose their prices. A firm’s advertising rate determines the prob-
ability that a consumer obtains its price oﬀer. An asymmetric equilibrium then
exists, wherein one firm advertises more than do other firms, who all advertise
equally. Prices are mixed, and now the firm with the higher advertising rate
charges higher prices (in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance). The rea-
son is that such a firm has a greater stock of captive consumers. Roy (2000) also
considers a sequential-choice game, and he allows further that firms may “target”
the individual consumers to whom their respective ads are delivered.76 Working
74Butters considers an extended model with search, but he does not analyze optimal search.
Baye and Morgan (2001) also examine a model of price advertising in which the information-
gathering activities of consumers are endogenized. In their model, a “gatekeeper,” such as a
magazine or an internet site, charges fees to firms that advertise prices and to consumers who
choose to access the list of advertised prices. Baye and Morgan (2004) extend the model to allow
that firms may also engage in brand advertising, where brand advertising by a firm increases
the number of consumers that are loyal to the firm’s product.
75Bester (1994) conducts a related analysis in a monopoly model. Consumers must sink a
search cost in order to visit the monopolist’s store, and the monopolist thus seeks a device
through which to commit to low prices. Price advertising is such a device. A mixed-strategy
equilibrium is constructed, in which the monopolist advertises only low prices. Modifying the
model to allow that the monopolist is privately informed as to its costs of production, Caminal
(1996) constructs a pure-strategy equilibrium, in which the monopolist advertises low prices
when its costs are low.
76For other studies of targeted advertising, see Adams and Yellen (1977), Esteban et al
(2001a), Esteban et al (2001b), Galeotti and Moraga-Gonzales (2004), Hernandez-Garcia (1997)
and Manduchi (2004). The related possibility of coupon targeting is considered by Bester and
Petrakis (1996), Moraga-Gonzalez and Petrakis (1999) and Shaﬀer and Zhang (1995), for ex-
ample.
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with a duopoly model, he finds that the two firms divide the entire market into
mutually exclusive captive segments within which each firm operates as a local
monopolist. Under the assumption that consumers have identical unit demands,
the resulting equilibria are socially eﬃcient: firms appropriate all consumer sur-
plus by pricing at R, and the social cost of informing consumers is minimized
(every consumer receives exactly one ad).
5.2. Diﬀerentiated Products
Grossman and Shapiro (1984) extend the Butters model to include horizontal
product diﬀerentiation. In their model, firms are located around a circle, and the
number of firms may be endogenous. Following Tirole (1988, Section 7.3.2), I
focus here on a duopoly model in which firms are located on a line. Even when
simplified in this way, the Grossman-Shapiro model oﬀers novel insights, and at
the same time provides a unified framework within which to interpret a broad
range of issues that arise in earlier writings and empirical eﬀorts.
Consider then the following model. A unit mass of consumers are uniformly
distributed along a line of unit length. Each consumer has reservation value R
for a single unit of an ideal product, and suﬀers a transportation cost t per unit
of distance from the ideal. There are two firms, located at opposite endpoints.
Advertising operates as in Butters’s model: a consumer can learn of a firm’s exis-
tence and price only by receiving an ad from that firm, and each ad is distributed
randomly over consumers. The cost of reaching a fraction Φi of consumers is
denoted A(Φi). Grossman and Shapiro allow for general advertising technologies
(of which the Butters’s technology given in (5.1) is a special case), and I specify
here a quadratic relationship: A(Φi) = a(Φi)2/2, where a > t/2.
There are again three kinds of consumers. If firms 1 and 2 advertise at levels so
that fractions Φ1 and Φ2 of consumers are reached, respectively, then a fraction
[1 − Φ1][1 − Φ2] of consumers receive no ad and are uninformed. A fraction
Φ1[1 − Φ2] receive only firm 1’s ads and are thus captive to firm 1; likewise, a
fraction Φ2[1 − Φ1] are captive to firm 2. Finally, a fraction Φ1Φ2 consumers
receive ads from both firms and are thus selective. Suppose that R is suﬃciently
large that a consumer purchases if any ad is received. Suppose also that the
number of selective consumers is of suﬃcient size that the firms compete for this
common demand. This is the case if the cost of advertising is not too great.
What demand function does firm 1 confront? If the firms choose prices P1
and P2, respectively, then the marginal selective consumer is located at x =
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(P2−P1+ t)/2t. When a firm chooses its advertising expenditure, it equivalently
chooses its reach. Firm 1’s demand function thus may be written as follows:
D1(P1, P2,Φ1,Φ2) = Φ1[(1− Φ2) + Φ2(P2 − P1 + t)/2t].
The informative view holds that a firm faces a more price-elastic demand in mar-
kets with greater advertising. This elasticity eﬀect is confirmed here. Firm 1’s
elasticity of demand when evaluated at P1 = P2 = P and Φ1 = Φ2 = Φ is easily
shown to be [ΦP/(2−Φ)t], which is increasing in Φ and thus in the market level
of advertising.
Consider now a game in which the two firms simultaneously choose their prices
and advertising levels. If the marginal costs of production are constant, firm 1
thus chooses P1 and Φ1 to maximize [P1− c]D1(P1, P2,Φ1,Φ2)−A(Φ1). It is now
straightforward to derive price and advertising reaction curves and then solve for
a symmetric equilibrium, P e1 = P
e
2 = P
e and Φe1 = Φ
e
2 = Φ
e. The equilibrium is
characterized as follows:


















where Πe is the equilibrium profit earned by a single firm.
At a positive level, these equations yield a number of important implications.
Consider first the equilibrium price. As (5.2) reveals, it is higher than c + t,
which is the price that would emerge were consumers informed of all prices. The
reason is that demand is less elastic in the presence of informational product
diﬀerentiation. This does not mean that advertising increases prices; indeed,
the market would close in the absence of advertising. As Stigler (1961) and
Ozga (1960) suggest, it is consumer ignorance that leads to higher prices, while
advertising provides information and lowers prices. This may be confirmed by
noting that the equilibrium price falls when the cost of advertising falls (i.e., when
a decreases). Second, using (5.3), the equilibrium advertising level is higher when
advertising is less costly and when products are more diﬀerentiated (i.e., when
t is greater). The latter eﬀect suggests that greater product diﬀerentation leads
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to more advertising. This contrasts with the empirical interpretations oﬀered by
Comanor and Wilson (1967, 1974), who posit that advertising induces product
diﬀerentiation. In the Grossman-Shapiro model, where advertising is endogenized,
product diﬀerentiation induces advertising.
As (5.4) shows, equilibrium profit is increasing in product diﬀerentiation and,
more surprisingly, the cost of advertising. When a increases, the direct eﬀect is
that each firm experiences a cost increase, but the resulting decrease in advertis-
ing also gives rise to a strategic eﬀect: each firm faces a less elastic demand and
thus charges a higher price. The strategic eﬀect dominates here, and firms benefit
overall when advertising is more costly (but not prohibitively so). This finding
provides a formal interpretation of work by Benham (1972) and others (see Sec-
tion 3.2.4) suggesting that some professions encourage legal restictions on adver-
tising.77 It also oﬀers a formal interpretation of the profit-advertising relationship
described by Comanor and Wilson (1967, 1974) and others (see Section 3.2.2). In
the Grossman-Shapiro model, advertising does not cause profit, nor does profit
cause advertising. Instead, as (5.3) and (5.4) confirm, advertising and profit are
both endogenous variables that are jointly determined from exogenous variables
corresponding to the extent of product diﬀerentiation and the cost of advertising.
In a given sample of industries, as the extent of product diﬀerentiation varies,
advertising and profit move together; however, as the cost of advertising varies,
advertising and profit may move in opposite directions. From this perspective,
the sign of an observed correlation between advertising and profit simply reflects
which of the exogenous variables varies most in the sample at hand.
The key normative finding in this model is that advertising may be inadequate
or excessive.78 To understand the various eﬀects, consider first additional adver-
tising by a firm that reaches a consumer who otherwise would be uninformed. The
social benefit of such advertising exceeds the private benefit, since the firm is un-
able to appropriate the resulting consumer surplus. This suggests that advertising
is inadequate. Consider next the eﬀect of additional advertising by a firm that
reaches a consumer that also receives an ad from the other firm. Social surplus is
created if the consumer is located closer to the firm that undertakes the additional
advertising. The advertising firm does not internalize this matching benefit, and
77But see also Peters (1984), who considers a model in which firms sell a homogeneous good,
face capacity constraints, and are privately informed as to their respective costs of production.
He argues that advertising restrictions may benefit high-cost (harm low-cost) producers, and it
can happen that prices are lower when advertising is restricted. See also LeBlanc (1998).
78See Tirole (1988, p. 294) for a formal confirmation of this finding.
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so the matching eﬀect also suggests that market advertising is inadequate. But
the firm is motivated by the profit margin that it would enjoy on the “stolen”
consumer, while social welfare is not impacted by the re-distribution of margins
from one firm to another. This business-stealing externality parallels Marshall’s
(1919) notion of combative advertising and suggests that the market advertising
may be excessive.
Bester and Petrakis (1995) oﬀer an interesting extension. In their model,
consumers live in one of two regions, where each region has a single firm. All
consumers are informed of the existence of both firms, and every consumer also
knows the price of the “local” firm. A consumer forms an expectation as to the
price charged by the distant firm, and a consumer learns the actual price if an ad
is received from the distant firm. In this setting, Bester and Petrakis character-
ize a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. Their findings share features with
those of Robert and Stahl and also Grossman and Shapiro. In equilibrium, with
some probability a firm posts a “list price” and attracts only local consumers and
with the remaining probability a firm advertises a low “sale” price and tries to
attract distant consumers.79 Moreover, firms gain from an increase in the cost of
advertising, and market advertising may be inadequate or excessive.
Finally, Rogerson (1988) considers a model in which firms advertise prices and
also select product qualities. Each consumer observes the advertised prices, selects
a firm, observes the product quality oﬀered by this firm, and then decides whether
to purchase or engage in sequential search. Consumers have heterogeneous search
costs and diﬀer also in their willingness to pay for quality. Rogerson characterizes a
monopolistically competitive equilibrium, in which firms that oﬀer higher-quality
products also enjoy larger markups. Consumers infer quality from the advertised
price, and those that are more willing to pay for quality select firms that advertise
higher prices. Intuitively, a firm will not “rip oﬀ” its consumers with a lower
quality, if the implied cost savings on those consumers that remain would be
small in comparison to the markup that would be lost on those consumers that
search again. At higher quality, the potential cost savings are greater, and a
higher markup is needed to dissuade the firm from cheating. With U-shaped
average costs and a zero-profit requirement, larger markups must be paired with
lower sales; thus, Rogerson finds that higher-quality firms are smaller. Rogerson
also examines a no-advertising benchmark, finding that social welfare is higher
when advertising is allowed.
79See also Bester (1994) and Caminal (1996), as discussed in footnote 75.
77
5.3. Non-Price Advertising
Bagwell and Ramey (1994a) emphasize two features of the modern retail market.
First, in many retail categories, large-scale discount firms co-exist with small firms,
and the large firms share a common set of attributes: high sales volumes, heavy
advertising expenditures, low prices and large investments in advanced selling
technologies. Second, competition between retail firms often occurs through non-
price advertising. The typical TV or radio retail ad, for example, contains little or
no direct (“hard”) information. Motivated by these features, Bagwell and Ramey
develop a new model of the retail firm and oﬀer an equilibrium interpretation of
non-price advertising by retailers.80
The retail-firm model is easily described with reference to a monopolist that
expects N > 0 consumers, where each consumer possesses the positive and
downward-sloping individual demand function, d(P ). The monopolist chooses
a price P ≥ 0 and a level of investment K ≥ 0. The cost of investment
is r > 0 per unit, and the benefit of greater investment is that the marginal
cost of selling is thereby reduced: c0(K) < 0. The firm’s net revenue is thus
R(P,K,N) ≡ [P − c(K)]Nd(P ) − rK. For given N , let PM(N) and KM(N) be
the price and investment levels that jointly maximize R. Assuming that second-
order conditions are satisfied, these monopoly values satisfy RP = RK = 0. Let
Π∗(N) ≡ R(PM(N), KM(N), N) denote the maximized value of net revenue.
Bagwell and Ramey establish a “coordination economy” that is enjoyed by a
firm and its consumers when the firm gets larger. First, using a standard envelope
argument, it follows that a firm does better when it expects more consumers:
Π∗0(N) > 0. Second, a consumer also does better when a firm expects more
consumers. To see this, observe that RPN = 0 at the monopoly values (since RP =
0), RKN = −c0d > 0 and RKP = −c0Nd0 < 0. It follows that K
0
M(N) > 0 and
P 0M(N) < 0 : a monopolist invests more and prices lower when more consumers are
expected. Intuitively, an investment that reduces marginal cost is more attractive
when a higher sales volume is anticipated, and the reduction in marginal cost in
turn makes a lower price more attractive.
At a general level, it is now possible to anticipate a role for non-price adver-
80Advanced selling technologies include advanced information systems (electronic-scanner
checkout systems, privately owned satellites) and superior delivery systems (privately owned
warehouses and trucks). Bagwell and Ramey observe, too, that large firms oﬀer greater product
variety, and their retail-firm model accounts for this attribute as well. I present a simplified
single-product model below. It is, however, useful to keep the multi-product version in mind,
since the focus on non-price advertising is most compelling for a retailer with many products.
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tising. Imagine that consumers do not observe the firm’s price until after a search
cost is incurred. Consumers do, however, observe the firm’s non-price advertising.
Suppose now that advertising attracts consumers: N 0(A) > 0. Then, a higher
advertising level leads to greater expected sales, which in turn induces greater
investment and thereby a lower price. Therefore, if it is supposed that consumers
respond to advertising, then a firm that advertises heavily also adopts a low price,
and so the supposed responsiveness of consumers to advertising becomes justified.
From this perspective, it is entirely rational for consumers to respond to non-price
advertising. This conclusion holds as well in multi-firm markets, if a firm expects
greater market share when it advertises more heavily.
To go further, an equilibriummodel of retail advertising is required. Consider a
three-stage game. In the first stage, firms decide whether to enter. Entry entails
a sunk cost, σ > 0. In the second stage, the firms simultaneously make price,
investment and advertising selections. Finally, in the third stage, each consumer
picks a firm from which to buy, based on the information that the consumer
possesses. There are two kinds of consumers. Informed consumers observe the
firm that makes the greatest advertising expenditure.81 Uninformed consumers do
not observe advertising eﬀorts. There is a unit mass of consumers in total. Let I
and U denote the exogenous proportions of informed and uninformed consumers,
respectively, where I + U = 1 and U ∈ (0, 1). No consumer observes a firm’s
price and investment selections prior to picking a firm. The firms thus select their
monopoly price and investment levels, given the number of consumers that they
respectively expect.
As a benchmark, consider the random equilibrium that obtains when con-
sumers are not responsive to advertising and thus pick firms at random. Entering
firms then choose zero advertising and divide the market. Thus, if n firms enter,
each firm expects N = 1/n consumers. Ignoring integer constraints, the equilib-
rium number of firms is the value nr that satisfies Π∗(1/nr) = σ. Each firm adopts
the price PM(1/nr).
Now consider an advertising equilibrium, in which informed consumers adopt
the rule of thumb of buying from the firm that advertises the most. As Bag-
well and Ramey show, for any n ≥ 2, a mixed-strategy equilibrium is induced.
This equilibrium is characterized by a distribution function F (A) that ensures
for each firm that the higher cost of additional advertising is balanced against
81Bagwell and Ramey thus posit a diﬀerent advertising technology than do Butters (1977)
and Grossman and Shapiro (1984). In the latter work, an individual consumer that receives an
ad (or ads) has no further information as to the respective advertising expenditures of firms.
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the benefit of a higher expected sales volume. In an advertising equilibrium,
when a firm advertises at level A, it expects to win the informed consumers with
probability F (A)n−1. Therefore, when a firm advertises at level A, it expects
N(A) = F (A)n−1I +U/n consumers, which is indeed an increasing function. The
distribution function is formally defined by Π∗(F (A)n−1I+U/n)−κA = Π∗(U/n),
where Π∗(U/n) is the profit that is enjoyed by a firm that chooses zero advertis-
ing. Observe that the simple rule used by informed consumers is rational. When
a firm advertises at level A, it sets the price PM(F (A)n−1I+U/n), and so higher-
advertising firms indeed oﬀer lower prices. This is consistent with the general
discussion above. Finally, ignoring integer constraints, entry occurs until ex-
pected profit is zero. Since a firm is indiﬀerent over all advertising selections in
the support, the equilibrium number of firms is the value na that generates zero
profit when a firm selects zero advertising: Π∗(U/na) = σ.
The random equilibrium would obtain, for example, if advertising were pro-
hibited, while the advertising equilibrium might be predicted when advertising is
legal. It is thus interesting to compare these two equilibria. Observe first that
the market with advertising has fewer firms that are on average larger: nr > na.
This observation follows, since Π∗(1/nr) = σ = Π∗(U/na) and Π∗0 > 0 imply
that 1/nr = U/na. Observe second that, with probability one, in a market with
advertising every firm oﬀers a lower price than in a market without advertising.
To see this, observe that the highest possible price in the advertising equilibrium
occurs when a firm does not advertise, and the price then charged equals the price
that is always oﬀered in the random equilibrium: PM(U/na) = PM(1/nr). There-
fore, expected consumer welfare is higher when advertising is allowed. Since firms
make zero expected profit either way, social welfare is higher when advertising is
allowed than when it is not.
Bagwell and Ramey capture and build upon a number of themes from ear-
lier work. In line with Chamberlin’s (1933) work, they construct a monopolisti-
cally competitive equilibrium, in which profits are dissipated through advertising
expenditures and entry, and advertising operates through a scale eﬀect to facil-
itate lower prices. But the scale eﬀect that they utilize is a “long-run” eﬀect,
under which greater expected sales volume leads to additional cost-reducing in-
vestments.82 In addition, their advertising equilibrium exhibits endogenous firm
heterogeneity: some firms advertise heavily, enjoy high expected sales, choose low
82Bagwell and Ramey show that a short-run scale eﬀect, corresponding to marginal costs that
decline with output, would reinforce their findings. Declining marginal costs may be relevant
when large retailers receive quantity discounts.
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prices and make large investments, while other firms advertise less but expect low
sales and set high prices while making small investments. Bagwell and Ramey
also provide a formalization of Nelson’s (1974b) signaling-eﬃciency eﬀect. In par-
ticular, they find that a choice of heavy advertising is paired with a selection of
large investment, and so rational consumers indeed can use ostensibly uninforma-
tive advertising expenditures as an indication of low costs and thus low prices.
Finally, they oﬀer an equilibrium interpretation for the empirical finding of Ben-
ham (1972) and others (see Section 3.2.4) that the introduction of even non-price
advertising leads to the entry of large-scale firms and lower prices.
Bagwell and Ramey (1994b) oﬀer an alternative formulation. In a first model,
where one firm is known to be more eﬃcient than a second, they show that the
possibility of advertising ensures that all consumers coordinate on the eﬃcient
firm. If another equilibrium were posited, then the eﬃcient firm could break this
equilibrium by advertising heavily. Sophisticated consumers would understand
that the eﬃcient firm could then possibly profit, only if it were to receive a large
number of consumers and price at the associated low monopoly price. Advertising
is not required on the equilibrium path, though, once consumers are coordinated
on the eﬃcient firm. In a second model, a firm is privately informed as to whether
it is more eﬃcient than its rival. In the (refined) separating equilibrium, when
this firm is more eﬃcient, it advertises a positive amount on the equilibrium
path, in order to signal its low costs and the associated low monopoly price. This
prediction confirms Nelson’s (1974b) signaling-eﬃciency eﬀect, when a firm’s level
of eﬃciency is exogenous and privately known.
In the Bagwell-Ramey (1994a,b) models, a consumer desires to visit a firm
that expects a large number of other consumers. In this sense, an “indirect” net-
work externality exists between consumers. Chwe (2001), Clark and Horstmann
(2001) and Pastine and Pastine (2002) consider the related but distinct case of
a “direct” network externality among consumers, whereby a consumer enjoys the
social prestige that is associated with purchasing from a firm that actually sells
to a large number of other consumers.83 Under both approaches, advertising may
promote improved coordination and welfare gains.
83For further discsussion of research on network externalities, see the contribution to this
volume by Farrell and Klemperer.
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5.4. Loss Leaders
The discussion above emphasizes extreme cases, in which a firm can advertise all
or none of the prices of its products. In many categories, retailers carry thousands
of items, and it is clearly not realistic to assume that all prices can be meaningfully
advertised. As mentioned in Section 3.2.4, however, a firm may then advertise
the price of particular “loss-leader” products.
I describe here the “commitment” and “signaling” theories of loss-leader pric-
ing. The commitment theory is advanced by Lal and Matutes (1994).84 In their
duopoly model, one firm is located at each endpoint of the Hotelling line, each
firm oﬀers two products and each firm can advertise the price of just one product.
For any firm, consumers observe one advertised price at zero cost and must pay
a search cost to observe the other, unadvertised price. Except for their locations,
consumers are identical and have independent unit demands for both goods. For
simplicity, suppose that consumers have a common reservation price R for each
good. A firm then faces a commitment problem: it is unable to credibly promise
that it will charge a price below R on an unadvertised good. In the absence of any
advertising, therefore, consumers would foresee that all products are priced at R
and choose not to visit any firm, thus saving the search cost. In the presence of
advertising, however, a firm can use an advertised loss-leader price to guarantee
suﬃcient consumer surplus to justify costly search, even though the unadvertised
good is priced at R. Notice that consumers rationally expect that the price of the
unadvertised product is independent of the advertised loss-leader price.85
Lal and Narasimhan (1996) extend the commitment theory to include a pre-
ceding stage in which the manufacturer of the loss-leader good selects a wholesale
price and a level of advertising. Manufacturer advertising raises the demand for
the manufacturer’s good; specifically, it increases the reservation value that con-
sumers have for a second unit of the loss-leader good. Lal and Narasimhan argue
that manufacturer advertising may lower the retail price and raise the wholesale
price of the loss-leader good, so that the retail margin is reduced and the whole-
sale margin is increased. This theory provides a formal foundation for work by
84See also Lal and Rao (1997) and Wernerfelt (1994). Gerstner and Hess (1990) and Hess and
Gerstner (1987) oﬀer related analyses that feature loss-leader pricing, bait-and-switch tactics
and rain checks.
85In their contribution to this volume, Farrell and Klemperer discuss a related “bargains-
then-ripoﬀs” theme that arises in dynamic models with switching costs. For interesting recent
contributions to the commitment theory, see Ellison (forthcoming), Konishi and Sandfort (2002)
and Rao and Syam (2001).
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Steiner (1973, 1978, 1984, 1993) and others, as discussed in Section 3.2.4.
Building on Nelson’s (1974b) signaling-eﬃciency eﬀect, the signaling theory
holds that a firm uses an advertised low price to signal low costs. Consumers then
rationally expect the price of the unadvertised product to be relatively low as
well. Bagwell (1987) oﬀers a formalization of this general idea. He considers a two-
period model, in which demand is downward-sloping, consumers must pay a search
cost to observe the current price and a firm is privately informed as to whether its
costs are high or low. A low-cost firm may signal its costs with an “introductory
sale.” The firm then obtains greater repeat business, since consumers rationally
expect the firm to charge a low price in the future. As Bagwell (1987, p. 384)
notes, his two-period, single-good model may be reinterpreted as a single-period,
two-good model, in which an advertised loss-leader price signals low costs and thus
a low price on the unadvertised product. Simester (1995) develops this loss-leader
model in detail and records a number of interesting predictions.86
5.5. Summary
The multi-firm models described above yield a striking set of predictions. Some
of these predictions confirm and extend ideas found in earlier writings. The for-
mal models also oﬀer a number of new predictions. At a normative level, this
work oﬀers support for the presumption that retail markets perform better when
advertising is possible. This is true for both price and non-price advertising. At
the same time, there is no presumption that the level of advertising is optimal.
As in the normative theory of monopoly advertising, inadequate advertising may
arise, since a firm does not internalize the consumer surplus that an additional ad
may generate. Furthermore, when there are multiple firms, excessive advertising
may occur, since a firm privately benefits from the sale that an additional ad may
generate, even when this sale is “stolen” from another firm and oﬀers no or modest
social benefit. Finally, in many retail categories, large retailers sell thousands of
products. The amount of direct price information that advertising can convey is
then necessarily limited. Important future work might consider further the role
of price and non-price advertising activities by multi-product retailers.
86See also Bagwell and Ramey (1994b). They provide an extended model in which loss-leader
pricing is used to ensure that consumers coordinate on the most eﬃcient firm.
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6. Advertising and Quality
Nelson (1974b) predicts a positive relationship between advertising and product
quality, especially for experience goods. In support of this prediction, he identifies
the signaling-eﬃciency, repeat-business and match-products-to-buyers eﬀects. As
discussed in Section 3.2.5, however, the empirical literature oﬀers mixed support
for this prediction. I consider now recent theoretical analyses of advertising and
quality. I organize this discussion around the three eﬀects that Nelson (1974b)
identifies. The signaling-eﬃciency eﬀect is formalized using a static model. A
related dynamic model is then presented, so that the repeat-business eﬀect may
be examined. This is followed by a short discussion of the match-products-to-
buyers eﬀect. Finally, I also discuss research that considers advertising in the
context of the quality-guarantee eﬀect.
6.1. Signaling-Eﬃciency Eﬀect
Nelson (1974b) argues that demand expansion is most attractive to eﬃcient firms.
Such firms may enhance demand by advertising heavily, setting low prices and
providing high quality; consequently, consumers may draw inferences as to the
deal that a firm oﬀers after observing its advertising. Above, I discuss the manner
in which observed advertising may signal eﬃciency and thereby price for a retailer
that oﬀers search goods. I consider now how observed advertising and price may
signal eﬃciency and thereby the (exogenous) quality of an experience good. This
analysis may be most relevant for the manufacturer of a new product.
My approach is to draw on techniques developed by Bagwell and Ramey (1988)
for signaling games with multiple signals. They analyze price and advertising as
signals of cost in an entry-deterrence model (see Section 7.2 below). As Bagwell
(1992) and Overgaard (1991) observe, these techniques also can be used to analyze
how a high-quality monopolist best uses multiple signals to signal its quality.87 In
particular, Overgaard examines the static model that I now summarize.88
87Here and in Section 7.2 below, I illustrate these techniques using a simple Lagrangian
argument. A more general treatment is available in the original papers.
88See also Zhao (2000), who places additional structure on the demand function and derives
a related set of findings. For models in which a high-quality monopolist signals its quality using
only price, see Bagwell and Riordan (1991) and Bagwell (1991, 1992). Under the assumption
that a higher-quality product entails a higher marginal cost, they show that the high-quality
monopolist adopts a high (supra-monopoly) price. This prediction is maintained below, when
the model is expanded to include advertising as a signal.
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Formally, suppose a monopolist privately observes whether its product-quality
type is low or high, t ∈ {L,H}, and then selects a price P ≥ 0 and an advertising
level A ≥ 0. Consumers observe P and A, form some belief b = b(P,A) ∈
[0, 1] as to the likelihood of high quality, and then demand D(P,A, b) > 0 units,
where DP < 0 < Db and DA ≥ 0. Advertising may be dissipative (DA = 0), or
it may contain information and/or induce social prestige and thus be demand-
enhancing (DA > 0). Let c(t) denote the constant marginal cost of production
when quality is type t. If c(H) < c(L), then the high-quality monopolist is also
the eﬃcient (low-cost) monopolist. This is the case to which Nelson’s (1974b)
signaling-eﬃciency eﬀect refers. As Schmalensee (1978) emphasizes, however, it
may be more plausible to assume that a high-quality product has a higher marginal
cost: c(H) > c(L). Both cases are considered here.89
A monopolist of type t makes profit Π(P,A, b, t) ≡ (P − c(t))D(P,A, b) −
κA. For fixed t and b, assume Π(P,A, b, t) has unique maximizers, Pm(t, b) and
Am(t, b), and is strictly concave in P. In the complete-information benchmark, the
monopoly selections are (PM(H), AM(H)) ≡ (Pm(H, 1), Am(H, 1)) and (PM(L), AM(L)) ≡
(Pm(L, 0), Am(L, 0)). The complete-information monopoly profits are πM(H) =
Π(PM(H), AM(H), 1, H) and πM(L) = Π(PM(L), AM(L), 0, L). Assume πM(t) >
0 for t ∈ {L,H}, so that both quality types are profitable.
APerfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a set of strategies, {P (t), A(t)}t=L,H , and be-
liefs, b(P,A), such that: (i) for each t ∈ {L,H}, (P (t), A(t))maximizesΠ(P,A, b(P,A), t),
and (ii) b(P,A) is derived from the equilibrium strategies using Bayes’ rule when-
ever possible. I focus here on separating equilibria, in which (P (H), A(H)) 6=
(P (L), A(L)) and thus b(P (H), A(H)) = 1 > 0 = b(P (L), A(L)). In a separating
equilibrium, the low-quality monopolist is “found out.” It can do no better than to
make its complete-information selections, (P (L), A(L)) = (PM(L), AM(L)), and
earn the corresponding profit, πM(L).90 Thus, if the high-quality monopolist is to
separate, then it must choose some pair (P,A) that the low-quality monopolist
89While it is plausible that unit costs tend to be higher for higher-quality products, this
relationship may fail if higher-quality products achieve greater market share and thereby enjoy
scale economies. Phillips et al (1983) use PIMS data and report that businesses with higher
relative quality often have higher market shares and lower relative unit costs.
90Suppose (P (L), A(L)) 6= (PM (L), AM (L)). Then the low-quality monopolist could deviate
to (PM (L), AM (L)) and earn strictly higher profit, since
Π(P (L), A(L), 0, L) < Π(PM (L), AM (L), 0, L) ≤ Π(PM (L), AM (L), b(·), L)
where b(·) ≡ b(PM (L), AM (L)). The final inequality follows since Db > 0 and πM (L) > 0, with
the latter implying that PM (L) > c(L).
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would not mimic:
Π(P,A, 1, L) ≤ πM(L). (6.1)
To make the problem interesting, assume that signaling is costly for the high-
quality monopolist: (PM(H), AM(H)) does not satisfy (6.1).
In the least-cost separating equilibrium, the high-quality monopolist separates
in the way that it finds most profitable. The least-cost separating equilibrium
is of particular interest, and it is also selected when standard refinements are
employed. Formally, define (P ∗, A∗) as the price-advertising pair that solves
Max
P,A
Π(P,A, 1, H) subject to (6.1). (6.2)
In a least-cost separating equilibrium, (P (H), A(H)) = (P ∗, A∗). Following argu-
ments by Bagwell (1992) and Overgaard (1991), the existence of the least-cost
separating equilibrium may be established. Here, I focus on the characterization
of this equilibrium.
To gain some intuition, consider any two price-advertising pairs, (P1, A1)
and (P2, A2), that yield the same profit for a mimicking low-quality monopolist:
Π(P1, A1, 1, L) = Π(P2, A2, 1, L). Observe that
Π(P2, A2, 1, H)−Π(P1, A1, 1, H) (6.3)
= [Π(P2, A2, 1,H)−Π(P1, A1, 1,H)]− [Π(P2, A2, 1, L)−Π(P1, A1, 1, L)]
= [c(H)− c(L)][D(P1, A1, 1)−D(P2, A2, 1)].
Suppose that c(H) > c(L), and consider a change from (P1, A1) to (P2, A2) that
leaves the low-quality monopolist indiﬀerent. According to (6.3), if demand is
lower at the new price-advertising pair, then the high-quality monopolist gains
from the change. The key idea is that demand-reducing changes are more at-
tractive to the high-quality monopolist when marginal costs increase with qual-
ity, since the demand reduction then oﬀers a greater cost savings. Similarly, if
c(H) < c(L), then a change that leaves the mimicking low-quality monopolist
indiﬀerent and enhances demand is preferred by the high-quality monopolist.
Further insight may be gained by analyzing the program given in (6.2). The
Lagrangian is L(P,A,λ) ≡ Π(P,A, 1,H) + λ[πM(L)−Π(P,A, 1, L)]. Using (6.3),
it may be verified that λ ∈ (0, 1) at the optimum.91 The Lagrangian may be
91The costly-signaling assumption implies that λ > 0. Given A∗, the first-order condition
LP = 0 determines P ∗ as the solution to
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rewritten as
L(P,A,λ) = (1− λ){(P − c(H)− λc(L)
1− λ )D(P,A, 1)− κA}+ λπM(L). (6.4)
As the bracketed term in (6.4) reveals, in the least-cost separating equilibrium,
the high-quality monopolist makes the same price-advertising selection as it would
were it to produce at constant marginal cost co ≡ [c(H)−λc(L)]/(1−λ) and oﬀer a
product of known high quality. Observe that λ ∈ (0, 1) implies sign{co−c(H)} =
sign{c(H)− c(L)}.
Consider first the case in which a high-quality product entails a greater marginal
cost: c(H) > c(L). In the least-cost separating equilibrium, the high-quality mo-
nopolist then undertakes a “cost-increasing distortion,” in that it sets the same
price-advertising pair as it would were its quality known but its marginal costs
higher (co > c(H)). It is natural to assume that under complete information a
monopolist would choose a higher price and less demand-enhancing advertising
were its constant marginal costs increased.92 Under this assumption, in the least-
cost separating equilibrium, the high-quality monopolist distorts its price upward
(P ∗ > PM(H)) and its demand-enhancing advertising downward (A∗ < AM(H)).
A high-quality monopolist thus best signals its quality with a high price and a low
level of demand-enhancing advertising. In essence, the high-quality monopolist is
signaling that it has high costs and is willing to reduce demand.
Consider second the case in which a high-quality product entails a lower
marginal cost: c(H) < c(L). Then, in the least-cost separating equilibrium, the
ΠP (P,A∗, 1,H)−ΠP (P,A∗, 1, L) = (λ− 1)ΠP (P,A∗, 1, L)
Take the case in which c(H) > c(L). The left-hand side is then positive. Consider the right-hand
side. Let ePm(t) maximize Π(P,A∗, 1, t). Suppose first that P ∗ < ePm(L). Then let (P1, A1) =
(P ∗, A∗) and (P2, A2) = (P
∗
, A∗), where P
∗
> ePm(L) satisfies Π(P ∗, A∗, 1, L) = Π(P ∗, A∗, 1, L).
P
∗
> P ∗ implies D(P ∗, A∗, 1) > D(P
∗
, A∗, 1). Using c(H) > c(L) and (6.3), the high-quality
monopolist strictly prefers (P
∗
, A∗), which contradicts that (P ∗, A∗) solves (6.2). Suppose
second that P ∗ = ePm(L). It follows from c(H) > c(L) that ePm(L) < ePm(H). Starting at
(P ∗, A∗), consider a small price increase, so that the new pair, (P ∗ + ε, A∗), satisfies P ∗ + ε ≤ePm(H). Given the strict concavity of profit in price, the high-quality (low-quality) monopolist
strictly prefers the new (old) pair, and again a contradiction is reached. It must be that P ∗ >ePm(L). This implies that ΠP (P,A∗, 1, L) < 0 at P ∗; hence, the right-hand side is positive if and
only if λ < 1. A similar argument applies when c(H) < c(L).
92For instance, it may be verified that this assumption is satisfied when demand is described
by either of the two examples considered in Section 4.1.2.
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high-quality monopolist undertakes a “cost-reducing distortion” (co < c(H)). The
result is a downward pricing distortion (P ∗ < PM(H)) and an upward distortion
in the level of demand-enhancing advertising (A∗ > AM(H)). As Nelson (1974b)
predicts, the high-quality monopolist best signals its quality with a low price and
high level of demand-enhancing advertising. Fundamentally, the high-quality mo-
nopolist is signaling that it has low costs and welcomes an expansion in demand.
What if advertising is dissipative? Whether marginal cost rises or falls with
product quality, dissipative advertising would not be used by a monopolist with
a known high-quality product; thus, such advertising is not used as a signal.93 In
this model, advertising is used as a signal of quality only if it is demand-enhancing.
While the model is static, the findings suggest a dynamic perspective. In
particular, once the monopolist’s product is suﬃciently mature, consumers are
presumably informed about its quality, and so the high-quality monopolist then
sets its price and advertising at their complete-information levels (PM(H) and
AM(H)). Over the long run, the model thus predicts that the high-quality prod-
uct’s price declines and its demand-enhancing advertising increases, if marginal
cost rises with quality. The opposite prediction (rising price, declining advertis-
ing) applies when marginal cost falls with quality. Whether its product is new or
mature, the monopolist would never use dissipative advertising.
A further prediction is that the correlation between advertising and quality
fluctuates across market settings. Suppose that marginal cost rises with qual-
ity and consider a new product. Relative to the complete-information bench-
mark, a high-quality monopolist distorts its advertising downward (A(H) = A∗ <
AM(H)), while a low-quality monopolist does not distort its advertising (A(L) =
AM(L)). But it is not clear whether the level of complete-information advertising
is greater when quality is high or low. Intuitively, complete-information advertis-
ing is expected to be greater when quality is high, if marginal cost rises slowly
with quality and the marginal impact of advertising on demand rises quickly with
quality. Pulling these themes together, it is possible that the advertising-quality
correlation is positive under complete information and thus for a mature product,
and yet the correlation is negative for a new product (A∗ < AM(L) < AM(H)).94
More generally, when c(H) > c(L), the advertising-quality correlation is stronger
(more positive, less negative) for a mature product. These findings oﬀer a possible
93Formally, if advertising is dissipative, then LA(P,A,λ) = κ[λ− 1] < 0, where the inequality
follows since λ < 1 (as shown in footnote 91). Thus, when advertising is dissipative, it is
optimally set at a boundary: A∗ = 0.
94For further discussion, see Orzach et al (2002) and Zhao (2000).
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interpretation for empirical eﬀorts (see Section 3.2.5) that report a generally weak
advertising-quality correlation that is stronger for established products.
The model may be extended to consider a monopolist of intermediate age,
so that some but not all consumers are informed of quality. If ζ represents the
fraction of uninformed consumers, then the profit for a monopolist now depends
upon its type through its marginal cost and the demand of informed consumers.
For example, the profit for a high-quality monopolist becomes ζΠ(P,A, b,H) +
(1− ζ)Π(P,A, 1,H). Linnemer (2002) develops a static model of this kind. When
c(H) > c(L) and an intermediate number of informed consumers exists, he shows
that dissipative advertising may be used along with a high (supra-monopoly) price
to signal high quality. Linnemer’s model shares important formal features with
the Milgrom-Roberts (1986) model, as I explain below.
It is also possible to extend the model to allow for multiple sellers. Under the
assumption that advertising is dissipative, Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984) explore
a model in which quality is high or low and firms are competitive price takers,
where the price that is “taken” may diﬀer depending upon whether a firm is
perceived to oﬀer a high- or low-quality product. In this context, advertising
can be understood as an “entry fee” that is necessary to enter the high-quality
market. They show that dissipative advertising can signal high quality even in
a static model, if marginal cost is suﬃciently lower when quality is high. The
idea is that a high-quality firm then enjoys a larger mark-up from a sale in the
high-quality market, and so the advertising expenditure can fall in a range that
only a high-quality firm would be willing to incur.95
As Fluet and Garella (2002) and Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001) demon-
strate, dissipative advertising may also signal high quality in a static duopoly
model. In the Hertzendorfer-Overgaard model, exactly one seller oﬀers a high-
quality product, but consumers do not know the identity of this seller. A key
feature of this model is that the sellers share private information as to the identity
of the high-quality firm. As a consequence, one seller’s price-advertising selection
provides potential information concerning the other seller’s quality. This enriches
95Wiggins and Lane (1983) also consider the manner in which advertising may signal quality
when prices are fixed. In their model, consumers are risk averse, and advertised products are of
more uniform quality. Horstmann and Moorthy (2003) examine a model in which competitive
firms face uncertain demand. Advertising by a firm can improve its capacity utilization in
low-demand states, by attracting consumers who otherwise would be uninformed. Since lower-
quality firms may have greater excess capacity in low-demand states, this particular benefit from
advertising can be greater for low-quality firms.
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the set of signaling possibilities.96 Under the assumption that marginal cost is
independent of quality, dissipative advertising is sometimes used as a signal of
quality, and the correlation between advertising and quality is highest when the
quality diﬀerence is intermediate in size. Allowing that marginal cost increases
with quality, Fluet and Garella conduct a related analysis and find that any sep-
arating equilibrium entails positive advertising by the high-quality firm, provided
that the quality diﬀerence is not too great.
6.2. Repeat-Business Eﬀect
Nelson (1974b) argues that advertising rekindles memories of experiences with the
advertised product. As recollections are more likely to prompt repeat business
when the quality of product is high, a high-quality product may be advertised to
a greater extent, and even new consumers may thus infer high quality from heavy
advertising. I now summarize several recent eﬀorts that use explicit dynamic
models in order to capture a repeat-business eﬀect. These eﬀorts diﬀer somewhat
from Nelson’s conception, in that a memory-activation process is not modeled;
instead, the repeat-business eﬀect emerges in the following sense: the return from
advertising and thereby achieving an initial sale may be greater for a high-quality
product, due to the greater repeat purchases that come from satisfied customers.
Schmalensee (1978) oﬀers a first formal investigation. As noted above, he
argues that the marginal cost of production is greater when a high-quality good is
produced. Under the assumption that all sellers must charge the same price, the
value of an initial sale may be greater when a low-quality good is sold, as then the
mark-up is larger. This “reverse” signaling-eﬃciency eﬀect favors low-quality firms
and can counter the repeat-business eﬀect that favors high-quality firms. Indeed,
Schmalensee demonstrates that low-quality products are more heavily advertised,
if consumers are responsive to advertising and marginal cost is suﬃciently greater
for a high-quality product.
As Schmalensee acknowledges, a weakness of his model is that consumer behav-
ior is irrational: consumers are responsive to advertising, even though advertising
is associated with low-quality products. This weakness is addressed by Kihlstrom
and Riordan. I discuss above their finding for a static model, but they also con-
sider a two-period formulation that allows for a repeat-business eﬀect. Due to this
eﬀect, the value of an initial (first-period) sale is greater for a high-quality firm,
96For other multi-sender signaling models, see Bagwell and Ramey (1991), de Bijl (1997) and
Matthews and Fertig (1990).
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and so dissipative advertising can signal high quality even if low-quality firms
enjoy a modest marginal-cost advantage. The precise extent of the critical ad-
vantage varies with the particular assumption that is made as to the information
held by second-period consumers.
Working with a monopoly model, Milgrom and Roberts (1986) allow that
consumers may draw product-quality inferences from advertising and price. In
eﬀect, they extend the static model with dissipative advertising from Section 6.1
to include a second period. The product is non-durable, and consumers have unit
demands in each period and heterogeneous reservation values. When a product
is consumed, the consumer discovers whether he is satisfied with the product. A
satisfied consumer enjoys the gross surplus (measured by the reservation value)
that the product oﬀers, while an unsatisfied consumer receives zero gross surplus.
Product quality is operationalized as the probability that a randomly selected con-
sumer finds the product satisfactory. If the product is satisfactory for a consumer
in the first period, then it will remain so for this consumer in the second period.
In the second period, the monopolist sells only to consumers that purchased in
the first period and had a satisfactory experience.
The main features of their analysis may be understood with reference to a two-
period profit function, V (P,A, b, t) = Π(P,A, b, t) + δeπ(P, b, t), where δ ∈ (0, 1)
is the discount factor, Π(P,A, b, t) is the profit function used above in the static
model and eπ is a reduced-form profit function for the second period. As above, the
consumers’ belief b derives from first-period price and advertising observations:
b = b(P,A). I assume that eπ is decreasing in P and increasing in b, since a firm
can earn greater second-period profit if it sold to a larger number of consumers in
the first period. More importantly, I assume that eπ embodies a repeat-business
eﬀect in the following sense: eπP is higher when t = L than when t = H.
The intuition for the repeat-business eﬀect is as follows. For any given belief,
when the monopolist raises its first-period price, some consumers elect not to buy.
Consider whether these “lost” consumers are of greater value to a low- or high-
quality monopolist in the second period. There are two considerations. First,
lost consumers might be more painful for the high-quality monopolist, since a
greater fraction then would have been satisfied and thus given repeat business.
Second, if marginal cost increases with quality, then lost consumers might be
less painful for the high-quality monopolist, since a smaller markup then would
be enjoyed on those lost consumers that did oﬀer repeat business. The first
(second) consideration works in favor of (against) the assumption made above.
The assumption therefore holds if the high-quality monopolist has a weak cost
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advantage (c(H) ≤ c(L)) or if any cost disadvantage of high-quality production
is suﬃciently modest.
Consider now the implications of the assumption that advertising is dissipa-
tive. First, the first-period profit function, Π(P,A, b, t), depends directly upon
advertising only through the cost of advertising: ΠA = −κ. A second implication,
already reflected in the notation, is that eπ depends on A only through the belief
function b(P,A). Third, advertising occurs (if at all) only in the introductory pe-
riod. The monopolist would not advertise in the second period, since advertising
does not directly alter demand and no opportunities for signaling remain (for all
second-period consumers the product is already known to be satisfactory). Finally,
in a separating equilibrium, if the monopolist oﬀers a low-quality product, then
it selects zero advertising. In analogy with the discussion above, in a separating
equilibrium, the low-quality monopolist picks its complete-information monopoly
price-advertising pair. When advertising is dissipative, the complete-information
solution entails zero advertising.
In the least-cost separating equilibrium, is it possible that the high-quality
monopolist picks positive advertising? Let vM(L) denote the discounted two-
period profit that the low-quality monopolist earns in a separating equilibrium.
In the least-cost separating equilibrium, the price-advertising pair selected by the
high-quality monopolist solves the following program:
Max
P,A
V (P,A, 1, H) subject to V (P,A, 1, L) ≤ vM(L). (6.5)
Suppose that the solution to (6.5) entails positive advertising. Then the first-
order condition for advertising is VA(P,A, 1,H) = λVA(P,A, 1, L). Given that
advertising is dissipative, this condition reduces to λ = 1. Consider next the
first-order condition for price. Using λ = 1, this can be written as
ΠP (P,A, 1,H)−ΠP (P,A, 1, L) = δ[eπP (P, 1, L)− eπP (P, 1, H)]. (6.6)
Thus, if the high-quality monopolist chooses a positive amount of dissipative
advertising, then the high-quality price must satisfy (6.6).
Consider first the case in which c(H) > c(L). Then the left-hand side of (6.6)
is positive. The right-hand side of (6.6) is also positive, due to the repeat-business
eﬀect. In this case, therefore, it is possible that a high-quality monopolist signals
its quality with a positive level of dissipative advertising along with a distorted
price. Milgrom and Roberts discuss the specific circumstances under which such a
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separating equilibrium occurs. Consider second the case in which c(H) ≤ c(L).97
Then the left-hand side of (6.6) is non-positive. Given that the right-hand side
is positive under the repeat-business eﬀect, (6.6) cannot be satisfied. A main
conclusion is now apparent: in the least-cost separating equilibrium, the high-
quality monopolist uses dissipative advertising to signal its quality only if the
marginal cost of production is greater for a high-quality product.
The underlying intuition is as follows. When the monopolist raises its first-
period price, sales for the first period are reduced. If a high-quality product
entails a higher marginal cost, this first-period eﬀect is less painful for a high-
quality monopolist. The price hike also reduces sales in the second period, since
there are then fewer satisfied consumers that emerge from the first period. Under
the repeat-business eﬀect, this second-period eﬀect is more painful for a high-
quality monopolist, as a greater fraction of its first-period consumers would have
had a satsifactory experience. Due to these oﬀsetting eﬀects, the cost of a price
increase can be equalized across the low- and high-quality types of monopolists
(i.e., (6.6) can hold). As both types also experience the same cost from dissipative
advertising, the monopolist may have no better option than to use both a distorted
price and a positive advertising expenditure when signaling high quality. By
contrast, if marginal cost (weakly) falls with quality, then the cost of a price hike
is (weakly) greater for a high-quality monopolist. The high-quality product is
then best signaled with a low price and no advertising.
It is interesting to compare the predictions of the Milgrom-Roberts model with
those of the static model. In the static model, dissipative advertising is not used as
a signal. Furthermore, when advertising is demand-enhancing and c(H) > c(L), a
high-quality monopolist distorts its advertising downward, with advertising rising
in the future (once consumers are informed) to its undistorted level. By contrast,
in the dynamic model, if c(H) > c(L), then a high-quality monopolist may use
dissipative advertising as a signal, with advertising falling in the future to its
undistorted level of zero. The inclusion of the repeat-business eﬀect thus generates
novel predictions, illustrating further the complex relationship between advertising
and product quality. Finally, recall Linnemer’s (2002) extension of the static
model. In his model, the profit earned on informed consumers plays a role similar
to that played by second-period profit in the Milgrom-Roberts model.98
97In the two-period model, future demand depends directly upon actual quality, and it is
possible that a separating equilibrium exists even when c(H) = c(L).
98In Linnemer’s model, the formal analog of the repeat-business eﬀect emerges as follows:
over the range of prices that a high-quality monopolist might choose, a price increase diminishes
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Hertzendorf (1993) oﬀers an interesting extension. He supposes that consumers
observe the monopolist’s advertising expenditure with error. By contrast, the
monopolist’s price is perfectly observed. If no advertising is observed, it may be
unclear whether the firm failed to advertise or the consumer failed to observe
the advertising. In this setting, if the monopolist’s price reveals quality, then
the monopolist will not use advertising as a signal. Intuitively, if the monopolist
were to use advertising, then it could deviate to a lower advertising level, without
being detected and without altering the consumers’ belief (since price already
reveals quality). Advertising may be used, however, when the monopolist’s price
is independent of product quality.99 In this case, if repeat-business eﬀects are
suﬃciently large and/or marginal cost does not rise too swiftly with quality, then
the high-quality monopolist advertises to a greater extent.
Horstmann and McDonald (1994) consider a diﬀerent kind of noise. In their
model, consumers observe price and advertising perfectly, but the consumption
experience generates only an imperfect indication of quality. Specifically, they
consider a two-period model in which a monopolist privately observes whether
the quality of its product is high or low, where the marginal cost of production
is independent of quality and in each period a higher-quality product yields a
satisfactory experience with a higher probability. A consumer’s experience with
the product is then not fully informative: a product may oﬀer a satisfactory ex-
perience in the first period and fail to do so in the second period. In the first
period, there is no basis for the monopolist to use price and advertising as signals
of quality. Imperfect signaling is possible in the second period, however, since
this period has a greater expected number of satisfied consumers when quality is
high. In a refined equilibrium, second-period play takes the following form: the
high-quality monopolist prices high and advertises, while the low-quality monop-
olist sometimes adopts this behavior and otherwise sets a low price and does not
advertise. The high price is such that a consumer purchases in period two only
if the product yielded a satisfactory experience in period one. Two predictions
follow. First, advertising does not signal the quality of newly introduced goods.
Second, advertising can signal the quality of an established good, but even then
the signal is imperfect. These predictions oﬀer further interpretations for em-
pirical eﬀorts (see Section 3.2.5) that report a generally weak advertising-quality
the profit earned on informed consumers by a greater amount for a high-quality monopolist.
99Moraga-Gonzalez (2000) oﬀers a related finding in a model in which advertising provides
direct information about product quality but not all consumers observe advertising eﬀorts.
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correlation that is stronger for established products.100
6.3. Match-Products-to-Buyers Eﬀect
I consider next Nelson’s (1974b) match-products-to-buyers eﬀect, whereby even
seemingly uninformative advertising can provide indirect information that im-
proves the match between product and buyer, since a firm has greater incentive
to send its ads to those consumers that value its product the most. Aspects of
this eﬀect appear in some of the preceding discussion. In particular, Grossman
and Shapiro (1984) provide conditions under which advertising that contains di-
rect information as to a product’s existence, attributes and price serves to increase
consumer surplus by generating improved matches and expanded sales. In the fol-
lowing, I consider work in which the matching eﬀect operates in markets for which
consumers are already informed of the existence of products. This work empha-
sizes advertising that provides information as to the attributes of the advertised
product, where the information may be direct or indirect.
Meurer and Stahl (1994) oﬀer a model in which advertising provides direct
information as to horizontal attributes. In their model, there are two firms, and
each consumer desires one unit of the product. For a given consumer, one product
is a good match and oﬀers gross utility V , while the other product is a bad match
and oﬀers zero gross utility. In the first stage of the game, firms simultaneously
choose advertising levels. An ad provides direct and truthful information as to
the attributes of the advertised product. A recipient of an ad thus knows whether
the advertised product oﬀers a good match. If it does not, then the other product
must. For a consumer that receives no ad, the two products are homogeneous
and each provide an expected gross utility of V/2. Advertising therefore induces
product diﬀerentiation. This is consistent with some of the arguments advanced
by proponents of the persuasive view, although here advertising-induced product
diﬀerentiation derives not from a change in tastes but from the information that
advertising provides. In the second stage of the game, each firm sets its (publicly
observed) price. The marginal cost of production is c < V/2.
As Meurer and Stahl show, the eﬀects of advertising on social surplus are
non-monotonic. The equilibrium characterization entails mixed strategies, but
the key ideas are easily related. One the one hand, as advertising increases, more
consumers are “informed” (i.e., receive an ad) and thus obtain a good match. On
100For other interpretations, see Orzach et al (2002), Zhao (2000) and the discussion above in
Section 6.1.
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the other hand, at higher levels of advertising, the extent of product diﬀerentiation
is greater and each firm has more market power. In particular, each firm is then
especially tempted to raise price to V and profit on those informed consumers
for which its product oﬀers a good match. But expected sales are then reduced,
since uninformed consumers are unwilling to purchase at this price. The better-
matching and reduced-sales eﬀects of advertising are conflicting. The result is a
non-monotonic relationship between advertising and social surplus. Building on
these themes, Meurer and Stahl show further that the Nash advertising level may
be excessive or inadequate.
A tension between the better-matching and reduced-sales eﬀects of advertising
also arises in the monopoly models analyzed by Lewis and Sappington (1994) and
Johnson and Myatt (2004). Lewis and Sappington consider a monopolist that
may use advertising to supply pre-purchase information to buyers. Advertising
provides direct but possibly noisy information about product attributes and thus
raises the expected value of the product for some consumers while lowering it
for others. As Johnson and Myatt emphasize, advertising then induces greater
dispersion in consumers’ expected valuations and thereby generates a clockwise
rotation of the demand curve. In these models, the monopolist can vary the
precision of the information, by varying the content of the ads. At one extreme, if
the monopolist provides no information, then each consumer regards himself as an
“average type,” and the monopolist selects the monopoly price for that type. At
the other extreme, if the monopolist provides perfect information, then consumers
learn their respective valuations, and the monopolist then sets a higher price that
is attractive only to consumers with above-average valuations. This latter strategy
facilitates better matching but also entails reduced sales. The main finding in this
work is that the monopolist’s expected profit often achieves its maximum at one of
the extremes; thus, a profit-maximizing monopolist either provides no or perfect
information about product attributes. Further, the latter option is more attractive
when consumer valuations are heterogeneous and costs are high.
Anderson and Renault (forthcoming) also analyze a model of monopoly ad-
vertising. In their model, however, search costs play an important role, and
advertising may provide direct information as to product attributes and price.
The basic model has a single consumer, who seeks one unit of the monopolist’s
product. The consumer can learn the product’s price and his “match” (reserva-
tion) value for the product by incurring a search cost. The monopolist is also
uncertain of the match value. When the search cost is suﬃciently low, the con-
sumer is willing to incur the cost, even though the monopoly price is anticipated,
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since he will enjoy positive consumer surplus if a high match value is realized. If
the search cost is higher, however, the consumer is unwilling to incur the cost,
unless the monopolist provides some information that raises the expected benefit
from search. In line with the discussion in Section 5.4, if the monopolist could
use advertising to transmit price information only, then it would raise the benefit
of search by advertising its commitment to a sub-monopoly price. Anderson and
Renault go further, however, and allow that the monopolist may use advertis-
ing to transmit price and/or attribute information. The consumer’s match value
may be determined by several product attributes, and the monopolist may elect
to oﬀer partial match information. Importantly, such information may raise the
expected benefit of search for the consumer, by reassuring the consumer that the
match value is not too low. Building from these points, Anderson and Renault
find that the monopolist uses advertising to transmit partial match information
for intermediate levels of the search cost, and uses advertising to transmit price
and partial match information when the search cost is higher.
Bagwell and Ramey (1993) present a multi-firm model in which advertising
oﬀers indirect information as to vertical attributes.101 In their model, marginal
cost is increasing in quality, and consumers possess downward-sloping demands.
Some consumers prefer high-quality, high-priced goods, while others prefer low-
quality, low-priced goods. Advertising may then provide information that better
enables buyers to match with their respective preferred products. Formally, they
consider a three-stage game. In the first stage, firms choose whether to enter.
If a firm enters, then at the same time if chooses its price, quality level and
advertising activities (i.e., claims and expenditures). In the second stage, each
consumer observes advertising activities, but not price and quality choices, and
picks a single firm to visit. Finally, in the third stage, each consumer observes the
price and quality at the selected firm and chooses a purchase quantity.102
Advertising claims need not be truthful. A firm that oﬀers one quality of
product may mimic the advertised claims and expenditures of firms that oﬀer the
101For an early discussion in which advertising plays a matching role in a market with vertically
diﬀerentiated products, see Rosen (1978). He proceeds under the assumption that advertised
claims are truthful. For another model in which advertising provides indirect information,
see Anand and Shachar (2004a). They explore a duopoly model in which advertising content
provides direct but noisy information; furthermore, the fact that a firm chooses to target its
ad to particular media channels provides indirect information that the firm’s product may be a
good match for consumers that are exposed to those channels.
102In this game, the product is a search good. Bagwell and Ramey also analyze the possibility
of an experience good, in which case quality is not observed at the time of purchase.
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other quality of product. The benefit of misrepresentation is that a firm thereby
“tricks” consumers that prefer the alternative price-quality oﬀering into visiting
its store. But there is also a cost: the misrepresenting firm loses those consumers
that prefer its (true) price-quality oﬀering and to whom it otherwise would have
sold. The net gain from misrepresenation hinges upon the diﬀerences in market
share that accrue to firms oﬀering the diﬀerent qualities. An equilibrium in which
advertising provides information is thus possible only if prices, advertising activ-
ities, and market shares satisfy incentive-compatibility and free-entry conditions.
Fortunately, a sorting condition is available: a quality-sensitive consumer may
yield more profit to a high-quality firm, since the demand expansion that ensues
is suﬃcient to overwhelm the higher marginal cost. If the market shares are suf-
ficiently similar across qualities, then costless advertising claims (“cheap talk”)
are credible, as under the sorting condition a firm does not gain from trading
consumers that prefer its product for a similar number of consumers that do not.
But if market shares diﬀer suﬃciently across qualities, then firms that oﬀer the
low-market-share quality are tempted to misrepresent, and so firms that provide
the high-market-share quality must use dissipative advertising expenditures to
discourage mimicry and signal quality. In a free-entry equilibrium, high market
shares are associated with high fixed costs. Thus, if fixed costs are roughly con-
stant across quality levels, then cheap talk credibly communicates quality. But if
fixed costs vary significantly with quality, then dissipative advertising is used by
firms oﬀering the quality of product that has the higher fixed costs.
6.4. Quality-Guarentee Eﬀect
Up to this point, I have emphasized the extent to which advertising signals prod-
uct quality, when quality is exogenous or determined by a once-and-for-all choice.
In many markets, however, firms oﬀer experience goods and must be given incen-
tive to provide a high-quality good in each period. An intertemporal tradeoﬀ is
suggested. On the one hand, a firm’s short-run incentive is to save costs and oﬀer
unsuspecting consumers a low-quality product. Balanced against this short-term
benefit, however, is the long-run cost of a lost reputation for quality. A firm that
saves costs and provides a low-quality good today foresakes its reputation and
thus the profit that it could earn on repeat sales tomorrow.
Where does advertising fit in? The reputational argument just advanced pre-
sumes that the firm is not anonymous. Clearly, a firm must be identifiable if it is
to be rewarded with repeat business only when it provides high-quality products.
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In turn, a firm may acquire a “name” by advertising its brand. From this per-
spective, advertising is associated with higher-quality products, since a “known”
firm is reluctant to lose its reputation by oﬀering a shoddy product. Advertising
thus has a quality-guarantee eﬀect that is reassuring even to first-time buyers.
The quality-guarantee eﬀect is emphasized by early writers. Fogg-Meade
(1901), Marshall (1919) and Shaw (1912) all argue that the advent of large-
scale advertising gave manufacturers a significantly greater incentive to provide
high-quality products. As observed in Section 2.2, Braithwaite (1928) takes an
opposing view and argues that the quality-guarantee eﬀect is modest, while Gal-
braith (1958, 1967) and Packard (1957, 1969) go further and suggest that brand
advertising has powerful and negative social consequences. The same debate con-
tinues in the modern era, perhaps with even greater intensity, as the eﬀects of
“globalization” are scrutinized. The Economist (2001), for example, argues that
a brand name removes the curtain of anonymity and makes a firm accountable for
the quality of its product and the working conditions of its laborers. But Klein
(2001) contends that persuasive (life-style) advertising is an important means by
which brand-name multinationals influence media, shape culture and generally
distort the economic and social aspirations of individuals.
This on-going debate is not resolved here. Accommodating aspects of both
views, I assume that a monopolist’s brand is known to consumers by name and
that advertising is demand-enhancing (perhaps due to its persuasive powers). In
this general context, my goal is to investigate the theoretical underpinnings of the
quality-guarantee eﬀect. Two questions are asked. First, in what manner must
the monopolist distort its price and/or advertising selections, in order to provide a
quality-guarantee eﬀect? Second, among those price-advertising selections that do
guarantee a high-quality product, which selection is preferred by the monopolist?
By answering these questions, I hope to determine whether advertising may play
a quality-guarantee role, even when consumers already know the brand name and
the monopoly can also provide quality assurances with its price.
Formally, I consider an infinitely repeated game. In each period, the monop-
olist chooses a price P , an advertising level A and a quality level t, where quality
is either low or high: t ∈ {L,H}. Consumers observe P and A but not t, form a
belief b as to the probability that the monopolist has selected a high-quality prod-
uct, and then demand a quantity D(P,A, b). After any consumption experience
is concluded, the monopolist earns profit Π(P,A, b, t) ≡ (P − c(t))D(P,A, b)−κA
and consumers observe the chosen quality t. Assume that a high-quality prod-
uct involves a higher marginal cost of production (c(H) > c(L)). Departing
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from the structure developed above, assume further that a consumer would never
knowingly purchase a low-quality product (D(P,A, 0) = 0). The stage game is
then repeated. I focus on stationary subgame perfect equilibria. In a stationary
equilibrium, along the equilibrium path, the monopolist makes the same price,
advertising and quality choices in every period.
To fix ideas, suppose for the moment that the stage game is not infinitely
repeated. In a static model, for any given price and advertising expenditure,
if consumers were to form a belief that results in a positive demand, then the
monopolist would surprise consumers with a low-quality product, as it would
thereby save costs without aﬀecting demand. This logic also carries through in
any finite-horizon game. The firm would “cheat” and provide low-quality in the
last period. Using backward induction, it follows that no transaction ever occurs.
In the infinitely repeated game, however, the short-run cost savings that ac-
company a low-quality selection can be balanced against an associated long-run
reputational cost. Suppose that consumers believe that the monopolist will pro-
vide a high-quality product if and only if it has always done so before and the
price and advertising selections fall in a range that guarantees quality. Formally,
quality is guaranteed for a reputable firm when the price and advertising selections
fall in the range for which
Π(P,A, 1, L)−Π(P,A, 1, H) ≤
∞X
t=1
δtΠ(P,A, 1, H), (6.7)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. The left-hand side represents the short-run
cost savings that the monopolist enjoys when it cheats and surprises consumers
with a low-quality selection. The right-hand side captures the long-run reputa-
tional cost that the monopolist incurs, if it cheats in the current period and thus
sacrifices its reputation and the prospect of repeat purchases at all later dates.103
Recalling the first question raised above, I now characterize the price and
advertising selections that quarantee quality. The incentive constraint captured
in (6.7) may be re-written as follows:
(c(H)− c(L))D(P,A, 1) ≤ δ
1− δ{(P − c(H))D(P,A, 1)− κA}. (6.8)
103If the monopolist cheats, then in all future periods play reverts to the Nash equilibrium of
the static game, whereby the monopolist does not advertise and oﬀers a low-quality product
while consumers do not purchase. The monopolist then earns zero profit.
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Let the interest rate r be defined by δ = 1/(1 + r). It is now straightforward to
re-write (6.8) as:
[P − (c(H) + r(c(H)− c(L))]D(P,A, 1)− κA ≥ 0. (6.9)
As (6.9) reveals, the monopolist has the incentive to provide a high-quality product
if and only if its price and advertising selections would generate non-negative
profit, under a hypothetical situation in which the firm’s marginal cost is c(H) +
r(c(H)− c(L)) and consumers believe that product quality is high.
An important implication is that the monopolist provides a high-quality prod-
uct only if the price strictly exceeds the true marginal cost, c(H). Intuitively, the
monopolist will forego the current-period opportunity to cheat consumers only if
profitable repeat business then would be lost in the future. Notice that advertis-
ing is not essential for the quality-guarantee eﬀect (once the name of the product
is known). To see this, put A = 0 and observe that (6.9) holds if and only if
P ≥ c(H) + r(c(H)− c(L)). (6.10)
When price exceeds this critical level, the quality-guarantee eﬀect is achieved
through price alone.
Consider now the second question raised above. Among those price-advertising
selections that guarantee quality, which one maximizes the monopolist’s profit?
The profit-maximizing selection solves the following program:
max
P,A
Π(P,A, 1, H) subject to (6.9). (6.11)
The associated Lagrangian can be expressed as
L(P,A,λ) = (1+λ){[P −(c(H)+ λ
1 + λ
r(c(H)−c(L)))]D(P,A, 1)−κA}, (6.12)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. As the bracketed term in (6.12) reveals, in
the most-profitable stationary equilibrium the monopolist oﬀers a high-quality
product and makes the same price-advertising selection as it would were it to
produce at constant marginal cost c1 ≡ c(H) + λ1+λr(c(H) − c(L)) and oﬀer a
product of known high quality.
The reputation model exhibits a surprising similarity to the static signaling
model of Section 6.1. As in the static model, a cost-increasing distortion is implied:
the high-quality monopolist does best when it sets the same price-advertising pair
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as it would were its quality of product known but its marginal costs higher (c1 >
c(H)). In comparison to the complete-information and high-quality monopoly
price and advertising selections, an upward distortion in price and a downward
distortion in demand-enhancing advertising is again predicted. Intuitively, the
upward distortion in price and downward distortion in advertising contribute to a
downward distortion in demand, thereby reducing the short-run cost savings that
would be gained if the monopolist were to cheat.104
Klein and Leﬄer (1981) oﬀer an early formalization of some of these themes.
They establish that a competitive firm has incentive to oﬀer a high-quality prod-
uct only if price exceeds marginal cost for the high-quality product (so that repeat
business has value). Their expression for the “quality-assuring price” is analogous
to (6.10).105 They also introduce advertising as an investment in brand-name cap-
ital that is forfeited if a firm degrades its reputation. In light of such advertising
expenses, they argue that the zero-profit requirement of competitive markets may
be reconciled with a positive markup. An implication is that an observed correla-
tion between advertising and profit (see Section 3.2.2) may reflect the rents that
are necessary for high-quality performance rather than the presence of market
power that is brought forth by an advertising-induced barrier to entry.
The reputation model presented above may be modified to illustrate the invest-
ment interpretation of advertising that Klein and Leﬄer advance. In particular,
consider an equilibrium in which the monopolist does not advertise through time
(i.e., A = 0), but does advertise at the time of entry. Suppose further that the
initial advertising A0 creates actual brand-name capital, in that it causes a (rep-
utable) monopolist’s demand to grow through time, where the (constant) rate
of growth increases with the initial advertising outlay. Two implications follow.
First, if the initial advertising outlay is increased, then the monopolist faces a
greater long-term loss from cheating (since a faster-growing consumer demand is
forfeited), and so a lower quality-guaranteeing price can be achieved. Importantly,
advertising that creates brand-name capital may thus represent a means through
which a firm can oﬀer a more competitive price while maintaining its incentive
to oﬀer a high-quality product. Second, if consumers require a suﬃcient up-front
investment in advertising, it remains possible to reconcile a positive markup with
104Likewise, if advertising were dissipative, then the high-quality monopolist would guarantee
quality most profitably by not advertising (i.e., setting A = 0).
105The formal expression in (6.10) is first derived by Shapiro (1983). See also Telser (1980) for
related themes and Stiglitz (1989) for further discussion.
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a zero-profit condition.106 Interesting future work might expand this framework
to allow for multiple firms that can choose to invest in advertising at any date.
Klein and Leﬄer also discuss the possibility that consumers may be uninformed
as to firms’ costs. They introduce the provocative idea that a firm’s dissipative
advertising expenditure may signal its cost type and thereby influence consumers’
quality perceptions. Intuitively, a firm benefits if consumers believe it to have low
costs (where a firm has “low costs” if for that firm c(H) + r(c(H)− c(L)) is low),
since it can then oﬀer a lower quality-guranteeing price. While the idea is simple
and intuitive, the appropriate formalization is non-trivial, as it involves dynamic
signaling in a rivalrous environment. Rogerson (1986) oﬀers a formal investigation
of this kind. This area, too, represents a promising direction for further work.
Finally, consider the implications of the reputation theory for multiproduct
firms. Suppose that the framework above is extended to allow that the monopo-
list carries two products. If the products do not have the same brand name, then
consumers may be unaware that the products are linked. The quality-guaranteeing
price for each product might then be determined by the product-by-product ap-
plication of the incentive constraint captured in (6.9). Now suppose that the
products have a common brand name. They are then linked in the consumers’
minds, and the monopolist may lose repeat business on both products if it cheats
on either. In the relevant incentive constraint, the product-by-product incentive
constraints are pooled (i.e., added together): the gains from cheating on both
products must be no greater than the loss in profits on both products that cheat-
ing would imply. It is possible that the monopolist can be induced to supply
high-quality products, even when the price-advertising selection for one product
would fail the incentive constraint for that product alone. Branding may thus
benefit a firm by expanding the set of quality-guaranteeing price-advertising se-
lections.107 This discussion reinforces the argument that advertising can motivate
106Formally, suppose that demand at time t is given as g(A0)td(P, 1), where g(A0) − 1 is the
demand growth rate, P is the stationary price selection and b = 1 is the belief. Suppose that
g(0) = 1, g0 > 0, and δg(A0) is bound below unity. Then δ in (6.8) is replaced by the eﬀective
(growth-included) discount factor, δe ≡ δg(A0). The quality-guaranteeing price is again given
by (6.10), when r is replaced by the eﬀective interest rate, re ≡ [1 + r− g(A0)]/g(A0). Observe
that sign{r − re} ≡ sign{g(A0)− 1} > 0 for A0 > 0. Finally, the monopolist earns discounted
profit in amount Π(P, 0, 1,H)/(1 − δe) − κA0, which is driven to zero at a finite and positive
level for A0.
107For further formal analyses of branding, see Bagwell (1992), Cabral (2000), Choi (1998),
Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1992) and Wernerfelt (1988). The general idea that incentive
constraints are relaxed when pooled is also exploited in the collusion literature. See Telser
103
high-quality choices by reducing anonymity and making brand names known.
6.5. Summary
A huge theoretical literature analyzes the relationship between advertising and
product quality. The relationship is subtle, and it varies across circumstances.
One set of work analyzes the manner in which advertising may signal quality. In
this context, the advertising-quality relationship can be understood with reference
to the three eﬀects that Nelson (1974b) identifies. These eﬀects provide a basis for
a positive relationship between advertising and product quality. But the signaling-
eﬃciency eﬀect may be reversed in a number of environments, since higher-quality
goods may use more expensive materials and thus have higher marginal costs. In
such environments, greater advertising may be associated with higher quality
if Nelson’s other eﬀects are prominent. The main empirical implication is that
no systematic correlation between advertising and quality is expected, since the
relationship reflects market circumstances and the simultaneous use of price and
advertising as signals of quality. This implication is consistent with the empirical
work summarized in Section 3.2.5. It also motivates new empirical work (as
discussed in Section 8) that considers price and advertising as joint signals.
A second set of work investigates the extent to which advertising may pro-
vide an incentive for the continued selection of high-quality products. As early
writers argue, advertising can play an important role by making brands known
and identifiable, so that brand reputations can be forged and maintained. Once
brands are known, however, if advertising enhances current demand, then the
quality-guarantee eﬀect is most profitably generated when price is distorted up
and advertising is distorted down. If advertising also creates brand-name capital
by enhancing future demand, then it appears possible that a firm may distort its
advertising upward, in order to be able to oﬀer a lower quality-guaranteeing price.
7. Advertising and Entry Deterrence
With a few exceptions, the theory summarized above does not address the rela-
tionship between advertising and entry. This is an important ommision, since the
persuasive view hypothesizes that advertising exerts an entry-deterrence eﬀect. As
discussed in Section 3, the empirical support for this hypothesis is mixed. In the
(1980) for a first formalization. Further analysis is oﬀered by Bernheim and Whinston (1990).
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absence of an empirical resolution concerning the relationship between advertising
and entry, theoretical analyses may be of special value.
In the tradition of Bain’s (1949) limit-pricing model, many of the first mod-
els of advertising as an entry barrier employ the assumption that the incumbent
can credibly commit to maintain its pre-entry advertising expenditures if entry
occurs.108 A high pre-entry advertising expenditure may then imply a hostile
environment for a potential entrant, in which case such advertising may deter en-
try. But the credibility of this commitment is questionable. As Needham (1976)
argues, in the absence of such a commitment, an incumbent’s pre-entry adver-
tising influences the entry decision only if there is some link between pre-entry
advertising and the entrant’s post-entry expected profit.109
I consider here two possible links. First, advertising may have a goodwill
eﬀect, so that some consumers favor the incumbent in the post-entry period when
the incumbent advertises heavily in the pre-entry period. While the empirical
studies reviewed in Section 3.1.1 suggest that the goodwill eﬀect of advertising
is often modest, the eﬀect may be pronounced in certain industries. Second, the
incumbent’s pre-entry advertising behavior may signal the incumbent’s private
information and thereby aﬀect the entrant’s expected profit from entry.
7.1. Advertising and Goodwill
If advertising generates goodwill for the incumbent, then it is natural to expect
that an incumbent could deter entry by engaging in heavy pre-entry advertis-
ing. But is this expectation confirmed in an equilibrium model? To answer this
question, the source of the goodwill eﬀect must be specified. An “informational
goodwill eﬀect” is present, if an incumbent’s pre-entry advertising provides con-
sumers with hard information of durable value concerning the incumbent’s exis-
tence and prices. The incumbent might include its location and phone number
on the ads, for instance. Alternatively, as persuasive-view advocates emphasize
(see Section 2.2), the incumbent’s pre-entry advertising generates a “reputational
goodwill eﬀect,” if in some general sense it reinforces consumers’ past experiences
so as to diﬀerentially reward an established firm. For example, the incumbent’s
advertising eﬀorts may reinforce any reputation that it has for providing reliable
and high-quality products.
In Schmalensee’s (1983) model, an informational goodwill eﬀect is posited. He
108See, for example, Salop (1979), Spence (1980) and Williamson (1963).
109See also Cubbin (1981).
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considers a homogenous-products market served by an incumbent and potentially
an entrant. Consumers learn of a firm’s existence and price through an adver-
tising technology of the kind proposed by Butters (1977). The three-stage game
proceeds as follows. In the first (pre-entry) stage, the incumbent sends out ads to
consumers. A consumer who receives such an ad is informed of the incumbent’s ex-
istence and can learn the incumbent’s (eventual) price at zero cost. In the second
stage, after observing the incumbent’s advertising behavior, the entrant considers
whether to incur a sunk cost and enter. If entry occurs, then the entrant sends out
its own ads. In this event, each firm then has a set of captive consumers, and there
is also a set of selective consumers. Finally, in the third (post-entry) stage, active
firms play some simultaneous-move oligopoly game. As Schmalensee observes, if
entry occurs and firms choose prices, then a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does
not exist. He thus supposes that the firms compete in quantities.
In this model, advertising is a durable investment and entry entails a sunk cost.
It is thus tempting to reason by analogy with Dixit’s (1980) entry-deterrence
model and conclude that the incumbent strategically overinvests in advertising
in order to deter entry. But this analogy is false. As Schmalensee shows, the
incumbent can deter entry, but it does so with a reduced advertising expenditure.
Intuitively, if the incumbent were to advertise heavily, then it would have many
captive consumers. The incumbent would then be tempted to set a low output,
so as to sell only to these consumers at a high price. A rational entrant would
thus perceive that the incumbent would be a “soft” competitor. Consequently, if
the incumbent seeks to deter entry, it should underinvest in advertising, thereby
ensuring that it has few captive consumers and would respond to entry with
vigorous competition for selective consumers.
Ishigaki (2000) modifies this three-stage game to allow that post-entry compe-
tition occurs in prices. After characterizing the mixed-strategy pricing equilibria
that entry induces, Ishigaki finds that the entry is either blockaded (the incumbent
deters entry when it behaves as it would were there no entrant) or accommodated
(the incumbent optimally allows entry and sets its Stackelberg advertising level).
There is no parameter region for which the incumbent strategically distorts its ad-
vertising choice in order to deter entry. Together, the models of Schmalensee and
Ishigaki suggest the following striking conclusion: in homogeneous-products mar-
kets, when the goodwill eﬀect of advertising is informational, a profit-maximizing
incumbent does not deter entry by investing more in advertising than it would
were there no entry threat. These models therefore provide no formal support for
the entry-deterrence eﬀect.
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As Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) establish, a similar conclusion may obtain
when the incumbent and entrant sell diﬀerentiated products. They consider a
simple two-period model that captures some of the central themes raised above.
In the first (pre-entry) period, the incumbent (firm 1) chooses a fraction Φ1 of
consumers to inform of its existence and price. As in the Grossman-Shapiro (1984)
model, the cost to the incumbent of informing a fraction Φ1 is A(Φ1), where A(Φ1)
is positive, increasing and convex for Φ1 > 0. Assume further that initially it is
prohibitively costly to reach all consumers: A(1) =∞. The informational goodwill
eﬀect is captured with a strong assumption: consumers who receive an ad in the
first period do not bother to read any ads that they may receive in the second
(post-entry) period, and they thus remain captive consumers for the incumbent
throughout the game. The incumbent selects its monopoly price in the pre-entry
period and achieves a net revenue of RM > 0 per consumer. The incumbent’s
pre-entry profit is thus Φ1RM −A(Φ1).
In the second period, the incumbent and the entrant (firm 2) make advertising
and pricing selections. Under the goodwill assumption, 1−Φ1 consumers remain
in the second period that are not captive to the incumbent. Fudenberg and Tirole
assume that the firms advertise so as to cover the remaining market. Let A denote
the second-period advertising expenditure incurred by each firm in the course of
creating 1 − Φ1 selective consumers. The second-period prices of the incumbent
and entrant, respectively, are denoted as P1 and P2. In the second period, the
incumbent enjoys per-customer net revenues of R1(P1, P2) from a selective con-
sumer and R1(P1,∞) from a captive consumer. The entrant sells only to selective
consumers and enjoys a per-customer net revenue of R2(P1, P2). Assume that the
net revenue functions are diﬀerentiable, concave in own prices, increasing in rival




The final assumption indicates that prices are strategic complements.
For this two-period game, payoﬀ functions are defined as follows:
Π1(Φ1, P1, P2) = [Φ1RM−A(Φ1)]+δ[Φ1R1(P1,∞)+(1−Φ1)R1(P1, P2)−A] (7.1)
Π2(Φ1, P1, P2) = δ[(1− Φ1)R2(P1, P2)−A], (7.2)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the common discount factor. Assume a Nash equilibrium
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Throughout, the dependence of P ∗i on Φ1 is suppressed.









In the second period, the incumbent thus would like to raise its price on captive
consumers and lower the price that it oﬀers to selective consumers. The incumbent
thus picks a second-period price that optimally balances these considerations.
The following relationships are now direct from (7.3), (7.4) and (7.5):




















According to (7.6), and as in Schmalensee’s model, when the incumbent’s pre-
entry advertising is greater, it becomes more attracted to higher post-entry prices.
In the formulation considered here, as (7.7) confirms, the incumbent’s pre-entry
advertising does not directly alter the entrant’s preferred price. But, as (7.9)
indicates, if greater pre-entry advertising leads the incumbent to price higher,
then the entrant becomes attracted to higher prices for this reason.
Under a standard stability condition, it is now easy to confirm that (7.6)-(7.9)







110With P1 on the y-axis, the stability condition indicates that the second-period pricing
reaction function of the incumbent is flatter than that of the entrant.
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Thus, as the incumbent advertises more heavily in the pre-entry period, a greater
number of captive consumers are created, and so the incumbent prices higher in
the post-entry period. Given that prices are strategic complements, the entrant
prices higher as well.
Consider now the advertising level at which the incumbent accommodates the
entrant in the most profitable manner. Assuming that the second-order condition
is satisfied, the incumbent maximizes its payoﬀ when it chooses in the pre-entry
period the value Φ∗1 that satisfies the first-order condition
dΠ1(Φ1,P∗1 ,P ∗2 )
dΦ1 = 0. Using
(7.3), this condition may be re-stated as
RM + δ[R1(P
∗
1 ,∞)−R1(P ∗1 , P ∗2 )] + δ(1−Φ1)







On the left-hand side of (7.11), the first two terms are positive and capture the
direct eﬀect of greater pre-entry advertising on first- and second-period net rev-
enue. The third term is also positive. This term represents the strategic eﬀect
of greater pre-entry advertising. As established in (7.10), when the incumbent
advertises more heavily, the entrant prices higher. The incumbent thereby earns
greater profit in the post-entry period. Finally, the term on the right-hand side
captures the cost of additional advertising.
It is interesting to compare Φ∗1 with the value that would occur if the entrant’s
post-entry price were unresponsive to the incumbent’s pre-entry advertising. In
the absence of the strategic eﬀect, the left-hand side would be smaller. Given the
convexity of the function A(Φ1), it follows that the optimal value for Φ1 would
then fall below Φ∗1. It thus may be concluded that the incumbent overinvests in
pre-entry advertising, in order to create a larger captive group of consumers and
thereby commit itself to a higher post-entry price, so that the entrant will respond
with a higher price of its own. As Fudenberg and Tirole put it, the incumbent
best accommodates the entrant by overinvesting so as to become a “fat cat.”111
111Boyer and Moreaux (1999) consider a diﬀerent demand specification, under which the en-
trant also has captive consumers. In their formulation, the incumbent’s advertising level exerts
a strategic eﬀect through its impact on the entrant’s price reaction curve. For example, when
the incumbent and entrant sell substitute products and prices are strategic complements, if the
incumbent advertises more heavily, then the entrant has a smaller set of captive consumers,
and so the entrant’s price reaction curve shifts downward. In contrast to Fudenberg and Tirole,
Boyer and Moreaux argue that the incumbent best accommodates entry by underinvesting in
advertising. Furthermore, this finding holds for a variety of sequential-move games and whether
the products are substitutes or complements. See Fershtman and Muller (1993) for an earlier
discussion of the underinvestment finding when products are substitutes.
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Suppose now that the entrant must incur a sunk cost if it chooses to enter.
Rather than accommodate the entrant, the incumbent might then choose to deter
entry. But how is this achieved? Intuitively, if the incumbent seeks to deter entry,
then it may achieve an indirect benefit by underinvesting in advertising, so as to
create a small group of captive consumers and thereby commit itself to a low price
in the event of entry. Fudenberg and Tirole refer to this as the “lean-and-hungry
look.” But an argument also can be made that the incumbent should overinvest
in advertising, since it thereby achieves the direct benefit of reducing the entrant’s
possible market. To see these competing eﬀects more clearly, use (7.4) and note
that the overall eﬀect of pre-entry incumbent advertising on post-entry profit to














−R2(P ∗1 , P ∗2 )]. (7.12)
The first term is positive under (7.10) and captures the indirect benefit to the
incumbent of reduced pre-entry advertising, but the second term is negative and
reflects the direct benefit to the incumbent of increased pre-entry advertising. As
Fudenberg and Tirole observe, in an important set of environments, the indirect
benefit of reduced pre-entry advertising dominates, and entry deterrence again
requires underinvestment in advertising.112
The models developed above, however, all posit an informational goodwill
eﬀect. What if instead advertising induces a reputational goodwill eﬀect? To
begin, it is useful to distinguish between two issues.113 A first issue is whether
an incumbent with an existing reputation for reliable and high-quality products
has an advantage relative to an entrant with no existing reputation. Undeniably,
this is often the case. Consumers are naturally willing to pay a premium for a
product from a reputable firm relative to that which they would pay for a product
from an unknown firm. This suggests that informational product diﬀerentiation
may be a barrier to entry. As Bagwell (1990), de Bijl (1997), Farrell (1986) and
Schmalensee (1982) demonstrate, this suggestion is readily confirmed in formal
models.114 A second issue concerns the extent to which advertising is the source of
this entry barrier. With respect to this issue, it is noteworthy that the incumbent
112In recent work, Doraszelski and Markovich (2004) use numerical methods to compute the
Markov-perfect equilibria for a dynamic game with an informational goodwill eﬀect. In their
model, an incumbent may deter entry by overinvesting in advertising, while the optimal accom-
modation strategy can vary with market characteristics.
113This distinction is explored in Section 2.2. It is also emphasized by Demsetz (1982).
114Schmalensee (1982) oﬀers a first formalization of the brand loyalty that consumers exhibit
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is not allowed to advertise in the formal entry-deterrence models just mentioned.
In these models at least, there is clearly no formal sense in which advertising is
necessary for informational product diﬀerentiation to act as an entry barrier.
But might advertising somehow reinforce consumers’ past experiences with the
established product and thereby exacerbate the informational barrier to entry? It
is, of course, possible to assume that advertising is more eﬀective when consumers
have greater experience with the advertised product.115 But a more compelling
model would yield the reinforcement eﬀect as an implication of optimizing behav-
ior. I am not aware of a model of this kind.
Drawing on the earlier writings, let me highlight one approach that may war-
rant formalization. As Braithwaite (1928, p. 32), Marshall (1919, p. 307) and
Comanor and Wilson (1974, Chapter 4) explain, a firm’s ad must bid for the
consumer’s attention, and it may be more costly for a new firm to get the con-
sumer’s attention when the consumer is already overloaded with related ads from
established firms. As Comanor and Wilson (1974, p. 47) put it:
“To the extent that the advertising of others creates ‘noise’ in the mar-
ket, one must ‘shout’ louder to be heard, so that the eﬀectiveness of
each advertising message declines as the aggregate volume of industry
advertising increases. In this case, it will be necessary for new entrants
to spend more today to gain an established market position than ex-
isting firms spent yesterday, when aggregate industry advertising was
probably far less. From these circumstances also, new entrants may
have diﬀerentially higher advertising costs than did established firms
at their entry into the market.”
This “noise eﬀect” suggests that the incumbent may strategically overinvest in
toward pioneering brands of known quality. He shows that a high-quality incumbent can earn
positive profit without inducing the entry of an equally eﬃcient, high-quality entrant. Bagwell
(1990) extends this model to allow that consumers rationally infer quality from price and that
the entrant may oﬀer a superior product. The key finding is that a low-quality incumbent
may deter entry, even when the entrant actually oﬀers a high-quality (and socially eﬃcient)
product. de Bijl (1997) establishes a similar finding for search goods when search costs are
high, and shows as well that the entry barrier may be diminished if the incumbent is informed
of the entrant’s quality. Farrell (1986) extends the analysis to consider the manner in which
the incumbent’s behavior aﬀects the entrant’s incentive to choose a high-quality product. See
also Schmalensee (1979) for a detailed discussion of the product-diﬀerentiation advantages that
accrued to pioneering brands in the market for lemon juice.
115See Comanor and Wilson (1974, Chapters 3 and 4) for a model in which it is assumed that
advertising’s eﬀectiveness varies with consumers’ experience with the advertised product.
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advertising, in order to jam the message space and force the entrant to be more
stentorian with its advertising eﬀorts. Incumbent advertising would then raise
the entrant’s advertising costs and exacerbate the entry barrier. This cost-raising
strategy is informally discussed by Hilke and Nelson (1984), who provide evi-
dence in the U.S. coﬀee market that Maxwell House used such a strategy when
facing entry by Folgers. Future work might revisit this noise eﬀect, in a model
that endogenizes the manner in which consumers with finite information-storage
capabilities manage (as possible) their exposure to advertising.
7.2. Advertising and Signaling
I consider now the possibility that the incumbent’s pre-entry behavior may signal
its private information. This information may be relevant for the entrant’s calcula-
tion of the expected profit from entry. In this case, an informational link connects
the incumbent’s pre-entry behavior and the entrant’s post-entry expected profit.
Milgrom and Roberts (1982) establish that a low-cost incumbent may distort
its pre-entry price downward in order to signal its costs and thereby deter entry.
Bagwell and Ramey (1988) extend the Milgrom-Roberts analysis to allow that the
low-cost incumbent may signal its costs by distorting its pre-entry price and/or
advertising. As I explain below, they find that the low-cost incumbent deters entry
most profitably, when its pre-entry price is distorted downward and its demand-
enhancing advertising is distorted upward.116 They thus provide a theory in which
an incumbent overinvests in advertising in order to deter entry.117
Bagwell and Ramey consider a signaling game with two periods. In the pre-
entry period, an incumbent of cost type t ∈ {L,H} selects its pre-entry price P ≥
0 and advertising level A ≥ 0. The incumbent earns pre-entry profit Π(P,A, t) ≡
(P−c(t))D(P,A)−κA, whereD > 0, DP < 0,DA ≥ 0 and c(H) > c(L). Advertis-
ing may be demand-enhancing (DA > 0) or dissipative (DA = 0). For t ∈ {L,H},
assume further that Π(P,A, t) is strictly concave in P , with a unique maximizing
116Methodologically, the analysis presented below is closely related to that presented above in
Section 6.1. Notice, though, that the incumbent now uses price and advertising to signal its
cost to an entrant, whereas in Section 6.1 the monopolist uses price and advertising to signal
quality to consumers.
117Milgrom and Roberts oﬀer an information-theoretic foundation for Bain’s (1949) prediction
that an incumbent can deter entry by limit pricing. Likewise, Bagwell and Ramey provide a the-
oretical counterpart to an interesting extension of Bain’s approach that is oﬀered by Williamson
(1963). In Williamson’s model, the incumbent deters entry, by making a pre-entry commitment
to a low price and a high level of advertising.
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pair, (PM(t), AM(t)). This pair denotes the monopoly price-advertising selection.
The corresponding monopoly profit is πM(t) ≡ Π(PM(t), AM(t), t).
At the start of the post-entry period, a single entrant observes the pre-entry
price and advertising level, but not the incumbent’s type, and forms some belief
b = b(P,A) ∈ [0, 1] as to the probability that the incumbent has high costs. The
entrant then enters or not, where E = 1 (E = 0) denotes (no) entry. If entry
does not occur, then the incumbent earns monopoly profit πM(t) in the post-entry
period. If entry does occur, then the entrant learns the incumbent’s type, and the
incumbent and entrant play some post-entry duopoly game, earning πD(t) and
πeD(t), respectively. The sunk cost of entry is included in π
e
D(t).
For a given price P , advertising level A, entry decision E and incumbent type
t, the incumbent and entrant payoﬀs are
V (P,A,E, t) = Π(P,A, t) + δ[EπD(t) + (1− E)πM(t)] (7.13)
u(E, t) = δEπeD(t), (7.14)
respectively, where δ is the common discount factor. At the time of the entry
decision, the entrant’s expected profit from entry is
U(P,A,E, b) ≡ [bu(E,H) + (1− b)u(E,L)]/δ. (7.15)
Using (7.14) and (7.15), it follows that U(P,A, 0, b) = 0 and U(P,A, 1, b) =
bπeD(H) + (1− b)πeD(L).
Further structure is provided by three key assumptions. First, whatever its
type, the incumbent prefers that entry not occur: πM(t) > πD(t). Second, the
entrant earns positive profit from entry if and only if the incumbent has high
costs: πeD(H) > 0 > π
e
D(L). Third, the incumbent gains at least as much from
entry deterrence when its costs are low as when its costs are high: πM(L)−πD(L) ≥
πM(H)−πD(H). The first assumption is unobjectionable, the second assumption
holds in standard duopoly models if the sunk cost of entry falls in an intermediate
range, and the third assumption reflects the diﬀerential benefit of greater sales to
a lower-cost firm and holds in many popular duopoly models.
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a set of strategies {P (t), A(t), E(P,A)}t=L,H
and beliefs b(P,A) such that: (i). for each t ∈ {L,H}, (P (t), A(t)) maximizes
V (P,A,E(P,A), t), (ii). for all (P,A) ≥ 0, E(P,A) maximizes U(P,A,E, b(P,A))
and (iii). b(P,A) is derived from the equilibrium strategies whenever possible.
I again focus on separating equilibria. For such equilibria, (P (H), A(H)) 6=
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(P (L), A(L)) and thus b(P (H), A(H)) = 1 > 0 = b(P (L), A(L)). The entrant
infers the incumbent’s type and enters if and only if the incumbent has high costs.
As the high-cost incumbent is “found out,” it can do no better than to make its
monopoly selection, (P (H), A(H)) = (PM(H), AM(H)), and then face entry.118
The high-cost incumbent thus receives the payoﬀ V (PM(H), AM(H), 1, H) ≡
VM(H). Separation then requires that the low-cost incumbent choose some pair
(P,A) that the high-cost incumbent would not mimic:
V (P,A, 0,H) ≤ VM(H). (7.16)
To ensure that separation is costly, I assume that the low-cost incumbent’s monopoly
selection (PM(L), AM(L)) does not satisfy (7.16).
In the least-cost separating equilibrium, the low-cost incumbent makes the
selection (P (L), A(L)) = (P ∗, A∗), where (P ∗, A∗) is the price-advertising selection
that solves the following program:
Max
P,A
V (P,A, 0, L) subject to (7.16). (7.17)
Bagwell and Ramey (1988) establish that the least-cost separating equilibrium
exists. I focus here on the characterization of such an equilibrium.
To gain intuition, consider any two price-advertising pairs, (P1, A1) and (P2, A2),
that leave the mimicking high-cost incumbent indiﬀerent. Since each pair deters
entry, indiﬀerence means that Π(P1, A1, H) = Π(P2, A2, H). Thus
Π(P2, A2, L)−Π(P1, A1, L) (7.18)
= [Π(P2, A2, L)−Π(P1, A1, L)]− [Π(P2, A2,H)−Π(P1, A1,H)]
= [c(H)− c(L)][D(P2, A2)−D(P1, A1)].
As (7.18) reveals, given that c(H) > c(L), the low-cost incumbent prefers the
pair at which demand is highest. Intuitively, a demand-increasing change is more
attractive to a low-cost incumbent, since the demand increase then translates into
a smaller cost increase.
118Suppose (P (H), A(H)) 6= (PM (H), AM (H)). Then the high-cost incumbent could achieve a
strict gain with a deviation to (PM (H), AM (H)), since
V (P (H), A(H), 1,H) < V (PM (H), AM (H), 1,H) ≤ V (PM (H), AM (H), E(·),H),
where E(·) ≡ E(PM (H), AM (H)). The final inequality follows, since πM (H) > πD(H).
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For further insight, consider the program given in (7.17). The Lagrangian is
L(P,A,λ) ≡ V (P,A, 0, L) + λ[VM(H) − V (P,A, 0,H)]. It may be verified that
λ ∈ (0, 1) at the optimum.119 Using (7.13), the Lagrangian may be re-written as
L(P,A,λ) = (1− λ){(P − c(L)− λc(H)
1− λ )D(P,A)− κA}+K(λ, δ), (7.19)
whereK(λ, δ) is independent of P and A. As the bracketed term in (7.19) reveals,
in the least-cost separating equilibrium, the low-cost incumbent makes the same
price-advertising selection as it would were its constant marginal cost known to
be c2 ≡ [c(L)− λc(H)]/(1− λ). Observe that λ ∈ (0, 1) implies c2 < c(L).
In the least-cost separating equilibrium, the low-cost incumbent thus under-
takes a “cost-reducing distortion,” in that it selects the same price-advertising pair
as it would were its costs known and lower than they truly are. Put diﬀerently, the
low-cost incumbent behaves as it would were it a monopolist operating in a single-
period setting with constant marginal cost c2 < c(L). It is natural to assume that
a single-period monopolist would lower its price and raise its demand-enhancing
advertising were its constant marginal cost of production reduced.120 Under this
assumption, the low-cost incumbent distorts downward its price (P ∗ < PM(L))
and upward its demand-enhancing advertising (A∗ > AM(L)). Intuitively, the
low-cost incumbent undertakes these distortions in order to demonstrate its will-
ingness to increase demand. Finally, dissipative advertising is not used as a signal,
since it would never be used by an incumbent with known costs.
As in the Milgrom-Roberts model, profitable entry is not deterred in a sepa-
rating equilibrium. The entrant infers the incumbent’s cost type and resists entry
exactly when entry would be unprofitable (i.e., when the incumbent has low costs).
The incumbent’s pre-entry behavior credibly reveals its cost type, however, only
when the low-cost incumbent distorts its pre-entry selection. In the least-cost sep-
arating equilibrium, the low-cost incumbent deters (unprofitable) entry by limit
pricing and overinvesting in demand-enhancing advertising.
With these predictions at hand, it is interesting to revisit the relationships
between advertising, profitability and entry (see Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3). The
Bagwell-Ramey model predicts that greater incumbent advertising is associated
with higher profitability and lower rates of entry. These predictions match closely
those suggested by Comanor and Wilson (1967, 1974) and other persuasive-view
119The proof is analogous to that given in footnote 91 for the product-quality signaling model.
120As observed in footnote 92, this assumption holds in each of the two examples discussed in
Section 4.1.2.
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advocates. The predictions, however, are not attributable to advertising-induced
brand loyalty; instead, they arise because an eﬃcient incumbent advertises more,
earns more and faces less entry than would an ineﬃcient incumbent. The Bagwell-
Ramey model thus oﬀers some support for the “superior eﬃciency” interpretation
advanced by Demsetz (1973, 1974) and Nelson (1974b, 1975).
The basic model can be extended in several directions. Bagwell and Ramey
(1990) suppose that the incumbent’s private information concerns the level of in-
dustry demand. The incumbent now deters entry by signaling that demand is
low. They establish that a “demand-reducing distortion” occurs: the low-demand
incumbent behaves as if it were a single-period monopolist but demand is lower
than it truly is. Under natural assumptions, in the least-cost separating equilib-
rium, the low-demand incumbent’s price and demand-enhancing advertising are
both distorted downward. Thus, entry deterrence entails limit pricing, whether
the incumbent is privately informed of its costs or the level of industry demand;
however, entry deterrence results in an underinvestment in demand-enhancing
advertising when the incumbent is privately informed as to the level of industry
demand. Bagwell and Ramey also consider the possibility that the incumbent
may wish to signal that demand is high, so as to influence the entrant’s beliefs
and accommodate entry in the most profitable manner possible. In this case, a
“demand-increasing distortion” occurs, with the implication that the high-demand
incumbent distorts upward both price and demand-enhancing advertising.121
The work described here also can be extended to analyze manufacturer-retailer
relations. Suppose that a manufacturer has private information concerning the
eventual demand for its new product. The retailer may wish to carry the manu-
facturer’s product only if the retailer believes that there is a high demand for this
product. The manufacturer thus may wish to use its advertising expenditure and
(wholesale) price to signal to the retailer that demand is high. Following the logic
just described, the manufacturer signals that it oﬀers a high-demand product by
engaging in a demand-increasing distortion, whereby it distorts upward both price
and demand-enhancing advertising.122 This discussion provides a formal counter-
121Bagwell and Ramey also provide propositions that characterize necessary features of re-
fined pooling equilibria. But Albaek and Overgaard (1992a) show that, in fact, refined pooling
equilibria fail to exist in this model.
122See Chu (1992) for a formalization of this extension, wherein the retailer learns demand if
it decides to carry the incumbent’s product. Albaek and Overgaard (1992b) suppose that the
retailer carries the product but does not learn demand prior to setting the retail price. The
retailer’s beliefs then impact its price choice. Now, a manufacturer may undertake a demand-
reducing distortion in order to signal that demand is low, as it thereby enourages the retailer to
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part to a common argument expressed in earlier writings that a manufacturer uses
heavy advertising to communicate its confidence in the new product to retailers.
See, for example, Berreman (1943) and Chamberlin (1933, p. 121).
Finally, Linnemer (1998) oﬀers an interesting extension, in which an incumbent
firm has private information with respect to its product quality and production
costs. He considers a two-period model, in which the incumbent’s first-period
price and dissipative advertising outlays are used by consumers to infer quality
and by a potential entrant to infer costs. Specifically, the incumbent either has
a low-quality product and low costs, a high-quality product and medium costs,
or a high-quality product and high costs. Consumers know product quality in
the second period, but they must infer it in the first period. The entrant knows
the incumbent’s product quality; however, the entrant does not know whether a
high-quality incumbent has medium or high costs. The entrant wants to enter,
unless the incumbent has a high-quality product that it produces at medium cost.
The interesting point is that the high-quality incumbent with medium costs has a
conflict. As in the static signaling model presented in Section 6.1, it is tempted to
distort price upward in order to signal quality to consumers. But, as in the limit-
pricing literature discussed just above, it is also tempted to distort price downward
in order to signal that its costs are not high and thus that entry would not be
profitable. In rough analogy with the Milgrom-Roberts (1986) model, given these
conflicting considerations, the high-quality medium-cost incumbent may have no
better option than to use a distorted price and a positive dissipative advertising
expenditure when signaling its type. As in the Bagwell-Ramey (1988) model, the
consequent overinvestment in advertising deters entry that is unprofitable.
7.3. Summary
In summary, when the goodwill eﬀect of advertising is informational, the the-
oretical literature emphasizes that an incumbent firm that seeks to deter entry
may underinvest in pre-entry advertising. It is also possible that advertising gen-
erates a reputational goodwill eﬀect, by reinforcing consumers’ experiences with
the established product and exacerbating informational product diﬀerentiation.
I am not aware, however, of an equilibrium model of this kind. On the whole,
the entry-deterrence eﬀect of advertising is not strongly supported by the existing
theoretical models that emphasize advertising’s possible goodwill eﬀects. Future
work might endogenize the “noise eﬀect” that is emphasized in earlier writings.
set a low price and hence mitigates the double-marginalization problem.
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I also consider the possibility that the incumbent’s pre-entry pricing and adver-
tising behavior may signal its private information and thereby aﬀect the entrant’s
expected profit from entry. When the incumbent has private information about its
costs, a low-cost incumbent may limit price and overinvest in advertising, in order
to signal its costs and thereby deter entry. On the other hand, if the incumbent
has private information as to the level of industry demand, a low-demand incum-
bent may limit price and underinvest in advertising, in order to signal demand
and thereby deter entry. The overinvestment finding provides some support for
the entry-deterrence eﬀect of advertising; however, it must be noted that entry is
deterred only when it is intrinsically unprofitable. In other words, the low-cost
incumbent’s heavy advertising does not make entry unprofitable; rather, it reveals
that entry would be unprofitable.
8. Empirical Analyses
While inter-industry studies oﬀer useful descriptions of economy-wide empirical
regularities, they often suﬀer from important endogeneity and measurement con-
cerns (as detailed in Section 3) and ultimately fail to identify the underlying
structural parameters that describe how individual markets work. As mentioned
in the Introduction, the modern (second-group) empirical analyses of advertising
increasingly use new data sets, which are often constructed at remarkably dis-
aggregated levels, and emphasize consumer and firm conduct. Strategic theories
of advertising (as reviewed in Sections 4-7) influence the specification of demand
functions and supply relationships in these analyses. In this section, I oﬀer a brief
and non-technical review of this empirical literature.
8.1. Advertising and the Household
I begin with a group of empirical studies that examine the impact of advertising
on brand purchase decisions. The studies utilize household brand purchase panel
data and often household advertising exposure data. With such disaggregated
data, it is possible to gain insight into the respective roles of advertising and
experience in explaining household brand purchase behavior. Likewise, it is possi-
ble to better distinguish between the informative, persuasive and complementary
eﬀects of advertising.
How are such data obtained and analyzed? One approach is to use a controlled
field experiment. In this way, Krishnamurthi and Raj (1985) examine the eﬀect of
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an increase in advertising on the elasticity of demand for an unnamed frequently
purchased brand. Household brand purchase data are obtained through panel
diaries maintained by households in a test city over a 52-week pre-test period and
a 24-week test period. Advertising exposure is controlled through a split-cable
TV experiment: a test panel of families is connected to one cable while a control
panel of families in connected to another cable, and then the level of (non-price)
advertising for the brand is increased in the test period for the test panel. At
the family-panel level, Krishnamurthi and Raj specify a log-linear demand for
the brand, where the log of the (relative) price of the brand is interacted with
a time (pre-test, test) dummy variable. They report that demand for the brand
becomes significantly more inelastic in the test panel of families once advertising
is increased.
Guadagni and Little (1983) advance an alternative approach. They obtain
household brand purchase data through supermarket scanner data. These data
include individual item sales and prices by store by week, promotional activities
within the store, and histories of purchases for samples of households. The multi-
nomial logit choice model of brand choice is well suited for the analysis of such
data. Guadagni and Little illustrate the power of this approach, by using scanner
data on 32 weeks of purchases of coﬀee by 100 households and estimating the
parameters that govern consumers’ optimal brand-size choices.
In the multinomial logit model, consumer i enjoys utility uik from alternative
k (i.e., a brand-size choice), where utility consists of deterministic and random
components: uik = v
i
k + ²k. Under an appropriate (extreme value) distibutional








where Si is the set of alternatives under consideration by consumer i.123 Next,
the deterministic term is decomposed into a linear combination of attributes that







where xijk denotes the value of attribute j for consumer i under alternative k. The
set T of attributes includes price, promotion and also brand and size experience
123See McFadden (1974).
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measures.124 The econometrican observes consumer choices and attribute values
and then estimates the bj parameters using maximum likelihood methods.
How is brand experience measured? At the time of the nth coﬀee purchase of
consumer i, the experience that this consumer has with the brand associated with
brand-size alternative k is an attribute of this alternative that is measured as a
weighted average of past purchases of the brand, where past purchases are treated
as 0−1 variables.125 The experience variables are then initialized using household
purchase observations for previous weeks. Using this approach, Guadagni and
Little report that brand and size experience are the most important attributes in
explaining consumer brand-size choice. Guadagni and Little do not have house-
hold advertising exposure data, however, and so their analysis leaves open an
important question: What are the respective roles of advertising and experience
in explaining household brand purchase behavior?
This question is the focus of subsequent work. For 251 households in a test city,
Tellis (1988) obtains scanner data for purchases of 10 brands of toilet tissues over
a 52-week period, and he also obtains TV meter records of household exposure to
brand advertising. Tellis seeks to explain both brand choice and volume, where
explanatory variables include brand experience, volume experience, advertising
exposure and price. Like Guadagni and Little, Tellis uses purchase behavior in a
pre-test period to develop experience measures. Using advertising exposure data,
he is also able to assess the impact of advertising on brand choice and volume,
both directly and interacted with experience. In line with Lambin’s (1976) work,
Tellis reports that experience is the strongest determinant of purchase behavior,
and that other marketing variables like price are more important than advertis-
ing. Advertising appears to have only a small eﬀect on brand choice.126 According
to this evidence, pioneering firms may enjoy important experience-based advan-
tages; however, advertising itself is not one of the more important determinants
of purchase behavior.
These findings are evaluated in further work that uses scanner and advertising
124Measurements of past purchase behavior are also sometimes referred to as indicating brand
(or size) loyalty.
125Let xibk(n) denote the brand experience that consumer i has at the time of the nth purchase
occasion for the brand associated with the brand-size alternative k. Then xibk(n) = αbx
i
bk(n−
1)+ (1−αb)dik(n−1), where dik(n−1) is a 0− 1 dummy variable that takes value 1 if consumer
i bought the brand associated with brand-size k at purchase occasion (n− 1). The smoothing
constant αb is selected by trial and then refined. Size experience is measured similarly.
126Pedrick and Zufryden (1991) consider the yogurt product category. In comparison to Tellis’s
(1988) study, they report a stronger direct eﬀect of advertising exposure on brand choice.
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exposure data and multinomial logit models to explain household brand-choice
behavior. Kanetkar et al (1992), for example, consider the product categories
of aluminum foil and dry dog food. Their explanatory variables include brand
experience, advertising exposure and price. They also find that the direct impact
of advertising appears small in comparison to other marketing variables like price.
Examining the interaction of price with advertising exposure, they further report
that increased advertising exposure is associated with greater brand choice price
sensitivity. One interpretation is that advertising increases the “identifiability” of
diﬀerent brands and thereby promotes price comparisons.127 Deighton et al (1994)
consider ketchup and detergent. They find a large inertia (loyalty) eﬀect, in that a
buyer is likely to purchase the same brand as was bought on the previous shopping
trip. Allowing for interactions between previous purchase and advertising, they
find that advertising does little to change the repeat-purchase probabilities of
consumers that have just purchased the brand. Advertising can be eﬀective,
however, in attracting consumers who have not recently purchased the brand.
The studies above are published in marketing journals, but economists are
now also conducting related analyses. Ackerberg (2001) constructs a binary logit
model to explain the household choice of whether to purchase a newly introduced
yogurt product, Yoplait 150. Explanatory variables include previous purchase
measures, advertising exposure, price and time. Advertising is also interacted
with an experience variable, where a consumer is experienced (inexperienced) if
he has (never) purchased Yoplait 150 in the past. Advertising’s eﬀect on inex-
perienced consumers is positive and significant, whereas advertising has only a
small and insignificant eﬀect on experienced consumers. Ackerberg also considers
a specification in which experience is measured in terms of the number of previous
purchases. He finds that the eﬀectiveness of advertising declines as the consumer
becomes more experienced (i.e., as the number of previous purchases increases).128
The models described above endogenize consumers’ current brand choices but
are nevertheless “reduced form.” Consumers’ past purchases are regarded as ex-
ogenous data that generate a brand experience attribute with which to better
explain current brand choices. On the other hand, in a “structural” empricial
model, the consumers’ dynamic choice problem is fully specified, and the pa-
127This is in the spirit of Steiner’s (1973, 1978, 1984, 1993) work. See Section 3.2.4.
128Shum (2004) reports similar findings in his study of household brand choice in the breakfast
cereal category. His investigation uses scanner data for 50 brands of breakfast cereal combined
with an aggregate measure of advertising exposure (namely, quarterly brand-level national ad-
vertising expenditures).
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rameters of the consumers’ utility function and/or constraints are estimated. A
structural model thus may oﬀer greater insight into the process through which
advertising aﬀects consumer purchase behavior.
In Erdem and Keane’s (1996) structural model, the utility that a consumer
derives from the purchase of a brand is a function of the brand’s attributes and
a random component; however, for each brand there is now an attribute (“qual-
ity”) whose value is uncertain and experienced with noise. The utility function is
parameterized to allow that the consumer may be risk averse with respect to the
experienced value of this attribute. The consumer seeks to learn the mean value
of a brand’s attribute, and the precision of the consumer’s information may be
improved by direct experience with the brand and observation of brand advertis-
ing messages. A forward-looking consumer thus may experiment and purchase a
brand today, in order to acquire information. The method of simulated maximum
likelihood is used to estimate parameters that describe the utility function and
the precision of experience and advertising exposure signals, so as to best explain
brand choices. Using scanner data and household advertising exposure data for
diﬀerent brands of laundry detergent, Erdem and Keane report that consumers are
risk averse and that experience is much more informative than advertising. The
model thus provides insight into how brand loyalty is formed: due to risk aversion,
consumers are loyal to brands that have delivered positive use experiences.
Ackerberg (2003) oﬀers a related structural model of brand choice. In his util-
ity specification, however, the consumer may be interested in observed advertising
for two reasons. First, if a consumer’s prior belief is that a brand’s advertising
intensity is positively associated with the value of its attribute, then observed
brand advertising provides indirect (signaling) information as to the brand’s at-
tribute value. Second, if a consumer directly values the prestige eﬀect that higher
brand advertising intensity is perceived to imply, then greater observed brand
advertising is indicative of a higher direct utility from brand purchase. Using
scanner data and advertising exposure data for Yoplait 150, Ackerberg conducts
a structural estimation. Identification of the informative and prestige eﬀects is
possible, since the informative eﬀect suggests that advertising aﬀects the purchase
probabilities of inexperienced consumers only whereas the prestige eﬀect implies
that advertising also aﬀects the purchase probabilities of experienced consumers.
Ackerberg reports that advertising has a large and significant informative eﬀect
and an insignificant prestige eﬀect.129
129The studies above emphasize the eﬀect of advertising on household purchase behavior for
various consumer goods. By contrast, Shachar and Anand (1998) consider the eﬀect of “tune-
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Finally, as Ippolito and Mathios (1990) illustrate, the eﬀect of advertising on
household purchase behavior also may be examined using event studies. They fo-
cus on the ready-to-eat cereal market. In response to growing evidence of fiber’s
potential cancer-preventing benefit, a regulatory ban in the U.S. on health-claim
advertising by cereal producers was lifted in 1985. Using brand-level cereal con-
sumption data, Ippolito and Mathios find that fiber cereal consumption increased
significantly, once the ban on health-claim advertising was removed. They also
use brand-level cereal consumption data for samples of individuals in 1985 (prior
to most health-claim advertising) and 1986 (more than a year after health-claim
advertising began). The household data suggest that advertising lowered the cost
of acquiring health-related information for individuals who were not well reached
by other health information sources.
In broad terms, the studies described above point toward a number of striking
conclusions. For a set of frequently purchased consumer goods: (1) experience is a
very important determinant of household purchase behavior; (2) advertising also
influences household purchase behavior, but experience is the more powerful input;
(3) advertising and experience are substitutes, in that advertising is less eﬀective
in influencing purchase behavior for households that have recent experience with
the brand; and (4) much of advertising’s eﬀect derives from the information that it
contains or implies. On the whole, the studies provide support for the informative
view of advertising.
The studies are of particular interest in light of the long-standing debate as
to whether advertising deters entry. As discussed in Section 7.1, existing the-
ory demonstrates that informational product diﬀerentiation may be a barrier to
entry; however, the theoretical literature to this point does not clearly identify
a sense in which advertising “reinforces” consumers’ experience and exacerbates
in” ads (i.e., TV ads in which a network advertises one of its own shows) on the TV viewing
decisions of individuals. Viewers are assumed to possess greater prior information about the
existence and attributes of regular shows than specials; thus, a diﬀerential eﬀect of tune-in ads on
viewing decisions across the two show categories may suggest that advertising has informational
content. Using a Neilsen data set that records individual characteristics and viewing behavior,
Shachar and Anand specify a nested multinomial logit model and report estimates indicating
that a diﬀerential eﬀect is indeed present. Anand and Shachar (2004b) provide further support
for the informative content of tune-in ads. Consistent with the models reviewed in Section 6.3,
they provide evidence that advertising enables buyers to better match their respective tastes
with the product attributes oﬀered by diﬀerent shows. Finally, Byzalov and Shachar (2004) also
study TV viewing decisions and report that advertising has a negligible direct eﬀect on utility;
instead, advertising provides information and thereby reduces the uncertainty that risk-averse
consumers face when contemplating purchase of the advertised product.
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the informational barrier to entry. Likewise, the studies described above support
the idea that consumer experience is an important asset for pioneering brands;
however, they suggest that advertising itself does little to reinforce experience.
At the same time, it must be emphasized that the studies have important
limitations. First, they focus on a narrow set of consumer goods. An important
task of future work is to determine the extent to which the conclusions of these
studies extend to other goods. Second, the studies treat price and advertising ex-
posure as exogenous variables. This is a concern, since brand choice may depend
upon attributes that are observable to market participants but unobservable to
the econometrician. In this case, price and advertising exposure may be corre-
lated with the error term.130 The possibility of endogeneity bias thus motivates
a structural approach that jointly estimates demand function parameters along
with parameters that determine firm behavior. Work of this kind is considered in
the next subsection.
8.2. Advertising and Firm Conduct
I consider next empirical studies that reflect the strong influence of the intervening
theoretical work and emphasize firm conduct. Some studies adopt a reduced-
form approach and evaluate the predictions of strategic theories of advertising,
while others adopt a more structural approach and specify demand functions, cost
functions and supply relationships.
Consider first the reduced-form studies that assess the predictions of strategic
advertising theories. While some recent papers discussed in Section 3 report
evidence that is relevant for the descriptive validity of intervening theoretical
work, I illustrate this style of analysis here using papers by Thomas et al (1998),
Horstmann and MacDonald (2003) and Ellison and Ellison (2000). I do this for
two reasons. First, these papers identify and assess predictions that are tightly
linked with the intervening theoretical work. Second, it is useful to collect as
many papers as possible in Section 3, so that the topic treatments found there
may be more self contained.
Using auto industry data, Thomas et al assess the advertising-quality relation-
ship. They provide evidence that models priced higher than the full-information
price tend to have higher advertising levels. Referring to the Milgrom-Roberts
(1986) model, the authors emphasize that this behavior is consistent with the
hypothesis that manufacturers of high-quality models signal unobservable quality
130For further discussion, see Berry (1994), Villas-Boas and Winer (1999) and Nevo (2001).
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attributes by setting prices above full-information levels and advertising expen-
ditures beyond those incurred by manufacturers of low-quality models.131 The
signaling interpretation is further supported by the finding that these relation-
ships are weaker for older models. Finally, as the repeat-business eﬀect suggests,
they find that automobiles that experience higher sales five years after introduc-
tion are characterized by greater advertising in the introductory period. These
findings are broadly consistent with Nelson’s (1974b) reasoning, but he does not
address the possibility that price and advertising serve as joint signals of qual-
ity. The predicted relationships between price and advertising are thus strongly
influenced by the intervening theoretical work.
Horstmann and MacDonald (2003) provide a related analysis that focuses on
the compact disc player market. Using panel data on advertising and pricing
during 1983-92 and controlling for product features, firm heterogeneity and ag-
gregate eﬀects, they provide evidence that advertising increases after a player is
introduced and price falls from the outset. As Horstmann andMacDonald observe,
this pattern is not easily reconciled with signaling models in which advertising is
dissipative. A possible interpretation of this pattern is provided by the static sig-
naling model of Section 6.1, however, when advertising is demand-enhancing and
a higher-quality product has a higher marginal cost. The high-quality monopolist
then best signals its quality by distorting its demand-enhancing advertising down-
ward and its price upward. In the dynamic perspective suggested by that model,
the high-quality product’s demand-enhancing advertising increases over time and
its price falls over time.
Ellison and Ellison (2000) consider the behavior of pharmaceutical incumbents
in the period of time that precedes the loss of patent protection. The incentive
to deter entry is greatest in intermediate-sized markets, since entry deterrence
is unnecessary (impossible) in markets that are suﬃciently small (large). For
prescription drugs, incumbent advertising has a public-good aspect, in that some
of the benefits may accure to generic entrants; thus, an incumbent operating in
an intermediate-sized market has a potential incentive to reduce advertising and
thereby reduce the profitability of entry. This rationale for diminished advertising
is weakened in larger markets, as the incumbent’s focus switches from deterrence
131Specifically, the authors first regress model i’s price at time t on the model’s observable qual-
ity attributes (horsepower, etc.) and other variables. The residual is interpreted as capturing
deviations from the full-information price that are due to unobservable quality attributes. Sec-
ond, they regress the advertising level for model i at time t on the corresponding price residual
(and other variables). A positive coeﬃcient is consistent with the described hypothesis.
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to accommodation. Arguing in this way, Ellison and Ellison build on intervening
theoretical work (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1984)) and oﬀer a novel prediction:
advertising may be reduced most rapidly in years prior to patent expiration in
markets of intermediate size. Using data on 63 drugs that faced patent expirations
over 1986-1992, they also report evidence that supports this prediction.
Consider next empirical studies that follow the methodology of the “new em-
pirical industrial organization” (NEIO) and adopt a more structural approach. It
is instructive to contrast the NEIO approach with the earlier structure-conduct-
performance paragidm (SCPP) that underlies the inter-industy studies of Bain
(1956), Comanor and Wilson (1967, 1974) and followers. In broad terms, the
SCPP makes two assumptions: (1) across large groups of industries, a stable and
causal relationship runs from exogenous structural characteristics through con-
duct to performance; and (2) market-power measurements of performance may
be calculated from available (e.g., accounting profit) data. As Breshahan (1989)
explains, the NEIO is distinguished from the SCPP in several respects. Among
these are: (1) the assumption of symmetry across industries is abandoned, and
instead an econometric model of a single industry (or a closely related set of mar-
kets) is developed; (2) market power is not treated as observable, and instead
the analyst infers marginal cost from firm behavior; and (3) firm and industry
conduct are not treated as simple implications of market-structure variables, and
instead the analyst specifies behavioral equations that are based on theoretical
models and uses estimates to test between models.
The standard NEIO analysis has three basic ingredients.132 First, demand
functions are specified. For example, a firm’s output may be a linear function of
own and rival prices as well as exogenous demand variables like income. Second,
marginal cost functions are specified. A firm’s marginal cost might be a linear
function of its output and exogenous cost variables like input prices, for instance.
Third, supply relationships are specified. A firm’s supply relationship corresponds
to a first-order condition for optimizing behavior. Once the marginal cost func-
tions are substituted into the firms’ respective supply relationships, the demand
functions and supply relationships constitute an econometric system of equations,
in which outputs and prices are endogenous variables, and the demand, marginal
cost and any conduct parameters may be estimated.
How are the supply relationships specified? Under one approach, the sup-
ply relationships include a conjectural variations or conduct parameter that is
estimated as a continuous variable. Under appropriate conditions, the conduct
132See Bresnahan (1989), Church and Ware (1999) and Kadiyali et al (2001).
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parameter can be identified and a performance inference thereby obtained.133 The
conjectural variations approach includes as special cases a number of hypotheses
as to firm behavior. The analyst may then test among these hypotheses using
nested methods. But the approach also has limitations: the estimated conduct
parameter may not correspond to any particular model of firm behavior, and some
interesting types of behavior (such as asymmetric collusion) may not be included
as special cases. An alternative approach is to consider a menu of models. For
example, the Bertrand, Stackelberg and Collusive models imply distinct supply
relationships that may be individually considered. Under the menu approach, the
analyst may test among models using non-nested methods and then emphasize
parameter estimates for the preferred model.
Some recent NEIO studies include advertising as an endogenous variable. The
models are then more complex. Each firm may have multiple choice variables;
furthermore, if a goodwill eﬀect is allowed, then the demand functions and supply
relationships must be dynamic. If the conjectural variations approach is adopted,
then dynamic conduct parameters may be specified and estimated, where such
parameters indicate a firm’s perception as to how a change in its current be-
havior would alter rival behavior in the future. The identification of structural
parameters then requires that some restrictions be placed on the dynamic conduct
parameters. Finally, it is desirable that the specification of demand functions be
suﬃciently flexible to include the primary (market-size) and selective/combative
(market-share) eﬀects of advertising.
Roberts and Samuelson (1988) oﬀer an early study of this general nature. They
develop an analysis of dynamic non-price rivalry among U.S. cigarette manufactur-
ers in high- and low-tar cigarette markets over the 1971-82 period.134 The demand
functions are specified in a multiplicatively separable fashion that facilitates the
identification of the market-size and market-share eﬀects of advertising. Mak-
ing use of factor demand data, Roberts and Samuelson estimate marginal costs
directly.135 Finally, the supply relationships are captured as dynamic first-order
133The conjectural variations approach is pioneered by Iwata (1974). See Nevo (1998) and
Corts (1999) for discussion of identification problems under the conjectural variations approach.
134Cigarette advertising was banned from TV and radio over this period, but substantial
advertising expenditures were made in magazines, newspapers and outdoor media.
135The approach here is to specify a total cost function, use Shephard’s lemma to derive
a system of factor demands and then estimate the parameters of this system. With the cost
parameters thus estimated, the estimated value of marginal cost can be determined as a function
of input prices and output volumes. See Bresnahan (1989, pp. 1039-40) for discussion of
the strengths and weaknesses of this approach relative to the alternative approach mentioned
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conditions for firms’ goodwill choices, where a firm’s dynamic conduct parameter
is restricted to describe the extent to which an increase in the firm’s goodwill
stock at date t would induce rivals to increase their goodwill stocks in period
t + 1. Their estimates suggest that advertising is not combative; in fact, adver-
tising in new-product categories (i.e., in the low-tar market) appears to expand
market sizes and constitute a public good among firms. They further report that
the estimated dynamic conduct parameters are negative. Evidently, firms are not
naive: each recognizes that an increase in its own advertising would encourage
less (market-size-expanding) advertising from rivals in the future.
Using data on the Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola markets over the 1968-86 period,
Gasmi et al (1992) illustrate the menu approach. They specify a demand func-
tion for each product, where sales depend on own and rival price and advertising
selections. The demand specification presumes that advertising has no goodwill
eﬀect. Marginal cost is constant at a value that is specified to be linear in input
prices. Using the demand and cost specifications, they then turn to the supply
relationships and derive first order conditions for each firm in price and advertis-
ing, where the parameters of these conduct equations take diﬀerent restrictions
as diﬀerent oligopoly games (Nash in prices and advertising, Nash in prices and
collusion in advertising, etc.) are considered. For any given game, the two de-
mand and four conduct equations can be simultaneously estimated, where the
six endogenous variables are the prices, advertising levels and quantities of the
two firms. After determining the best-fitting game, the authors then emphasize
the associated parameter estimates. Their analysis suggests that Coca-Cola was
a Stackelberg leader in price and advertising until a mid-sample period (1976).
After this period, duopoly conduct is characterized by collusion in advertising and
possibly price. In this context, their estimates suggest that advertising in the cola
market is largely combative.
This approach is also used by Kadiyali (1996), who analyzes the U.S. pho-
tographic film industry. In the 1970s, Kodak had a virtual monopoly of this
industry; however, Kodak accommodated entry by Fuji in the 1980s. Kadiyali
refers to 1970-1980 (1980-1990) as the pre-entry (post-entry) period. She specifies
a demand function and a constant marginal cost for each firm, and then considers
the two periods separately. In the pre-entry period, only Kodak is active, and
the supply relationship is described by Kodak’s pricing and advertising first-order
conditions. In the post-entry period, the supply relationship is described by pric-
ing and advertising first-order conditions for both firms, where the parameters
previously, whereby marginal cost is inferred from the supply behavior of firms.
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of these conditions assume diﬀerent restrictions as diﬀerent post-entry games are
considered. Kadiyali’s parameter estimates for the pre-entry period indicate that
Kodak maintained its monopoly position by using limit pricing and high adver-
tising. As in the Bagwell-Ramey (1988) model, a possible interpretation is that
Kodak reduced price and raised advertising in order to signal low costs. Kadiyali’s
estimates for the post-entry period suggest several conclusions, including: (1) Ko-
dak was compelled to accommodate Fuji by 1980, since Fuji enjoyed demand
and cost advantages; (2) Kodak and Fuji then colluded in price and advertising,
putting a large weight on Fuji’s profit; and (3) advertising expanded market size
and constituted a public good across firms.
Finally, Slade (1995) develops a dynamic “state-space” approach with which
to study price and advertising brand rivalry. In this formulation, firms adopt
Markov strategies that determine price and advertising behavior, given the cur-
rent state of play. The empirical model is described by demand and strategy
equations. The endogenous variables of the strategy equations are the size and
probability of price and advertising changes, while the exogenous variables in-
clude factor prices (costs) and past endogenous choices (goodwill). Using weekly
price, sales and advertising data for four brands of saltine crackers sold in grocery
stores in a small town, Slade obtains estimates suggesting that a brand’s sales
are decreasing (increasing) in own price (advertising) and increasing (decreasing)
in rival-brand price (advertising). Advertising is thus combative, but it has an
overall positive eﬀect on market size. Given the specification of linear demand
and costs, the demand coeﬃcient estimates may be used to draw inferences about
the strategic environment. Slade reports cross-brand evidence that advertising
eﬀorts are strategic substitutes, prices are strategic complements, and low prices
and high advertising make a brand “tough” (i.e., reduce rival-brand profits). In
the dynamic game, firms thus compete aggressively in advertising and accom-
modate when setting prices, but the resulting high prices do not reflect collusive
behavior.136 A further implication is that entry-deterring behavior would involve
limit pricing and high advertising.
Placing firm conduct at centerstage, the empirical studies reviewed here are
strongly influenced by the intervening theoretical work. While the NEIO analysis
of advertising is just getting underway, it is already clear that one conclusion of
the earlier empirical work is retained: the eﬀects of advertising vary importantly
across markets. The recent work also generates some interesting specific findings.
136Nevo (2001) draws a similar conclusion in his analysis of the ready-to-eat cereal industry.
See also Vilcassim et al (1999).
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First, in some markets, there is evidence that firms choose advertising in a collu-
sive manner. This contrasts with a common view that firms compete aggressively
in non-price variables, although support for the common view is found in other
markets. Second, while advertising is often combative, there is also some support
for the market-size eﬀect (e.g., in new-product categories). Finally, some studies
oﬀer new evidence that limit pricing and high advertising may deter entry. While
these are interesting findings, the primary contribution of the existing NEIO ad-
vertising studies is methodological.137 The studies reviewed here pave the way for
what should be an active and valuable research area in the coming years.
8.3. Summary
The research described here constitutes an important advance in the empirical
analysis of advertising. While the earlier inter-industry analyses searched for evi-
dence of general causal relationships from structure to performance, the studies re-
viewed above emphasize the limitations of the inter-industry approach and instead
use new disaggregated data sources to explore household and firm conduct. One
set of studies examine purchase decisions, using household-level brand-purchase
and advertising-exposure panel data. These data oﬀer a remarkable opportunity
to study a long-standing and fundamental question in the economic analysis of
advertising: Does advertising reinforce consumer experience and insulate pioneer-
ing firms from entry? A second set of studies integrate game-theoretic models of
advertising into the empirical investigation. Some studies examine the descriptive
validity of the models, while others implant a model of the supply relationship
into the system of equations that is to be estimated. These studies oﬀer a window
into the strategic conduct of firms.
9. Sunk Costs and Market Structure
As Sections 5 through 7 reveal, an important lesson of game-theoretic models in
industrial organization is that details may matter. Empirical eﬀorts that follow
the SCPP and seek inter-industry confirmation of sweeping causal hypotheses are
thus too ambitious. But what are the alternatives? As illustrated by the NEIO
137The work described above highlights two advantages of the structural methodology: it may
be used to estimate unobserved economic parameters and to compare the predictive power of
alternative theories. A further advantage is that an estimated structural model may be used to
make policy recommendations. Dube et al (forthcoming) perform an analysis of this kind.
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studies reviewed in the previous section, one alternative empirical strategy is to
focus on a particular industry, where more details are observed and the theory
imposes tighter restrictions. As Sutton (1991) emphasizes, a second strategy is to
cull from the game-theoretic models a few robust implications and then examine
those implications at inter-industry and industry levels. In this section, I provide
a brief review of work by Sutton and others that follows this second strategy.138
9.1. Main Ideas
Sutton develops robust predictions that concern the manner in which the en-
dogeneity of sunk costs and the “toughness of price competition” influence the
relationship between market size and concentration.139 To this end, he models
industry equilibrium in terms of a multi-stage game, in which firms enter, sink
costs, and then compete (e.g., in prices) in the product market. Considerable lat-
titude is allowed as to whether firms sell horizontally or vertically diﬀerentiated
products, move sequentially or simultaneously within given stages of the game,
sell single or multiple products, or choose prices or outputs.
Sutton distinguishes between two categories of industries. In an exogenous
sunk cost industry, the only sunk costs are exogenous setup costs. These are the
costs of acquiring a single plant of minimum eﬃcient scale and perhaps advertising
at some threshold level. An exogenous sunk cost industry may be an industry with
homogeneous or horizontally diﬀerentiated goods, for example. In an endogenous
sunk cost industry, by contrast, a firm incurs advertising (or R&D) outlays which
result in an enhanced demand for that firm’s product in the subsequent stage of
product-market competition.140 As in the first example described in Section 4,
an industry is characterized by endogenous sunk costs if products are vertically
diﬀerentiated as a consequence of brand-image advertising, for instance. Sutton is
not concerned with the reason that advertising works in such an industry; rather,
he assumes that it does and then examines the implications.
Consider first the case of an exogenous sunk cost industry. To illustrate the key
predictions, imagine that firms sell products that are diﬀerentiated in a symmetric
sense, so that the equilibrium price when N firms enter may be represented as
138For further discussion, see Bresnahan (1992), Schmalensee (1992), Sutton (1997a) and Sut-
ton’s contribution to this volume.
139Sutton’s analysis builds on that in Shaked and Sutton (1983, 1987, 1990).
140The analsyis is extended to include endogenous R&D sunk costs in Sutton (1997b, 1998).
For an early analysis of this kind, see Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980).
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p(N | θ), where θ denotes the toughness of price competition.141 For example,
θ may correspond to transportation costs or competition policy. A firm’s cost
function is C(q) = cq + σ, where σ > 0 denotes the exogenous setup costs that
are associated with entry. An increase in the market size S > 0 is accomplished
through successive replications of the consumer population. This ensures that the
distribution of tastes is not altered, so that the equilibrium price does not depend
directly upon market size. Ignoring the setup cost σ, it is then possible to denote
a firm’s equilibrium gross profit function as SΠ(N | θ). In most such models,
p(N | θ) is nonincreasing in N and p(N | θ) > c for all N.142 Assume then that
Π(N | θ) is positive and decreasing in N, with Π(N | θ) → 0 as N → ∞. The
equilibrium level of entry is determined by SΠ(N | θ) = σ.
Using this example, two predictions can be described. First, as market size S
increases indefinitely relative to the setup cost σ, the equilibrium concentration,
measured as 1/N, converges monotonically to zero. Intuitively, an increase in
market size always raises profit and invites further entry, where the additional
entry restores the zero-profit requirement by reducing each firm’s market share
without increasing its markup. Economies of scale thus become unimportant as
a barrier to entry in markets that are suﬃciently large. The second prediction
concerns the eﬀect of an increase in the toughness of price competition. An
increase in θ is associated with a reduction in p(N | θ). Assume then that Π(N | θ)
is decreasing in θ. Under this assumption, a second prediction follows: an increase
in the toughness of price competition shifts the equilibrium concentration upward.
This simply reflects the familiar intuition that fewer firms can enter in a zero-profit
equilibrium, when price competition is more vigorous.
As Sutton discusses, the main features of this example generalize across a
wide range of models. In some of these models, multiple equilibria may arise. For
example, if products are horizontally diﬀerentiated, then there may exist many
single-product firms or a smaller number of multi-product firms. The functional
relationship just described between concentration and market size is thus replaced
by a lower bound relation. More generally, as Sutton (1991, p. 308) states, the
two robust predictions for exogenous sunk cost industries are: (i) the function
that gives the lower bound to equilibrium concentration converges monotonically
to zero as market size increases; and (ii) this lower bound shifts upward, in re-
141For example, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Shubik and Levitan (1980) and Sutton (1997a, 1998)
provide models of this kind. My discussion here follows that in Sutton (1997a).
142An exception is the case of Bertrand competition with homogeneous goods. In this case,
only one firm enters, regardless of market size.
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sponse to an increase in the toughness of price competition. These predictions
are illustrated in Figure 3a.
Consider second the case of an endogenous sunk cost industry. As Sutton
(1991, p. 47) puts it, the main point is then as follows:
“If it is possible to enhance consumers’ willingness-to-pay for a given
product to some minimal degree by way of a proportionate increase
in fixed cost (with either no increase or only a small increase in unit
variable costs), then the industry will not converge to a fragmented
structure, however large the market becomes.”
As this quotation suggests, in endogenous sunk cost industries, the negative rela-
tionship between concentration and market size breaks down.
Formally, suppose that a firm’s product is described in terms of a single vertical
attribute, u, where the willingness-to-pay of all consumers is increasing in u. In
an endogenous sunk cost industry, a firm’s advertising expenditures may aﬀect its
brand image and thus u; therefore, let the advertising response function, A(u),
indicate the sunk expenditure that a firm must incur in order to achieve u, where
A(u) is non-negative and increasing. A firm’s total fixed cost expenditure is then
F (u) = A(u) + σ . Let c(u) ≥ 0 denote the firm’s unit cost of production. Now,
assume that there exist constants α > 0 and K > 1 such that by incurring K
times more fixed costs than any of its rivals, a firm will achieve a final stage
(i.e, gross) profit that is no less than αS, where S corresponds to total consumer
expenditure in the market. This assumption can be understood as embodying
two features: (i) a suﬃciently high attribute implies a certain minimal level of
profit in the final stage (i.e., c(u) does not increase too quickly with u), and (ii) a
certain large increase in fixed advertising expenditures translates into a suﬃciently
high attribute (i.e., F (u) is increasing and continuous, with an elasticity that is
bounded above). Under this assumption, as Sutton (1991, pp.73-4) establishes, a
non-convergence property is implied: there exists some B > 0 such that some firm
must enjoy at least a fraction B of total industry sales at any subgame perfect
equilibrium, independent of the size of the market.143
143The proof below is developed for a three-stage game between single-product firms, in which
firms enter, sink costs and then compete, with simultaneous moves in each stage. In some
settings, equilibria may fail to exist, and so only the necessary features of equilibria are char-
acterized. As Sutton explains, the proof may be applied to a variety of related games. For
example, if firms sink costs sequentially within the second stage of the game, then the proof
applies once the deviant firm is identified as the firm that comes last in the sequence. See Sutton
(1997b, 1998) for further discussion of such games.
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The proof is instructive and simple. For a given equilibrium, let
_
u denote
the highest value of u oﬀered by any firm, and let
_
m denote the highest share
of industry sales enjoyed by any firm. The profit in the final stage to any firm
clearly cannot exceed
_
m S. Hence, if the firm that oﬀers
_
u is to earn non-negative
profit in the game, then it is necessary that
_
m S ≥ F (
_
u). (9.1)
Now suppose a firm were to deviate and advertise to such an extent as to incur
fixed costs KF (
_
u). Using the assumption stated above, the deviant firm enjoys









m]S. Of course, in equilibrium, a firm cannot earn net profit in excess of
_
m S. Therefore, an equilibrium exists only if
_







Thus, as (9.3) confirms, regardless of the size of the market, in any equilibrium
the maximal market share must exceed the constant B.
Intuitively, under the assumption that a given proportionate increase in a
firm’s advertising outlay relative to that of rivals can induce some some fixed
fraction of consumers to purchase that firm’s product at a price that exceeds the
firm’s unit variable cost, a fragmented market structure cannot stand: some firm
would deviate with a large advertising outlay and earn greater profit. In equilib-
rium, as market size increases, the tendency toward fragmentation is oﬀset by a
competitive escalation in advertising outlays. This suggests that the relationship
between market size and concentration may be non-monotonic. Sutton provides
some examples in support of this suggestion. In summary, two robust predictions
for endogenous sunk cost industries are that the lower bound to equilibrium con-
centration (i) is bounded away from zero as market size increases, and (ii) is not
necessarily monotonic in market size.144 Figure 3b illustrates.
144Sutton (1991, p. 308) mentions further the robust prediction that an increase in setup cost
(σ) results in an increase in the lower bound for concentration.
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9.2. Econometric Tests and Industry Histories
Sutton (1991) next confronts the predictions of the theoretical analysis with a
careful analysis of twenty narrowly defined food and drink manufacturing indus-
tries across six countries.145 He divides the industries into two groups. In the first
group, firms sell homogeneous products, and advertising outlays are very low. The
homogeneous-goods industries are examined in light of the theoretical predictions
for exogenous sunk cost industries. In the second industry group, advertising out-
lays are moderate to high. The advertising-intensive industries are thus analyzed
with reference to the theoretical predictions for endogenous sunk cost industries.
Cross-country comparisons aﬀord the necessary variation in market size.
The empirical eﬀort begins with a cross-sectional econometric analysis of ob-
served concentration levels. The empirical regularities that Sutton uncovers are
consistent with the predictions of the theory. In the group of homogenous-goods
industries, he reports a strong negative correlation between (four-firm) concentra-
tion and the ratio of market size to setup cost, S/σ. He observes further that the
lowest levels of concentration found at large values of S/σ are very small (below
5%). By contrast, in the advertising-intensive group, the lowest level of concen-
tration is 25%. Several of these industries also have large values of S/σ. Bounds
regression analysis oﬀers further support for the predictions of the theory.
With the inter-industry statistics in place, Sutton next presents a remark-
able set of industry studies. Interesting on their own, these studies oﬀer fur-
ther opportunities for assessing the theory. For example, in his discussion of
homogeneous-goods industries, Sutton considers the salt and sugar industries and
identifies international diﬀerences in competition policy that suggest variation in
the toughness of price competition. This variation facilitates an examination of
the prediction that, for exogenous sunk cost industries, tougher price competition
is associated with more concentrated markets. Broadly, the industry experiences
are consistent with this prediction. Likewise, within the group of advertising-
intensive industries, Sutton oﬀers convincing qualitative support for the main
theoretical ideas. For example, consistent with the hypothesis of a lower bound,
in the frozen food industry, a wave of new entry resulted in a fragmentation of
the market that sparked a competitive escalation in advertising outlays by lead-
ing firms, leading back to a more consolidated structure. Finally, Sutton’s case
studies also confirm that details matter. Above the lower bound, a rich array of
strategic interaction is observed.
145The six countries are France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S..
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9.3. Related Work
Sutton’s research is related to several strands of work that are discussed above.
I describe here four such relationships. I then mention some recent work that
extends Sutton’s theoretical and empirical analyses.
Consider first the inter-industry studies of advertising and concentration. As
discussed in Section 3.2.1, while the advertising-concentration relationship is cen-
tral to Kaldor’s arguments and the focus of a number of inter-industry studies,
the relationship has defied a simple characterization. Sutton (1991, pp. 125-8)
explains that his work encompasses a possible interpretation: if the relationship
between market size and concentration varies in kind between homogeneous goods
and advertising-intensive industries, then the earlier studies, which use pooled
data and ignore this switch of regime problem, are misspecified. This interpreta-
tion explains further why such studies occasionally report a positive and significant
relationship between advertising intensity and concentration. Consistent with Sut-
ton’s theory, suppose that (i) a negative (null) relationship exists between concen-
tration and market size for the homogeneous goods (advertising-intensive) group,
and (ii) the mean level of concentration is higher in the advertising-intensive group.
Under this supposition, if pooled data are used and concentration is regressed on
the market size/setup cost ratio and advertising intensity, then a positive coeﬃ-
cient is expected on the advertising intensity variable.
Second, while Sutton studies manufacturing industries, similar relationships
may also emerge in retail industries. As discussed in Section 3.2.4, some evidence
suggests an association between advertising and the growth of large-scale retail
firms. Consider the retail eyeglass industry. In the 1960s, considerable variation
existed across states in the U.S. with respect to the legal restrictions imposed
on advertising in the retail eyeglass industry. Depending on the scope of other
sunk cost outlays, it may be appropriate to regard a retail eyeglass market as
characterized by exogenous (endogenous) sunk costs when advertising is (not)
restricted in the corresponding state. Interestingly, work by Benham (1971) and
others (see footnote 55) suggests that large-scale retail firms operated in states
that permitted advertising. Likewise, as Steiner (1978) and Pashigian and Bowen
(1994) argue, the growth in manufacturer brand advertising, instigated by the
emergence of TV and the growth in (relative) earnings by females, may have
substituted for retail service and facilitated the emergence of a more concentrated
retail market structure.
In this context, it is also interesting to compare Sutton’s theoretical approach
with that of Bagwell and Ramey (1994a). As discussed in Section 5.3, Bagwell
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and Ramey explore a multi-stage model of retail competition, in which firms
first enter and then make their advertising, pricing and (cost-reduction) invest-
ment decisions. It is straightforward to extend their model to include a market
size variable, S, corresponding to the total mass of consumers. If advertising is
banned, a zero-profit “random” equilibrium obtains, in which each of the n enter-
ing firms sells to S/n consumers. As in Sutton’s exogenous sunk cost industries,
the market fragments as S gets large. On the other hand, when advertising is en-
dogenous, a zero-profit “advertising” equilibrium obtains, in which entering firms
make heterogeneous decisions. As in Sutton’s endogenous sunk cost industries,
the market does not fragment as S gets large.146
Third, Sutton’s multi-stage approach, in which advertising outlays are sunk
prior to price competition, may be questioned in light of the empirical stud-
ies discussed in Section 3.1.1, which find that the eﬀects of advertising on sales
are often brief. While this concern has some merit, it should be noted that
the no-fragmentation prediction for advertising-intensive industries may also hold
when advertising outlays do not precede price choices. Using a variant of the
Schmalensee (1976b) model of advertising competition, Schmalensee (1992, pp.
130) suggests that this prediction may be maintained whenever market share is
“suﬃciently sensitive to variations in fixed costs, so that rivalry is both tough and
focused on fixed outlays, not on per-unit price-cost margins.”147
Fourth, it is interesting to compare Sutton’s theoretical findings with the
persuasive-view (see Section 2) and game-theoretic (see Section 7.2) examina-
tions of advertising’s entry-deterrence eﬀect. Sutton oﬀers some support for the
entry-deterrence eﬀect, in that the scope for profitable entry is limited when ad-
vertising expenditures escalate. At the same time, it must be noted that Sutton
does not oﬀer a theory in which an incumbent firm strategically advertises at a
high level in order to deter subsequent entry. In fact, advertising follows the entry
choice in Sutton’s basic model, so that it is the expectation of future advertising
rivalry that restrains entry.
Sutton’s theoretical and empirical analyses has been extended in several re-
cent eﬀorts. Symeonidis (2000a) considers the theoretical eﬀect of tougher price
competition on concentration in endogenous sunk cost industries. When price
146In particular, the highest-advertising firm achieves a share of industry sales that is bounded
from below by the fraction of informed (i.e., advertising-responsive) consumers, I. See also
Bagwell et al (1997), who oﬀer a related dynamic model of price competition that describes the
evolution of a concentrated retail market structure.
147Likewise, in the Bagwell-Ramey (1994a) model, a no-fragmentation prediction occurs, even
though advertising and pricing decisions are simultaneously made.
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competition is tougher, final-stage profits are reduced, giving firms less incentive
to sink advertising expenditures in the penultimate stage. As both gross profit
and sunk costs are then lower, the overall eﬀect on net profit may be ambiguous.
As a general matter, then, in industries with endogenous sunk costs, an increase
in the toughness of price competition has a theoretically indeterminant eﬀect on
concentration. In recent empirical work, Symeonidis (2000b) examines the evo-
lution of concentration in U.K. manufacturing industries following a change in
competition law that prohibited price-fixing agreements. The resulting increase
in the toughness of price competition is associated with greater concentration in
exogenous and even endogenous sunk cost industries. The relationship between
concentration and market size is negative in exogenous sunk cost industries, and
the relationship breaks down in industries with high advertising. These findings
are consistent with Sutton’s predictions. Other supportive empirical studies of
manufacturers are oﬀered by Bronnenberg et al (2005), who study the geographic
distribution of brand market shares across U.S. metropolitan markets for several
consumer package goods industries, Matraves (1999), who examines the global
pharmaceutical industry, and Robinson and Chiang (1996), who use PIMS data.
Looking across U.S. metropolitan areas, Berry and Waldfogel (2004) study the
newspaper industry and oﬀer evidence consistent with Sutton’s predictions for
endogenous sunk cost industries. Finally, Ellickson (2001a,b) considers the retail
supermarket industry. He reports that endogenous sunk costs associated with
investments in store size and information and distribution networks are an impor-
tant source of concentration in this retail market.
9.4. Summary
Sutton’s innovative eﬀort contributes importantly at both methodological and
substantive levels. Methodologically, Sutton demonstrates an eclectic approach
that evaluates game theoretic models by employing traditional inter-industry
(SCPP) and recent industry-study (NEIO) empirical methods. This approach
invites theorists to explicitly distinguish between the robust and particular impli-
cations of their models. Robust implications, such as those associated with the
lower bound, may be examined using traditional inter-industry regressions. But
there is also a rich set of observed behaviors that occur above the lower bound.
The specific experiences of a given industry can be further interpreted using par-
ticular strategic models, historical analyses and recent industry-study methods.
At the substantive level, Sutton convincingly makes the fundamental point that
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endogenous sunk costs in the form of advertising outlays often play a critical role
in the evolution of market structure. The role of (brand and retail) advertising
in the evolution of concentrated retail structures represents a promising direction
for future research.
10. New Directions and Other Topics
In this section, I briefly discuss two new directions for advertising research. The
first direction concerns the use of advertising in media markets. This is a long-
standing research topic that has enjoyed renewed attention in the past few years.
The second direction is at an earlier stage and concerns the potential implications
of findings in the fields of behavioral economics and neuroeconomics for advertising
research. Finally, despite the length of this survey, many topics remain untreated.
At the end of the section, I mention a few such topics and identify some research
for further reading.
10.1. Advertising and Media Markets
In the research reviewed above, sellers choose advertising levels and incur a cost
when delivering advertising messages to consumers. The models, however, gener-
ally treat the cost of advertising as exogenous.148 How is the price of an advertising
message determined? As emphasized by Kaldor (1950), advertising and enter-
tainment are often jointly supplied to the consumer: much advertising reaches
consumers through media markets. A viewer of a commercial TV broadcast, for
example, encounters frequent advertisements, and advertisements are also promi-
nent in magazines, newspapers and radio broadcasts. Advertising revenue is a
major source of income for media companies, and such companies naturally have
some control over the price of an advertising message. But an advertiser is will-
ing to pay only so much for a message, and the advertiser’s willingness-to-pay is
driven by the number of potential consumers that the message might reach.
It is useful to think of the media market as a two-sided market.149 In a two-
sided market, two groups interact through an intermediary or platform, and inter-
148Baye and Morgan (2001) oﬀer a notable exception. As discussed in footnote 74, they focus
on a single information gatekeeper (i.e., a “monopoly platform”) that sells advertising to firms
and information to consumers. My focus below is on research that characterizes the price of
advertising when multiple media companies exist and compete for firms’ advertising messages.
149For more on two-sided markets, see Armstrong (2004), Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and
Rochet and Tirole (2003).
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group network externalities are present in that members of one group are directly
aﬀected by the number from the other group that use the same platform. In the
commercial TV market, for example, the two groups that interact are consumers
and advertisers, and the platform is the broadcast company. Advertisers benefit
when the broadcast has more viewers, since those viewers represent potential
consumers for the advertised products. Thus, for a given broadcast, a positive
network externality flows from viewers to advertisers. At the same time, viewers
may regard ads as a nuisance; and if the nuisance cost outweighs any other benefit
that is associated with the ad, then a negative network externality flows from
advertisers to viewers. The broadcast company must then ensure that consumers
stay on board, by bundling the ads with entertainment.150
Anderson and Coate (forthcoming) provide a theory of commercial broad-
casting and advertising that captures many of these features.151 In particular,
their model permits a welfare analysis concerning how well the commercial broad-
cast market fulfills its two-sided role of delivering programming to viewers and
enabling advertisers to contact potential consumers. Advertising has a social ben-
efit in their model, since it is the means through which firms inform consumers of
the existence of their respective products. But advertising also has a social cost;
namely, a viewer incurs a nuisance cost when an ad is viewed. In this general set-
ting, when a broadcaster chooses a level of advertising, it determines the number
of viewers and thereby induces a price for advertising at which firms are willing
to demand the chosen level of advertising.
The basic model has two channels, where each channel carries one program
and a program can be of two possible types (e.g., news or sports). A given viewer
can watch only one program, and viewers have diﬀerent preferences over program
types. Viewers are distributed along a Hotelling line, with a viewer’s location
defining that viewer’s ideal program type; and the two possible program types
are located at the respective endpoints of that line.152 A viewer’s benefit from
viewing one of the possible program types decreases with the distance of this type
150As noted in Section 2.4, some similar themes appear in work by Barnett (1966), Becker and
Murphy (1991) and Telser (1978).
151See Armstrong (2004), Dukes (2004), Kind et al (2004) and Nilssen and Sorgard (2001) for
related eﬀorts. Berry and Waldfogel (1999) provide a related empirical analysis of the radio
broadcasting market. I do not provide an extensive survey of work on advertising and the
media here. Instead, I refer the reader to Anderson and Gabszewicz (2004), who provide a
comprehensive and recent review of such work.
152Anderson and Coate also discuss the endogenous determination of programs. I focus here
on their analysis of advertising when programming decisions are given.
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from the viewer’s ideal type. All viewers also suﬀer a (common) nuisance cost
from watching ads. Ads are placed by firms with new goods and inform viewers
of the existence and nature of these goods. Firms are diﬀerentiated with regard
to their desire to advertise: one firm may oﬀer a product that is more likely to
be satisfactory to consumers than is the product of another firm. Each firm is a
monopoly in its product market, facing consumers who each desire at most one
unit and have a common reservation value for a satisfactory product. Once a firm
advertises, it therefore prices at the reservation value, sells to those consumers
who regard the product as satisfactory, and collects all social surplus associated
with the introduction of the new good. Under the assumption that a viewer can
watch only one program, each broadcaster has monopoly control over the access
by firms to its viewers.153 When the broadcaster chooses a level of advertising for
its program, a price for advertising is induced, and those firms with products that
are more often satisfactory elect to advertise.
Anderson and Coate show that the equilibrium level of advertising is below
(above) the socially optimal level if the nuisance cost of advertising is low (high).
Intuitively, broadcasters determine the level of advertising with the objective of
maximizing advertising revenue; thus, the nuisance cost of advertising aﬀects the
level of advertising provided by the market only insofar as a broadcaster perceives
that additional advertising would induce a marginal viewer to switch oﬀ or over
to the other program. It is particularly interesting that the market may provide
programs that have too few ads. This finding reflects two considerations. First,
broadcasters compete for viewers, and they can do so only by lowering advertising
levels. Second, for any given set of viewers, each broadcaster has a monopoly
in delivering those viewers to advertisers. A broadcaster may thus hold down
advertising levels, in order to drive up the price of advertising. A further and
related finding is that the level of advertising would be higher if the two programs
153In terms of the literature on two-sided markets, each viewer can use only one platform (i.e.,
watch only one program) and thus single-homes. By contrast, a firm can use both platforms
(i.e., advertise on both programs) and may thus multi-home. As Armstrong (2004) shows, in
such a situation a “competitive bottleneck” arises: platform competition is more intense over
the party that single-homes. See also Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and Rochet and Tirole (2003).
In an extension of their advertising model, Anderson and Coate allow that viewers may be
charged subscription fees. Consistent with the literature on two-sided markets, they find that
competition often drives such fees to zero (when subsidies for viewing are infeasible; see also
footnote 19). Focusing on newspapers, Gabszewicz et al (2001) establish a similar finding. The
single-homing assumption is perhaps more natural with respect to newspapers than with TV
channels, since with the latter consumers may switch platforms more frequently.
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were operated by a monopoly. The key intuition is that a monopoly broadcaster
does not reduce advertising levels in order to compete for viewers; instead, the
monopolist is concerned only that greater advertising might cause some viewers
to watch no program.
The basic model can be extended in a variety of directions. For example, the
assumption that advertising generates a nuisance cost is more plausible in some
media markets than in others. Rysman (2004) oﬀers an empirical analysis of the
market for Yellow Pages directories. His estimates indicate that consumers value
advertising; thus, the nuisance cost of advertising is negative. This is consistent
with the idea that consumers visit the Yellow Pages platform to obtain information
that is embodied in ads. Similarly, Gabszewicz et al (2001) focus on newspapers,
where ads are easily avoided. They make the plausible assumption that ads do
not generate a nuisance cost in this context.
At this point, it is useful to remark on some recent trends in the advertising and
media industries. Several commentators argue that, over the past several years,
firms have increasingly opted for ads that target specific consumer groups.154 At
a broad level, the greater emphasis on targeted advertising seems to reflect two
related considerations. First, the returns from mass-audience advertising may
be lower due to an underlying fragmentation of media platforms. The commer-
cial TV platform is now a less dominant means of reaching potential consumers,
since such consumers increasingly enjoy a range of alternative media platforms,
including internet sites, cable-TV programs and specialty magazines. Second, the
relative returns from targeted advertising may be higher due to advances in digital
technology. For example, personal video recorder devices, such as TIVO, enable
consumers to rapidly skip through TV ads and thus reduce the eﬀectiveness of
some mass-audience advertising. At the same time, internet ads that are aﬃli-
ated with keywords on search engines better enable firms to target their ads to
interested consumers and then measure the impact of these ads.
If the reported trends are accurate, what might they suggest for future research
on advertising? First, research on targeted advertising and price discrimination
is of special importance. Several recent studies of this kind are mentioned briefly
in Section 5 (footnote 76). Second, empirical studies of the substitutability across
diﬀerent media of the demand for advertising may be of particular value. For
recent work of this kind, see Fare et al (2004), Seldon et al (2000), and Silk et
al (2002). Third, the described patterns suggest a greater role for ads that oﬀer
information. Consumers are more likely to view such ads, and relevant informa-
154See, e.g., Bianco (2004), Delaney (2005), Lewis (2000) and The Economist (2005).
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tion may be more easily transmitted using digital media platforms. Theoretical
work that further analyzes Nelson’s (1974b) match-products-to-buyers eﬀect may
be especially relevant. Some recent work on this topic is described in Section
6.3. Finally, as the nature of advertising evolves, so, too, will the industry that
“produces” advertising content. Silk and Berndt (1993, 1995, 2004) study the
production of advertising and estimate the cost structure of advertising agencies.
Interesting future work might further study the on-going evolution of this industry.
10.2. Advertising, Behavioral Economics and Neuroeconomics
As discussed in Section 2, some of the early proponents of the persuasive view,
such as Braithwaite (1928) and Robinson (1933), emphasize that advertising al-
ters consumers’ tastes and creates brand loyalty. As detailed in Section 3, the
empirical implications of this view have been extensively assessed; however, much
less attention has been given to the process by which advertising distorts tastes.
According to the complementary view, for example, advertising does not change
tastes and instead enters as an argument in a stable utility function. As discussed
in Section 4, Dixit and Norman (1978) oﬀer a sophisticated normative treatment
of persuasive advertising, but they remain somewhat agnostic as to the underlying
mechanism through which advertising shifts tastes.
Given this state of aﬀairs, it is natural that economists would seek insights
from other disciplines. Two related approaches stand out. First, over the past two
decades, behavioral decision research in psychology has contributed to the field of
behavioral economics. Work in this field is motivated by the desire to increase the
psychological realism of economic models by imposing assumptions that are rooted
in psychological regularity. Thus, preference functions or associated behavioral
rules that have experimental support are embedded in theoretical models, in order
to achieve new theoretical insights and better predictions. Second, in recent years,
neuroscience research has used imaging of brain activity and other methods to
gather insight into the way that the brain works. This works informs the new and
emerging field of neuroeconomics, which seeks to understand economic decision
making at a more foundational level.155
Recent work by Gabaix and Laibson (2004) illustrates the behavioral ap-
proach.156 They endow some consumers with a behavioral bias by assuming
155For overviews of behavioral economics and neuroeconomics, respectively, see Camerer and
Loewenstein (2004) and Camerer et al (2005).
156See also Brekke and Rege (2004) and Krahmer (2004). The former paper considers how
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that these consumers are naïve and fail to foresee ”shrouded attributes,” such
as maintenance costs, expensive add-ons and hidden fees. For example, when a
guest checks into a hotel, the guest pays a room charge but may not fully an-
ticipate the additional expenses attributable to large markups on extra services
(parking, meals, minibar, phone, etc.). In a standard model of price competition
between firms, if price advertising were costless, firms would reveal all expenses
and compete over the total price. Information revelation may break down in the
presence of naïve consumers, however. Firms will not compete by publicly un-
dercutting their competitors’ add-on prices, even when advertising is costless, if
add-ons have close substitutes that are only exploited by sophisticated consumers
and many naïve consumers would drop out of the market altogether once the
add-on expenses were made more salient.
The model suggests some novel predictions for advertising theory. First, the
competitive pressure that is normally associated with price advertising may be
suppressed when pricing is complex and some consumers are thus naïve. Second,
in markets with naïve consumers, advertising content is more likely to shroud
negative product information. Finally, in comparison to the loss-leader literature
reviewed in Section 5.4, a new prediction is that loss-leader behavior (e.g., a low
room rate with large markups on extra services) is used by profit-maximizing
firms, even when it is costless for firms to make commitments as to add-on prices.
Recent work in neuroscience suggests that human behavior is the outcome of
an interaction between distinct neural systems. McClure et al (2004a) use func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging and report evidence that parts of the limbic
system are activated by decisions involving immediately available rewards while
regions of the prefrontal cortex are engaged by intertemporal choices. This work
provides neurological support for models in which decision makers use a hyperbolic
discounting function. More generally, as McClure et al (2004a, p. 506) explain,
recent imaging studies “suggest that human behavior is often governed by a com-
petition between lower level, automatic processes that may reflect evolutionary
adaptations to particular environments, and the more recently evolved, uniquely
human capacity for abstract, domain-general reasoning and future planning.”
The imaging studies motivate new two-system models of decision making.
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2004) develop a model in which decisions reflect
an interaction between a deliberative system that assesses options using a goal-
advertising may impact consumers’ assessments as to the popularity of a brand, while the latter
paper oﬀers a formalization of Nelson’s (1974b) memory-activation role for advertising (see
footnote 13 and Section 6.2).
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based perspective and an aﬀective system that encompasses emotions and moti-
vational drives. Environmental stimuli might activate one or both systems. With
the exertion of willpower (cognitive eﬀort), which is a scarce neural resource,
the deliberative system may partially override the aﬀective system. Formally,
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue represent the decision-making process as a kind of
principal-agent model. The deliberative system (the principal) chooses behavior
to maximize its objective function subject to the constraint that it must incur
the cost of exerting the willpower that is required to get the aﬀective system (the
agent) to carry out the chosen behavior.157 Focusing on addiction, Bernheim and
Rangel (2004) develop a related model in which the brain can operate in a “cold
mode” or a “hot mode.” At a broad level, the cold (hot) mode is analogous to the
deliberative (aﬀective) system. In the Bernheim-Rangel model, however, at any
given point in time, either the cold mode or the hot mode is in total control. The
model is also dynamic: when an individual makes a decision in the cold mode, he
takes into account the associated probability that cues will be encountered that
trigger hot modes in the future.
In such two-system models, what is the appropriate measure of decision-maker
welfare? Loewenstein and O’Donoghue suggest that the deliberative system objec-
tive function guide welfare calculations, but they oﬀer arguments for and against
including the cost of exerting willpower. Bernheim and Rangel, on the other
hand, unambiguously recommend that welfare be measured using cold-state pref-
erences. In their view, hot-mode decisions are cue-triggered errors that correspond
to imperfections in the process by which the brain delivers choices.
What has this to do with advertising? As Braithwaite, Robinson and other
persuasive-view advocates argued long ago, advertising is often designed to elicit
emotions and motivational drives. In other words, advertising content may be
designed to serve as an environmental cue that activates the aﬀective/hot-mode
system. If advertising indeed plays this role, then it may be possible to use models
similar to those just described and reconsider the welfare eﬀects of persuasive
advertising. For example, in the Dixit-Norman (1978) model reviewed in Section
4, the pre-advertising (post-advertising) demand curve may be broadly associated
with the deliberative system or the cold mode (the aﬀective system or the hot
mode). These models may also give rise to new rationales for bans on advertising
of addictive products. More generally, as further advances are achieved in the
analysis of two-system models, important new tools may be created for positive
and normative analyses of advertising.
157For further discussion of self-control and willpower, see Benabou and Tirole (2004).
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Neurological studies may also provide insight into the elusive concept of brand
loyalty. McClure et al (2004b) oﬀer a first study of this kind. In a blind taste
test, they find that subjects split equally in their preferences for Coke and Pepsi.
When one cup was labeled “Coke,” however, individuals showed a significant
bias for the labeled cup (even though the unlabeled cup also contained Coke);
further, when the subjects were informed that they were drinking Coke, brain
regions associated with memory were activated. By contrast, brand knowledge
of Pepsi did not have similar eﬀects on choice or brain activity. This study gives
striking neurophysiological evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that
some consumers exhibit brand loyalty toward Coke. The full implications of this
study are not yet clear; however, it does at least raise the possibility that future
neurological studies may provide important and novel insight as to when and how
advertising may instill brand loyalty.
10.3. Other Topics
Advertising is a huge research area, with key contributions from various disciplines
including economics, marketing, psychology, neuroscience and political science.
Clearly, it is not possible to summarize all of this work in one survey. Here, I
simply mention a few omitted topics and oﬀer suggestions for further reading.
First, I largely ignore the literature that considers the economic consequences
of laws against deceptive advertising. Pitofsky (1978) describes the rationale be-
hind the government regulation of truth-in-advertising. Sauer and Leﬄer (1990)
provide an empirical assessment of the implications of such regulation for adver-
tising content. In a recent eﬀort, Barigozzi et al (2002) show that laws concerning
the veracity of comparative advertisements can enhance the signaling potential of
advertising. Second, I ignore many aspects of advertising that are emphasized in
other social sciences. Advertising plays an important role in political contests, for
example. For recent work of this kind, see Coate (2004) and Prat (2002). Finally,
the success of a given ad depends in part on the associations that it triggers in
consumers’ minds and thus hinges on specific psychological considerations that
are not considered here. For research of this kind, see Kardes (2002).
10.4. Summary
I discuss in this section two new directions for advertising research. First, recent
work returns to a long-standing research topic and analyzes the role of advertising
in media markets. This work highlights the two-sided nature of the media mar-
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ket, and provides novel insights regarding the endogenous determination of the
price of advertising and the potential welfare consequences of advertising. Second,
recent work also considers the implications of findings in the fields of behavioral
economics and neuroeconomics for advertising research. This work is just getting
underway but already oﬀers striking new perspectives on persuasive advertising
and brand loyalty.
11. Conclusion
This survey is written with two objectives in mind. A first objective is to sum-
marize the economic analysis of advertising in a way that brings to the surface
the more essential contributions and thereby clarifies what is known. To this end,
I describe these contributions and summarize the main theoretical and empirical
findings. These summaries are found at the close of the various sections (and
subsections) above.
The second objective is to clarify how this knowledge has been obtained.
Throughout the last century, advertising has provided the field with a number
of important and diﬃcult questions, including: Why do consumers respond to
advertising? Does advertising reinforce consumer experiences and deter entry?
What is the relationship between advertising and concentration, profit, price and
quality? Does the market provide too much advertising? With every method-
ological innovation in the field of industrial organization, economists have turned
to these and other questions, demonstrating the additional insight that their new
approach aﬀords. In eﬀect, advertising represents a case study with which to
assess the progress gained as industrial organization methods have evolved.
But has progress been achieved? As a body, the research summarized in this
survey makes a strong case for an aﬃrmative answer. The progress achieved
takes several forms. In some cases, progress is destructive in nature, as when
recent studies reject the simplistic and often absolutist conclusions put forth by
some key early contributors. In other cases, progress is constructive and reflects
the discovery of new evidence and the generation of novel insights. Finally, with
the development of new data sets and advances in econometric techniques and
theoretical models, substantial progress is evident at a methodological level. At
the same time, one must not get carried away. While much has been learned, the
economic implications of advertising are subtle and controversial, and many of
the most important questions remain unresolved.
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